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TITLE: PALESTINE : PALESTINE REFUGEES : BRITISH
POLICY.

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File No.

EE 18/12

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Reference.....

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- 5 APR 1955

Mr. Modre

AM 17.2

Planning Staff

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Mr. Thomson

16/2

You may like to see the two attached papers:-

- (a) an address by Mr. John Reddaway, Deputy Commissioner-General of UNRWA, to the British Council for Aid to Refugees;
- (b) a paper by Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, which he left with Lord Caradon.

EF 18/12 ②

These papers are of interest both on their own account, and by way of comparison with Sir R. Beaumont's paper on the same subject. Both see any eventual solution of the Palestine Refugee problem as being a combination of repatriation, resettlement in the surrounding Arab countries and resettlement elsewhere abroad; this being combined with compensation either to those giving up the right of repatriation or to all the Palestine Arab refugees. These are in fact, the same elements to which Sir R. Beaumont looked for a solution of the problem.

2. Taking (a) first, Mr. Reddaway's ideas are generally very much in line with our own. As is perhaps to be expected from an UNRWA official, he lays rather more stress than either Sir R. Beaumont or Prince Sadruddin on what has already been achieved. He vigorously and on the whole convincingly, rebuts allegations that the Refugees have all been living in idleness and that they have been used as a pawn by the Arab host governments to the detriment of the refugees own real interests (pages 7 to 11). His contention is that great progress has been made in the individual rehabilitation of refugees, thus enabling them to perform a useful function in the communities in which they are living. There is no doubt much in this, though it does not alter the fact that this individual rehabilitation has not lessened the financial burden on UNRWA and consequently on the United States and the United Kingdom.

3. The two points on which Mr. Reddaway has something definitely different or new to say are (a) his suggestion that there should no longer be a link between the right to receive compensation and renunciation of the right to repatriation (pages 20 to 22); and (b) public recognition on the part of western governments, particularly Great Britain and the United States that "a great and grievous wrong was done to the Arab people of Palestine in the course of the events of the past 50 years" (page 23). This latter idea is also to be found in Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard's paper for the British Council of Churches (paragraphs 20 and 81).

4. As regards (a) I am sceptical of the advantage of now going for unconditional compensation for the Refugees (i.e. without renunciation of repatriation), as I find it difficult to believe that the Israelis would play their full part in a compensation scheme,

/unless

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unless they were assured that those who were getting compensation were extinguishing thereby their right to return to Israel. I can, however, see the argument for (b) on the grounds that this is a necessary step towards the psychological rehabilitation of the Arab refugees. There might, I suppose, be a danger that some sort of public recognition of this kind of a wrong done to the Arabs might be used to buttress claims for compensation to be laid against H.M.G. by those who have lost land, etc., in what is now Israel. If it ever came therefore, to serious consideration of this idea, Legal Advisers would have to be brought in at a very early stage to see whether a form of words could be found which would not extend H.M.G.'s legal liabilities in connexion with termination of the mandate.

5. Prince Sadruddin's paper points rather more to the deficiencies of the present situation than to the success of UNRWA in achieving a measure of individual rehabilitation. He takes what may be a realistic view in not expecting much from the Israelis on repatriation and, therefore, he turns his attention in some detail to what would be possible by way of resettlement in the area and of emigration overseas. It is impossible to say at present whether the assumptions he makes in working out his plans will in fact be valid. At first sight, however, he seems to expect rather more than I should have thought was realistic from emigration of Palestinian Arabs overseas. I wonder, for example, whether he has chapter and verse for his statement (on page 15) "that Australia would be extremely interested to receive a very large number of Palestinians into their country". He also seems to expect a good deal of the United States, Canada and the Latin American countries and he takes the view that quite a large number, particularly of the younger refugees would be prepared to move away from the Middle East. His scheme also contemplates Syria being willing to take an additional 250,000 refugees, a proposition which seems at best doubtful in the present circumstances. However, he has at least got down to working out some details and no doubt if he were ever given the job of putting through an internationally backed plan, he would modify the details in the light of the situation at the time.

J. C. Moberly

(J. C. Moberly)
5 February, 1968.

*With regard to Mr. Reddaway's
two suggestions (para 3 & 4 of
Mr. Moberly's minute) I think the
I might have suggested individual*

/ declaration

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declarations of renunciation of
rights, provided a settlement
of the refugee problem was in
the context of a settlement of
the Arab Israel problem as a
whole agreed to by Arab Govts.

Mr. Redaway's proposal for
"recognition of the war"
done to the Arab people of
Palestine has merit, but I would
prefer to put it as "recognition
of the war suffered". The Arab. I
like many other people, have had
a raw deal but it has been
at the hands of history rather
than of the powers. A. Mr. Redaway
says the phrasing would need
careful thought.

Palestine

A.R. 17
5.2

Mr. David
Mr. Davis
A. R. 17
5.2

CONFIDENTIAL

Reg Jones
22-1



UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 Third Avenue, NEW YORK, N.Y.

(1827/250/67)

29 December, 1967.

EE 18/12

Dear John,

Palestine Refugees

The Minister of State wrote to Sir Richard Beaumont about three weeks ago saying that Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, might call in on him on his way back from New York to Geneva, for a talk on his ideas about the longer term prospects for the refugees.

... 2. I do not know whether Sadruddin found time to call. However I enclose a photostat of a memorandum on the problem which he left with Lord Caradon on 1 December, saying he had not shown it to others. The basic assumption behind the memorandum is political willingness on the part of the Arabs generally to bless large resettlement schemes financed by others outside Palestine.

Yours ever,
Stephen
(S. L. Egerton)

J. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

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PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

Any endeavour to find a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, which is now nearly twenty years old, must take into account the historical background and the mental condition of the refugees themselves.

It will be recalled that, after the hostilities of 1948, some 700,000 Palestinians fled from Palestine on the eve of the creation of the new State of Israel and sought asylum in the surrounding areas of Gaza, Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria. Some time after, when it appeared that no early solution would be found to the problem, a new United Nations Organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), was created to deal with the problem. It is rather important to recall the Mandate of UNRWA as, from time to time, the Organization has been criticized for failing to find a solution to the problem.

PART I - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF UNRWA

The new Agency began actual operations on 1 May 1950. It was assumed that UNRWA would be a purely temporary organization and that the relief problem would soon be solved, especially with the inauguration of the three-year reintegration programme in 1952. This objective was not achieved and the UNRWA Mandate was therefore renewed periodically for different periods, in the hope that time would heal the wounds and permit a serious possibility of a solution to the problem.

With the help and co-operation of the Arab host-governments, UNRWA carried out a dual task of :

- a) providing the refugees with food, clothing, shelter, health care, education and welfare services, and
- b) assisting them to become self-supporting and productive.

While the UNRWA Mandate authorized the Agency to engage in works projects, large scale projects generally proved unsuccessful.

For operational purposes, UNRWA considers as eligible for assistance "those refugees who resided in Palestine for a minimum of two years prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 1948, who lost their homes and their means

of livelihood, who are in need, and who now reside in one of the countries in which UNRWA is providing relief, as well as children of such refugees, wherever born.¹⁾ The UNRWA working definition was designed solely for the determination of eligibility for relief. For the purposes of repatriation or compensation, as envisaged in General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the term "Palestine refugee" is used with a different, less restrictive meaning."²⁾

It is clear therefore that, although there was a hope that UNRWA might partially solve the problem, in fact the number of refugees now under the care of that Organization, i.e. some 1,300,000 is greater than the original problem of 1948.

Whilst all of what has been said above and some of what will be said later is well known, it is important to recall the past and so, get the whole subject into perspective in order that any endeavour to find a solution to the problem will carefully take into account what has so far been tried, what made attempts to solve the problem difficult, if not impossible, and so perhaps give some guide-lines which would ensure that any mistakes of the past were noted and avoided in the future.

Perhaps the fundamental mistake made in the creation of UNRWA was to guarantee as a right, i.e. without any means-test, food, medical attention and education for all who could claim to have left Palestine in July 1948. This decision has made it possible for even those thousands of people who have employment not only to live in UNRWA settlements, but to draw rations for themselves and their families and take advantage of educational and medical facilities indefinitely. It is often said that the real problem of the Palestinian refugees is a political one. This, of course, is largely true, but any endeavour to solve it which does not take into account the psychological and present mental condition of the refugees themselves could

1) This definition, which was developed on the basis of experience under the UNRPR (1950), dates from the period of 1950-1951, and has undergone a number of refinements. It excluded some 317,000 "other claimants" to relief (about 182,000 frontier villagers in Jordan, 100,000 non-refugee poor in the Gaza Strip, 10,000 refugees in Egypt, 11,000 Bedouins, and 14,000 Jerusalem poor), leaving aside about 155,000 children (1962), whose eligibility was not in doubt, but who had not been registered for rations because of the reluctance of refugees to submit to verification of the existence and eligibility of those already on the ration rolls.

2) Extract from UNRWA REVIEWS, Information Paper No.1, September 1962.

easily be doomed to failure. One must realize that, although many of us might consider the life of the Palestinian refugee to be a futile, useless waste of life, for the great majority of the group it is not such a bad life since food, some clothing, blankets, medical attention and education are available without effort or cost. When one realizes that the vast number of the citizens of the countries which offer Palestinian refugees asylum would be materially greatly better off if they were Palestinian refugees, one begins to see the magnitude of the human problem. It might well be, therefore, that the political solution will be easier than the human one. With all this in mind, it is necessary to approach the refugees in an understanding, sympathetic but firm way. It would be wrong to assume that all of them are unhappy with their present lot and desire a new life where responsibilities and duties would appear for the first time in two generations. It would therefore be unrealistic to assume that some magic formula can be found whereby more than one million people would suddenly feel the need to cooperate with an agency which would in fact have, as its objectives, finding for them a way of living which would end the system of hand-outs to which they have become accustomed and has now lasted for nearly twenty years.

It might also be useful to recall in summary some of the efforts of UNRWA to solve the problem by encouraging groups of refugees to become self-supporting. As early as 1951, the international community concerned itself with the possibility of large scale settlement projects in the area. Thus from the earliest days of UNRWA, there was concern for the solution of the refugee problem and an Economic Survey Mission made a report. It is interesting to note the following remarks ¹⁾ :

"Despite the caution of the Economic Survey Mission concerning the 'folly and frustration' of undertaking large-scale development projects, since the area was not prepared for them, on 26 January 1952, a three-year \$200,000,000 development programme, which pointed toward an early solution of the refugee problem, through 'reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement', was inaugurated. Under this programme several projects were initiated, including those for the irrigation of the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley and the development of a selected area in the Sinai Peninsula with water from the Nile River and, by 1953, an expenditure of some \$111,000,000 was charted. It was hoped that these projects would offer opportunities for between

1) Extract from UNRWA REVIEWS, Information Paper No.1 September 1962.

150,000 and 200,000 refugees to become self-supporting. But, by 1954, only \$7,000,000 of the reintegration fund had been expended and it was estimated that, at best, it would take some years before the major projects would assist a substantial number of refugees to become self-supporting - in the case of the Sinai project, as much as fourteen years. There was little progress in this field when, in December 1954, the UNRWA Mandate was renewed for a five-year period until 30 June 1960. The programme was substantially at an end even before 1957, when UNRWA had expended some \$37,676,327 of the reintegration fund on self-support programmes, under which 23,797 names had been removed permanently, and 140,279 temporarily from the relief rolls.

"Among the reasons for the failure to achieve more substantial results in these efforts were the absence of a solution of the Palestine problem along the lines of General Assembly resolutions concerning repatriation and compensation, the unsettled conditions in the Middle East during this period, the meagreness of the resources actually available for works-projects¹⁾ and the attitude of the refugees and governments in the area. While some \$45,069,528 had been spent on self-support programmes (including education) by June 1958, there was no longer any question of large development projects, and early in 1958 when, for lack of funds, all new projects had to be suspended there was much doubt whether UNRWA would have sufficient funds even to carry out its education programme. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, on 15 June 1959, made broad proposals for economic development, and stressed the necessity of overcoming political difficulties involved in the Palestine problem, questions of inter-Arab relationships, and the issue of Arab economic co-operation. The Secretary-General noted that reintegration of some one million refugees into the productive life of the Middle East (Arab countries and Israel) presented problems similar to those involved in all cases of reintegration of a largely unemployed population into economic life, whatever the area. The process would require capital in the form of agricultural and industrial investment, but the Secretary-General stressed that the refugee problem was essentially a great human problem and, provided the world were willing to assist in economic development, the perspective was not discouraging. In response to the Secretary-General's proposals, the Arab Governments, while not rejecting the principle of economic development per se, emphasised the right of the refugees to return to their homeland.

1) In its Resolution 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, the General Assembly decided to retain the rehabilitation fund, but as the UNRWA Director, Mr. Henry R. Labouisse emphasised in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on 23 February 1957, while there was a fund of \$/ 200,000,000 approved in principle on 26 January 1952, in fact there never was such a fund in the sense of ready cash, and UNRWA never had "that money".

"The experience of the past decade suggests that rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees, by the means envisaged in the large-scale projects, on which so much apparently fruitless effort was expended in the early years by the Agency, has proved to be a much more difficult and much longer-term task than was at first thought. Among other things, 'works' projects which appeared to look towards resettlement were unacceptable in principle to the refugees and, more generally to the Arab people and the Arab Governments, on the grounds that action of this kind would be contrary to the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) concerning repatriation and compensation. The host countries possessed limited natural resources and were already faced with grave problems in providing a livelihood for their own rapidly growing populations. There were thus serious social and economic obstacles, which stood in the way of large-scale refugee employment, leaving other considerations aside. Lack of the necessary skills and the relatively modest rate at which new jobs were created, generally, in the Middle East in the period since 1950 were additional factors.

"From the very beginning of its work in 1950, UNRWA had also undertaken a number of smaller self-support projects. In 1950, for example, it had considered a programme of small loans to help individuals or groups to become self-supporting, and in 1951 the Jordan Development Bank was inaugurated partly in this interest. By March 1962, the Bank had made 685 loans in agriculture, industry and building, in the amount of \$2,837,772 and it was estimated that some 13,000 refugees had benefited from its projects, with more than 3,000 directly employed."

It can be seen from the above that, with the encouragement of the General Assembly and the support of the Arab Representatives at the General Assembly, a number of large-scale works projects and other self-support projects were worked out in great detail by UNRWA and some of them implemented. But the Arab States, who did not oppose economic development, nevertheless, insisted that reintegration did not signify the permanent resettlement of the refugees away from their homes.

The last report of UNRWA presented to the General Assembly for the period ending 30 June 1966 (document A/6313) indicates little progress and, among other things, states :

"As year succeeds year, there is no sign that the refugees are becoming any less embittered by their conviction that a grave injustice has been done to them through the loss of their homes and country and the continued deprivation of any benefit from the property they left behind. The implications for peace and stability in the Middle East of the continued existence of the Palestine refugee problem thus remain as grave as ever."

PART II - REPATRIATION and/or COMPENSATION

Before turning to how a new effort might be made to solve the Palestine refugee problem, it is extremely important to review, even if briefly, the subject of Repatriation and Compensation.

From the earliest days this subject has been under consideration and Resolution 194 (III) adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948 referred to it as follows :

"... 11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;"

Most subsequent resolutions have referred to this matter and two more recent ones are quoted to indicate that the subject has continued to be considered important, although clearly no progress whatsoever has been made on the subject. Resolution 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961 says, amongst other things :

"Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet been able to report progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again requests the Commission to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon not later than 15 October 1961;"

Resolution 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 states :

"Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern."

When considering the whole problem of repatriation and/or compensation a number of important factors must be taken into account. First of all, the General Assembly appears to have paid a great deal of lip-service to the problem, but does not appear to have come to grips with the problem in any vital way. A number of reasons could well be given for this state of affairs.

First of all, as the years passed, the idea of repatriation became less and less a reality and what was really meant by "repatriation" was, in effect, resettlement in Israel. This is a most important fact to note, as by and large any Palestinian refugee electing to return would be returning to a country which was steadily developing a culture and a way of life and language completely foreign to him. In addition, when Israel talked of "repatriation", she also tended to think of accepting into her country strangers who would not be returning home, but who would be offered an opportunity to settle in the new Israel. These factors are fundamental to the whole consideration of the idea of "repatriation". It is also well-known that Israel, whilst considering the possibility of accepting the return of some of the Palestinian refugees, has also expressed the fear that too large a number of returnees would present a serious security problem and might well be an invitation to the creation of an organized "Fifth Column" within the territory. There has therefore been no really great effort on either side to pursue in any serious way major "repatriation".

The subject of compensation, too, is fraught with many facets. The Conciliation Commission undertook a major review of the whole subject of compensation. No final report was ever made public. It has been said that the real reason for this was that all Palestinian refugees claimed to have been the owners of the land on which they worked, even when some thousands of them were in fact only workers on estates and not at all owners. The amount of land therefore claimed to be the property of the Palestinian refugees became enormous and it has been jokingly said that Palestine must have stretched from the Mediterranean to Ur of the Chaldees. Although this may be considered somewhat facetious, it is significant that no final report on the subject was published. It is also fairly well-known that some of the Palestinian land-owners settled their problems privately and even secretly in the capitals of Beirut, Paris, London and Rome, to mention only a few. These land-owners obviously did not wish any of the refugees to know of these settlements but

any serious attempt at compensation for the refugees would undoubtedly stir up a lot of dust which would be embarrassing for both sides.

With this little background it is therefore obvious that it is easy to talk about compensation but rather difficult to determine who has to be compensated for what. In reviewing the major refugee problems of the last twenty years, it is rather sad to note that to-date no organization has been able to arrange that any refugees were compensated for their properties and belongings left behind. True it may be said that the Palestinian refugee problem is different. One might argue however that the real difference has been that the solution to the problem has been tackled in a different way from the others and that the General Assembly on so many occasions resolved to deal with the problem of compensation and repatriation. In various debates in the General Assembly, Israel has tended to be more generous in her words on the subject of compensation rather than on repatriation. But all the statements have tended to have, as a prerequisite, a political solution to the problem based on the acceptance by the surrounding States and the refugees themselves of the State of Israel.

In conclusion, and assuming that it would be impossible to determine in any realistic fashion who was entitled to what in terms of compensation, it might be argued that an amount of so many dollars be paid to each refugee. One should remember, however, that 1,300,000 refugees multiplied by any significant sum of money would add up to an enormous sum of money.

PART III - NEW APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

One should not assume therefore that UNRWA was not competent or made no effort at finding a permanent solution for the Palestinian refugees. If the three major projects referred to above had been implemented, it was confidently expected that at least 300,000 refugees would have been permanently settled in the Middle East. When it became clear that the major development plans would not be implemented, the Director of UNRWA proposed to carry out a number of self-support projects and a wide expansion of the education programme to include a large vocational training programme in the Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and the Gaza Strip.

In the course of the following years, some 45 million dollars were expended on this programme but, as a result of the stalemate which tended

to occur after the 1956 War in the area, even some of the smaller settlements started to disintegrate and there is now little to show for the 45 million dollars, except vocational training schools which have provided a permanent asset to the area and which could be exploited with greater effort if a political solution could be found to the basic problem.

It would probably be unwise to terminate the services of UNRWA as such an action, however well-intentioned, would most probably create major despair in the minds of the refugees and suspicion on the part of the host-governments. It might be much better to revise the Mandate of UNRWA and to ask them to confine their activities to the provision of relief, health and educational services whilst a new organization was created to syphon off groups of refugees for whom an acceptable permanent solution had been developed. This in effect would mean a gradual but steady accelerating diminution in the work of UNRWA and a gradual but increasing effort on the part of the new agency to find permanent solutions not only in the area of asylum but in countries of emigration abroad. Whilst such an arrangement might well be cumbersome any endeavour to eliminate UNRWA entirely would probably result in opposition to the new agency which would be designed primarily to find permanent solutions for the refugees without taking care of them in the meantime. It would of course be possible to create a new agency with both functions; in fact that was the original UNRWA Mandate but, for political reasons, it never really got going on the permanent settlement part of its Mandate.

Again, however, all of this is really part of the background to the problem which should be taken into account when determining how best to approach the solution to the problem. UNRWA is so deeply entrenched in the Middle East that its demise might well be extremely counter-productive. On the other hand, its international image is so heavily weighted towards relief that it is difficult to imagine a realistic resurrection

In finding a solution to the problem one might well assume that more than half of the people, and especially the older group, would elect to stay in the Middle East, with the majority of the rest accepting attractive offers of emigration abroad. The solution to their problems will require to be diverse and convincing and presented in a way which simple people will understand and finally find attractive. Much will depend on the success of the first year. It might be useful in this first year to aim at the younger group

which, having had the advantages of vocational training, might be encouraged to go further afield than they have done so far to find employment and a new way of life. Because of political intrigues and tensions, most of the graduates of the UNRWA vocational training schools have, up till now, been employed either in the area itself or in the larger Middle East; few however have gone to the new world. (If some of the new graduates could find really good opportunities in countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada and the United States of America, a new vista would be opened up. In time, more and more, the refugees convinced not by the new organization but by the success of these early resettlement schemes, would look further afield and be attracted to follow and start afresh.

Concurrently with this resettlement endeavour, it would be wise to put under implementation some of the works projects which were developed by UNRWA for Jordan and the Sinai Desert some ten years ago, but which never were implemented because of political opposition by the countries of asylum. Such an action is imperative as, otherwise, the refugees will feel that the whole purpose of the new plan is to disperse them far from their own land and the culture which they know and still love. Every effort therefore should be made to offer a choice : Do you wish to settle in the Middle East with a view to become self-supporting, or do you prefer to move further afield into areas which have proven to be lands of new opportunity ?

The problem could be broadly broken down into two major parts :

- 1) the permanent local settlement of the older group in Jordan, the Lebanon, Syria and the Sinai Desert, and
- 2) a major migration effort on the scale of the International Refugee Organization (IRO).

1. Permanent local settlement in the area of asylum

In approaching the problem of permanent settlement in the area where the refugees now live, a number of important factors should be taken into account.

A number of well-defined and detailed project plans have already been engineered. These are in particular : The Development Plan for the Litani River Basin (Lebanon); the Northeast Sinai Project (United Arab Republic) The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Yarmuk-Jordan Valley Project and small-scale schemes in Jordan and Syria. Any of these projects could be implemented much more quickly than any completely new ones since these plans exist in great detail.

Before developing this theme further it might be wise to indicate the breakdown of the refugees as was last reported by UNRWA to the General Assembly in 1966. (No really reliable statistics are as yet available since the "Six Day War".)

Jordan	706,658
Lebanon	163,904
Syria	140,032
Gaza Strip	307,245
	<u>1,317,839</u>

The same Report shows that since 1950 to date there have been 560,915 births and 112,275 deaths.

In approaching the whole subject of the permanent local settlement in the present areas of asylum, it is of course impossible to forecast with any accuracy how many refugees will wish or can be settled in the various areas. It might be useful, however, to indicate on the basis of presently known projects, which were not implemented but which exist, what would be possible in the various areas if some of these projects were put under implementation. The following therefore is a summary of what might be possible in Jordan, the Lebanon, Syria and the Sinai Desert (Gaza Strip).

Jordan

A number of major project plans exist and in particular the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Yarmuk-Jordan Valley Project (Johnston Plan). During 1953-1955, the idea of the unified development of the water resources of the Jordan Valley was actively discussed with Israel and the Arab States. This plan was designed to irrigate some 936,000 dunums (244,000 acres) at an estimated cost of \$ 121,000,000, and to generate 167,000,000 kilowatt hours of electric power at an estimated cost of \$53,119,000. It was estimated that this project would provide an economic base for some 300,000 people. The resultant plan, submitted to UNRWA in July 1955, estimated that the undertaking would support 224,000 workers and their families in the Jordan Valley, 160,000 directly from agriculture, and 64,000 from ancillary employment, or 143,000 more than were employed in agriculture and ancillary occupations in the Jordan Valley in 1953. But it was noted that implementation of the plan would depend on "inter-governmental agreements" (Israel and the Arab States) which, up to that time, had not been reached. One result during this

period was that little further work was done on the development of the Yarmuk and Jordan Valleys pending the necessary political decisions. While certain smaller projects moved forward, neither political nor technical agreement was reached relative to the unified plan, largely because in the last analysis effective Arab-Israel collaboration was not possible.

If this project were put under implementation, 300,000 persons could easily be absorbed in gainful employment. Such a scheme would greatly alleviate the present over-population in Jordan. It is rather clear that this country cannot absorb 700,000 refugees. It would appear necessary therefore, even if the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley Project were implemented, that some 400,000 refugees would require to be moved elsewhere to find a self-supporting way of life. Many could be moved to Syria which, as mentioned hereafter, could easily absorb an additional 250,000 people. Some too could be resettled abroad.

Lebanon

The Government of the Republic of Lebanon has always felt that more than 100,000 of largely Moslem refugees, if permanently settled there, would tend to upset the religious balance of the country. 50,000 of these refugees could easily be settled in the Lebanon and in fact a considerable number of the refugees now in the Lebanon have already managed to find gainful employment and do not need any further international assistance.

Syria

Syria has probably the greatest potential of any of the host governments for the settlement of hundreds of thousands of additional people. It will be recalled that when Syria and Egypt joined together, there was a plan to transfer some one million Egyptians to the North-East of that country. It would appear, therefore entirely feasible to find gainful employment in Syria for an additional 250,000 refugees based on a major land reclamation project. A number of plans have been, from time to time, considered for Syria, one in particular being the Jezire Plain.

Already some 100,000 Palestinian refugees are known to be in gainful employment in Syria. An additional 250,000 could obviously be settled.

Gaza strip

The most hopeless group of Palestinian refugees is no doubt that situated in the Gaza Strip, as it is clearly quite impossible to find gainful employment on a strip of sand for some 300,000 people. It is therefore necessary to move

the vast majority of this number, some (probably a large number) to be resettled abroad and 50,000 could be settled in the Sinai desert under the Northeast Sinai Project. This project which has been studied and engineered was based on the following idea:

Billions of gallons of water from the Nile flow wastefully into the Mediterranean each year. This project envisaged a channelling of some of this water into the Sinai desert, thus providing major irrigation possibilities. The project would not have affected in any way the water needed by Egypt. Whilst the fundamental idea was irrigation of a large area of desert land, it was considered possible that many ancillary smaller projects could be developed and that some 50,000 people could find a viable life.

In 1956, the then Director, Mr. Harry Labouisse, discussed the implementation of the project with President Nasser. The President stated that he was not willing to agree to the implementation of the project before the Assouan dam project had been completed. This, in so far as UNRWA was concerned, was the end of the project. As indicated earlier, however, the project has been completely engineered and designed and could therefore be reviewed and represented for implementation rather quickly, if a positive political decision were taken.

In tackling this permanent settlement part of the problem, some bold decisions would obviously require to be taken. It is clearly obvious that any settlement of 300,000 people in the Gaza Strip is completely impractical. Also Jordan, even with extensive irrigation schemes, cannot provide a viable life for 700,000 refugees. The whole problem therefore must be approached with this clearly in mind as, otherwise, intrigues and emotional campaigns will tend to force the planners back to the status quo. No new organization should therefore accept responsibility for the solution to the Palestinian refugee problem without laying down some well defined limits as to what is possible in each of the present regions. This would probably be the starting point for the whole plan of action.

In summary, if it proved possible to implement the ideas and projects outlined above for Jordan, the Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip, this action would result in permanent settlement in these areas in the following magnitude :

Jordan	350,000	
Lebanon	50,000	
Syria	350,000	(100,000 already there
Gaza	none	(250,000 to be moved there
Sinai Desert	50,000	
	<u>800,000</u>	

In conclusion, it would be useful to indicate that the order of magnitude of financial requirements for permanent local settlement would probably be some 1,000 dollars per person. Therefore the settlement of 800,000 persons would cost 800,000,000 dollars.

2. Permanent solution of problem through major migration efforts

If the local settlement plans were successful, 800,000 refugees would find a solution to their problems through this means. Since the problem at the moment concerns 1,300,000 refugees, solutions for some 500,000 people would have to be found in other ways. It is fairly well-known that a large number of the Palestinian refugees are already self-sufficient. It could safely be assumed, therefore, that, of these 500,000, 200,000 are already settled and do not require any action by any international organization.

This being said, it would mean that 300,000 persons would still remain and for whom solutions would require to be found. Their problems might very well be solved by emigration abroad. So far, comparatively very few refugees have emigrated abroad. However it is interesting to note that, in a Statistical Summary Bulletin issued by UNRWA in June 1960, the following statement appears :

"Overseas emigration assistance

"The Agency extended payment of transportation costs, averaging \$257, to 407 refugees who have obtained visas through their own efforts but had no funds to finance the journey. Of these, 167 went to the USA, 166 in Brazil, 18 to Canada, 17 to Chile, 9 to Venezuela, 8 to Colombia and 22 to other countries."

Assuming therefore that such a movement was annual and that the average movement over the last 20 years would have been in the neighbourhood of 300 persons per annum, some 6,000 persons would have emigrated abroad. It is, of course, well-known that there is a very large community of persons of Arab origin in Latin America. It would not be difficult for many more of the refugees to move to this part of the world and join with an already

existing and fairly prosperous community. In addition, many would find the same possibility in the United States of America, ^{and Canada.} Further, it is no secret that Australia would be extremely interested to receive a very large number of Palestinians into their country. A selection mission already exists in Beirut but to-date has of course not, in any official way, concerned itself with Palestinian refugees. It would not therefore seem impossible to assume that, if the wish existed in the minds of the refugees for resettlement abroad, it would be possible to resettle in Latin America, the United States of America, ^{Canada} and Australia 300,000 Palestinian refugees. Such a movement would of course be an enormous task, a task in size comparable, although in a smaller way, to that undertaken by the International Refugee Organization. It is well to recall that the IRO, with a world-wide network of offices and a large international staff, took almost 4 years to move 1,000,000 people.

. The vital key to any such movement, apart from the desire of the refugees to move and the wish of governments to have them, is the all important resettlement centres through which they are processed and from which they are ultimately moved. To handle such a caseload it would prove necessary to have at least two major resettlement centres, probably one in Beirut and the other in Port-Said. There would be no difficulty in establishing such centres as a great wealth of experience exists and many ex-IRO officers would be available to establish and operate efficiently such centres. No endeavour will be made here to work out any detailed plan, as this is obviously premature. It might be useful, however, to indicate the kind of money that might be required to transport, document and operate the transit centres. Assuming that 350 dollars will be expended on each refugee moved on an across-the board average basis, a sum of 105,000,000 dollars would be required to move 300,000 persons.

The time factor would certainly not be less than 3 years and it might take 5 years to complete such a major movement of people. This would be particularly so when one realizes that the first year could be devoted largely to planning and encouraging the refugees to consider resettlement abroad as a good solution to their problem.

PART IV - ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

In the last Report of UNRWA to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly (document A/6313) it was shown that the staff employed by them as at 31 December 1965 was as follows :

to about \$ 12,000,000 a year and directed the programme independent of the Headquarters of WHO and UNESCO. With this precedent in mind, every effort should be made to have the whole budget for the new effort under the control of one organization.

In reviewing the Mandate of UNRWA, it could well be argued that UNRWA, as it stands, if supported by the host governments and financed sufficiently by the international community, could tackle the problem. It should be remembered however that, over a period of 20 years, UNRWA, through little fault of its own, has tended to be regarded as a vast relief agency with little success in the field of large-scale permanent solutions. Therefore something new appears to be absolutely essential.

October 1967

ISRAEL AND THE ARABS

THE WAY FORWARD

INCLUDING SUMMARY OF
THE HISTORIC BACKGROUND
LESSONS LEARNT FROM RECENT WAR

BY

SIR ANTHONY BUZZARD

THE BRITISH COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

10 Eaton Gate, SW1

price 2/-

FOREWORD

This pamphlet is the result of a discussion of the Middle Eastern problem, which has been going on in an advisory sub-committee of the International Department of the British Council of Churches and the Conference of British Missionary Societies, since the end of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. The committee soon became convinced that there was need for a background paper summing up in a balanced way the facts of the Arab-Israeli situation and the essentials of the problem to be solved, and suggesting some of the steps which might be taken on the difficult road to a just settlement.

They, therefore, invited their Chairman—Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard—to undertake the task of writing such a paper. He has had the benefit of numerous consultations with authorities of various shades of opinion, and of the comments and criticisms of the members of his committee on the successive drafts that were submitted to them. The committee is in general agreement with the substance of the paper; but every member is not to be held responsible for every view expressed. Similarly, although the paper is published under the auspices of the British Council of Churches, it is not to be regarded as an official manifesto of the Council.

It may be added that this paper is complementary to an earlier one written by Sir Anthony Buzzard for the International Affairs Committee of the Board for Social Responsibility of the Church Assembly during the crisis immediately before the war (*The Middle East*, published by the Church Information Office, June 1967—price 1/-).

KENNETH SANSBURY, *Bishop*
General Secretary
British Council of Churches

ISRAEL AND THE ARABS

THE WAY FORWARD

1. **The overall aims** of any Christian or other impartial approach to the problems now besetting the Middle East would seem to be:—

- (a) To pursue justice and peace for the people of the area itself.
- (b) To ensure that activities in this key area help—not hinder—world order, East/West relations and North/South relations.
- (c) To provide freedom of conscience, worship and access to the Holy Places for all religions in the area.
- (d) To restore confidence in the U.N. and where possible develop it, or at least the moral and legal principles which lie behind it.

2. It is proposed to tackle the problem under three aspects:—

- I. The Historic Background.
- II. The Lessons Learnt from the recent war.
- III. The Way Forward.

3. It will be assumed that I and II are relevant only to the extent that they affect III.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4. Public reaction to the war has, in some countries—particularly Britain and America—disclosed a certain asymmetry in its understanding of the historic background of the Arab/Israeli confrontation. It has been comparatively easy to understand the Israel point of view. Jews were promised a “national home” in Palestine. This was approved by the League of Nations and incorporated in a mandate for Britain to implement. A State of Israel has been recognized by the U.N. for nineteen years. Yet the Arabs have refused to recognize this, attacked Israel in 1948, threatened her with words, raids and war ever since, boycotted her trade, denied her the use of the Suez Canal, and then this year closed the Straits of Tiran to her, mobilized their forces around her, and threatened her with extinction if she challenged them.

5. The Arab point of view is less well-known and more complex. The operative part of our Balfour Declaration in 1917 read as follows:—“HMG view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

6. A year later Lord Allenby, commanding our forces operating against Turkey in Palestine declared that “the goal envisaged . . . is the complete and final liberation of the people who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of National Governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations”. Later he went on to say “their only concern is to offer such support and efficacious help as will ensure the smooth working of the governments and the administrations which those populations will have elected on their own free wills to have”.

7. Similar sentiments were expressed by America’s President Wilson at the end of World War I.

8. When King Hussein of the Hejaz—the then leader of the Middle East Arabs—asked for an elucidation of British policy our representative—Commander Hogarth—assured him “that since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and in as much as HMG view with favour the realization of this aspiration, HMG are determined that insofar as is compatible with freedom of existing populations, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realization of this ideal”. King Hussein apparently accepted this statement as safeguarding the political freedom of the Arabs in the Palestine area.

9. At the time 93 per cent of the Palestinian population were Arabs and 7 per cent Jews.
10. Our efforts to fulfil our promises to both Arabs and Jews by limiting Jewish immigration were largely defeated by the flood of Jews to Palestine caused by Hitler's persecution of them during the thirties. This was aggravated by America's immigration quota system which excluded many Jews wishing to go there.
11. Nevertheless in 1939 a British White Paper stated that HMG had never contemplated the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine and reiterated many previous official announcements to the effect that it had never been British policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state. It added (albeit with criticism from the League of Nations mandate commission) that a further seventy-five thousand Jews should be admitted during the next five years, after which there would be no more immigration unless the Arabs of Palestine were to agree.
12. After the second World War, however, Britain and America recommended the admission of 100,000 Jews and, disregarding Arab opinion, Britain made plans for partitioning Palestine. Tension and terrorism increased on both sides, and the flight of Arabs from their homes began. When it became clear that partition could only be imposed by force, Britain—encouraged by America—resigned the mandate which she had held under the League of Nations and withdrew, leaving quite inadequate administrative arrangements.
13. Thereafter the U.N. adopted a Partition Plan, which was accepted by the Jews but refused by the Arabs. Jerusalem was to be internationalized. In May 1948 came the Zionist declaration of the independent State of Israel, by which time the Arabs were attacking her and suffered the first of their defeats.
14. At the subsequent armistice, Israel was left with 23 per cent more territory than under the partition plan, Jerusalem became divided, and the Arab refugees in Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip had increased to about $\frac{3}{4}$ million.
15. Although a U.N. Resolution of December 1948 demanded of Israel that "refugees wishing to return home and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date; compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return", the resolution also included points covering a final settlement and access to Holy Places. And since the Arabs would not recognize Israel, allow her Jews access to their Wailing Wall or encourage the refugees to "live in peace" if they returned, the tragic refugee problem remained unsolved. Indeed Arab leaders used it to register their resentment of the Israeli State being established in the face of our former promises.

16. From 1948 onwards the Arabs, maintaining the state of belligerency, boycotted Israeli trade and denied her the use of the Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, until in 1956 the Egyptian nationalization of the Canal and build up in Sinai was followed by the Franco/British/Israel attacks and the second Arab defeat. It was of course Israel's withdrawal after this that left the U.N.E.F. precariously holding open the Straits of Tiran, until its abrupt removal by the Egyptians in May 1967.

17. Meanwhile, with continuing Jewish immigration into Israel (including maltreated Jews from Arab countries), and Israel's openly professed task of "the ingathering of the exiles of the Jewish people in its homeland, speeding up 'Aliya' from all countries and classes", the Arabs also harbour an inherent fear of perpetual Zionist expansion.

18. It is sometimes argued that the surrender of such a small proportion of Arab territory was a reasonable price for them to pay for our freeing them from Turkish bondage, that our promises of self-determination for the Arabs had been made under pressure of war conditions, and that a Jewish home and nation for a persecuted race was a real human need which for deep religious and historic reasons Palestine could best meet.

19. The fact remains however, that whatever one's judgment of these matters, the Arabs still deeply resent the injustices resulting from the unfulfilled promises which we repeatedly made to them in the past, and greatly fear that Zionism is expansionist—a threat which seems to them to be confirmed by the territory occupied in the 1948 War, the attacks suffered in 1956, and now the further territory occupied in 1967. They consider their threats and use of force in trying to expel the Israelis are justified by the original British, and later Israeli use of force in imposing the Jewish state on their territory. And they feel that this has generally been done with strong support and encouragement from America and the West for "Imperialistic" and strategic reasons.

20. However justified or otherwise this Arab attitude is considered to be, any attempt to help solve the Middle East problem now which fails to recognize and understand their deep sense of injustices of the past and of fears for the future would be intolerably superficial. Moreover we British and to a lesser extent Americans should recognize our share of responsibility for the tragedy and suffering of the present situation. This is additionally necessary for Christians because the majority of indigenous Christians in Palestine are Arabs.

21. All this should and can be done without in any way condoning the misdeeds of Arab leaders, without denying the legitimate rights and fears of Israel and without implying that the clocks should be put back to 1917, which would not be the least of the evils facing us today, nor the course most likely to lead to justice and peace now.

II. LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE RECENT WAR

22. **The Tiran Straits Crisis** probably arose as a result of:—

- (a) Increasingly violent raids by Syria over the last year, encouraged by Russia;
- (b) Increasingly vigorous—if not excessive—Israeli reprisals, leading to the destruction of a Jordanian village last November and the shooting down of Syrian fighters over Syria in April; and Eshkol's Statement on 14th May: "We shall choose the time, the place and the means to counter the aggressor";
- (c) Failure of the Security Council to deal with these threats to peace;
- (d) Exaggerated Russian and Syrian reports of an Israeli build-up against Syria in May, to deter which (in compliance with his Defence pact), and to boost his leadership, Nasser mobilized in Sinai and demanded the U.N.E.F. removal;
- (e) U Thant's perhaps, too ready acceptance of the U.N.E.F. removal. (But our 1956 Security Council Veto caused the U.N.E.F. to be set up by the General Assembly instead, and so to be dependent upon "host" approval only; and Israel refused U.N.E.F. on their side in 1956, and refused its transfer from Egypt to her side in May 1967, though this would not have affected the Tiran Straits);
- (f) American, British and French failure to see the situation developing, or to provide any guarantees to replace the Anglo/American/French Tripartite declaration which had guaranteed Arab/Israeli frontiers until 1956, when Britain renounced it;
- (g) Nasser's Statement on 22nd May: "under no circumstances will we allow the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba. The Jews threaten war. We tell them you are welcome. We are ready for war."

23. **The war which broke out fourteen days later (5th June)** probably resulted from:

- (a) Russia's accusation on 23rd May of imperialistic support for Israel's threatened "large scale punitive operations" and "decisive blow" at Syria, and her intention to oppose any "aggression in the Near East".
- (b) The failure of the great powers to meet Israel's demand of 23rd May to open the Tiran Straits (doubtless influenced by (a) above and by America's commitment in Vietnam).

- (c) Russia's refusal in the Security Council on 24th May to accept America's proposal for a Four-Power effort to restore and maintain peace in the Middle East, and the Security Council's resulting inability to take action.
- (d) The failure of the Maritime Powers to act in time or in sufficient numbers to open the Tiran Straits.
- (e) Nasser's statement on 26th May: "If Israel starts aggressive action . . . it will mean total war*", with the main objective to destroy Israel."
- (f) King Hussein's Defence Pact with Nasser on 30th May, followed shortly by Iraq, and later by the despatch of forces from Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
- (g) France's declaration of neutrality on 2nd June.
- (h) The addition of General Dayan and Mr. Beigin to the Israeli Government, which—in the crucial Cabinet meeting of 3rd June—almost certainly strengthened the feeling that Israel could wait no longer.
- (i) Israel's surprise attack on 5th June, considered "pre-emptive" by her and "aggression" by the Arabs.

24. A **provisional conclusion** might be that Israel's action was due to her judgment, either:—

- (a) that the closure of the Tiran Straits warranted war, or
- (b) that she considered the time ripe generally for a single-handed victory against the Arabs before their strength and efficiency developed further, and while 50,000 Egyptians troops were in Yemen, or
- (c) that war was about to be made on her by the Arabs and that she was not going to receive the Western help needed to prevent defeat or grievous injury if she waited.

25. Of these, (a) would, surely, have been "disproportionate", since the Tiran Straits were not vital to Israel (only about 5 per cent of her trade used that route, though it was developing) and America had promised her oil through the Mediterranean. Nor did it appear to be a "last resort", for the Straits might well have been opened in due course. Moreover, in purely legal terms, the case against Nasser's right to close the Straits was by no means clear.

26. (b) could not, surely, be condoned, and seems very unlikely.

27. As to (c) it is possible that Nasser (with 50,000 troops away) did not intend to initiate war at this stage, and that he did—as he claims

* Referred to as a "Holy War" on another occasion.

—heed American and Russian pleas for restraint. On the other hand it is possible that he may have passed the point of no return. At all events the Israelis probably felt that assurances of Western support were not firm enough for them to be able to risk it.

Either, therefore, Israel went to war unjustly ((a) or (b) above) or—much more likely—for lack of adequate guarantees in relation to the risks involved in waiting. And in these risks was not only the possibility of the Arabs attacking but also:

- (a) the growing strength of Arab forces being gathered from afar;
- (b) the difficulty of maintaining the morale and readiness of Israel's mobilized "citizen" forces, without detriment to her economy;
- (c) most of all, the tactical advantage of getting in the first blow—particularly by surprise—against airfields.

29. As to guarantees of assistance, the Anglo/American/French Tripartite declaration had gone, and de Gaulle had declared France neutral. President Johnson reaffirmed America's traditional policy in "support of the independent and territorial integrity of Middle East states", but with Russia virtually committed to supporting the Arabs, Israel probably thought this unreliable, unless it was backed by a firmer secret assurance.

30. As for Britain, she failed to follow America's public declaration of "support of independence and territorial integrity", and she may or may not have given Israel some secret assurance. But a guarantee by her alone would probably not have been considered adequate anyway.

31. **The main lessons learnt seem to be:**

- (a) Inadequate political efforts to solve the basic issues, parallel to the U.N. patrolling of armistice lines.
- (b) A failure of the major powers to heed U Thant's warnings of the developing situation.
- (c) A lack of contingency planning by the U.N., including the major powers in the Security Council.
- (d) The inability of the Security Council to keep the peace without the timely agreement or acquiescence of America and Russia.
- (e) So long as Russia remains liable to commit herself to the Arabs only, an American guarantee of Israel is likely to be inadequate, and indeed to risk a clash of the two super powers and

world war. What seems really needed is a guarantee of frontiers by an "intermediate force" between the levels of UNEF and the two super powers, who should keep each other out of any direct involvement. Britain and Europe seem to offer the only possibility for such a force, but the political climate for its establishment and acceptance does not seem to exist yet.

- (f) The appalling *instability* of the Arab/Israel arms situation in which so much military advantage lay in striking first and by surprise. By example, if not by agreement, we must strive for better balance between defensive, stabilizing arms on the one hand and offensive, destabilizing arms on the other. Observation posts on airfields to guard against surprise attacks also seem necessary. The inherent vulnerability of Israel's previous frontiers also seems to call for demilitarized zones in the absence of assured guarantees.

III. THE WAY FORWARD

Refugees

32. The U.N. Assembly sent a representative—Mr. Gussing of Sweden—to report on this situation, after passing a resolution (116 votes to 0) which included a demand to ensure the safety and welfare of inhabitants where military operations had taken place, and to facilitate the return of those who fled. Mr. Brown demanded at the U.N. Assembly shortly after the war, that this should be done without waiting for a final settlement of the Arab/Israel issue. U Thant, in his Annual Report said that "people everywhere, and this certainly applies to the Palestinian refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future". All World and British Council of Churches Statements have emphasized the urgency of solving the refugee problem both new and old.

33. On the 15th September Mr. Gussing reported that about 350,000 refugees (including some 115,000 "old" refugees previously registered with UNWRA) left their homes in the areas of Syria, Egypt and Jordan now occupied by Israel.

34. He also reported that only when talks are initiated with Syria and Egypt, will Israel be prepared to discuss the return of *their* refugees. Of the 200,000 Jordanian refugees (about one-fifth of the total West Bank population), some 170,000 have applied to return, but as yet less than 20,000 have received Israeli permits to do so. So far, Israel has

only agreed to receive in addition to these, special hard cases and those wanting to return for reunification of families.

35. Unfortunately the recrudescence of Syrian raids on Israel, passing through Jordanian territory, and Amman's radio inciting returning refugees "to be a thorn in the flesh of Israel", has provided Israel with reasons for refusing the bulk of the West Bank refugees awaiting return. It is understood, however, that the Amman radio has now for sometime ceased its incitement, and the problem of dealing with Syrian and other infiltrators does not seem to be so difficult as to warrant refusing the 150,000 or so West Bank refugees facing the approach of winter in their tents on the East of Jordan.

36. Moreover with reports of young pioneer Israel farmers now being settled in the West Bank, and of Israeli ministers calling for more Jewish immigrants to settle in newly acquired territories, it is very difficult not to conclude that the Jordanian refugee problem is now being used as a bargaining counter for the final settlement, as is already so in the case of the Syrian and Egyptian refugees. Indeed, it provides fuel for Arab accusations that Israel appears to intend to retain most of the fertile areas of her newly acquired territory.

37. There are, however, indications that Israel is taking steps to rehabilitate those refugees under her control, and is preparing progressive development plans for the Jordan Waters, desalinization plants, etc., for which she—as well as the Arab countries—will want far more money than is at present available.

Aid for Refugees

38. Study of the financial aid subscribed to UNRWA over the years shows that:—

- (a) The bulk of it has come from America, with Britain's contribution roughly in proportion, having regard to our smaller resources and population.
- (b) The contributions from the rest of the Western European countries have been proportionately minute, their combined total being but a fraction of even the British contribution.
- (c) No contributions have been made by Russia or Eastern Europe.

39. Drawing attention to (b) above seems justified in view of Western Europe's comparative prosperity, its dependence on the Suez Canal and Middle East Oil, and the influence of its past Jewish policies on the Israeli/Arab problem.

40. But the British public's concern for refugees, at least immediately after the June war, also seemed inadequate. The *Sunday Times* of the 9th July reported the following findings of its Opinion Research Centre, on whether our Government should give money to help the refugees made homeless by the Middle East War.— "Should do it—41 per cent", "Should not do it—48 per cent" and "Don't know—10 per cent"

41. At all events if the refugee problem is not once again to disgrace civilization and poison Arab/Israeli relations, it seems that:—

- (a) the Arabs should refrain from using them as a fifth column;
- (b) Israel should comply with the U.N. demand to allow them to return to their homes, without awaiting a general settlement;
- (c) the prosperous countries of the world, particularly in Europe, should provide a great deal more aid for rehabilitation and development.

42. The principal private British organizations helping refugees are The Red Cross, UNA, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund, War on Want and Christian Aid. The last has so far given £93,800 for this purpose. With the onset of winter and the problem as yet so far from being solved, there is still a need for all possible private contributions, and for a demand for further governmental support, particularly from Western Europe.

Arab/Israeli Settlement

43. A general international consensus* seems to have developed that justice and peace demand a settlement around the basic formula of:—

- (a) *Israeli withdrawal* from conquered territory, in exchange for:
- (b) *Arab recognition* of Israeli statehood and freedom to use waterways.

44. The Latin American U.N. Assembly Resolution on these lines in July came nearer to a two-thirds majority in the Assembly than any other, and would probably have been carried if France and the bulk of her ex-colonies had supported it.

45. Both the American and Afro/Asian resolutions debated in, but not adopted by, the Security Council early in November, contained this formula, with variations in the emphasis between (a) and (b) above, and in the instructions to the U.N. envoy being proposed. This formula is also implicit in the World Council of Churches' Resolution of August.

* See also postscript, para. 105.

46. (a) and (b) in para. 43 above, both contain basic U.N. and moral principles. Article 2 of the Charter provides that "All members shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity . . . of any state". In his U.N. speech of 21st June, Mr. Brown said this meant "War should not lead to territorial aggrandizement". Clearly the *rights* of membership of the U.N. demand in exchange the *responsibility* of respecting the territorial integrity and maritime rights of fellow members.

Probable Israeli Objections

47. Israeli objections to such a settlement seem likely to be:—

- (a) the rescinding of their annexation of *East Jerusalem* and
- (b) Dependent upon what *guarantees of security* they can obtain particularly in Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Tiran Straits, the West Bank enclave, and on the Syrian Heights.

48. **Jerusalem.** On the 4th July the U.N. Assembly voted by 99 votes to 0, with twenty abstentions, that Israel's measures to change the state of Jerusalem were invalid and should be rescinded. Britain was amongst the 99, but America abstained.

49. Israel's compliance with this demand, or at least some flexibility such as some form of internationalization, would probably be the most helpful move she could make towards a general settlement, but also probably the hardest for her to make. As yet she is reported as having said that her annexation of Jerusalem is not even negotiable.

50. If this is true and continues, it is bound to aggravate the Arab—particularly Jordanian—difficulties in moving towards a general settlement. Apart from the psychological difficulties of accepting Israeli annexation it seems to involve much loss of tourist trade for Jordan. The annexed area goes far beyond the old city, and includes much of the outskirts of Jerusalem, with many other Holy Places.

51. From the purely religious point of view, freedom of conscience, worship and access to the Holy Places is, of course, the main requirement. Mr. Eshkol promised that the internal administration and arrangements of the Holy Places will be entrusted to the religious leaders concerned, the necessary procedures being in the hands of his Minister of Religious Affairs.

52. From the report of the Swiss Ambassador, Thalman, sent by U Thant to obtain information on Jerusalem towards the end of August it seems that the religious authorities were then generally satisfied with the situation except for:—

- (a) The Muslims, who in addition to protesting against the annexation of Arab territory and property, lodged numerous complaints regarding the treatment of some of their Holy Places and the administrative arrangements for pilgrims and tourists generally.
- (b) The Catholic Church which considered that the city and vicinity should be under an international regime in the form of a "corpus separatum". But talks on this were being continued between Israel and the Vatican.
- (c) Concern by some religious leaders regarding privileges, taxes and the teaching being organized by the Israeli Ministry of Education in schools.
- (d) Continuing interdenominational disputes regarding the possession and custody of some of the Holy Places.

53. In general it seems that attempts to meet the religious requirements should not be allowed to take priority over the needs of an overall settlement. A first step might be to demand the establishment of an inter-religious commission, perhaps under the chairmanship of a U.N. representative, in order to overcome the present dissatisfaction, and to ensure that worship and pilgrimages may proceed as smoothly as possible for the time being.

54. **Guarantees of Security.** Despite considerable Russian re-armament and the survival of many Arab pilots, Arab losses in army personnel and morale are likely to leave Israel's forces supreme for at least a year or two. Understandably, she has moreover at present little faith in the U.N. or great power guarantees.

55. Nevertheless, in the long term the inherent inferiority of Israel's manpower and geographical position makes it necessary to develop some international guarantees for her, if she is to accept:—

- (a) The withdrawal necessary for an overall settlement and
- (b) The treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons now tabled at Geneva.

56. An international guarantee of Arab frontiers will, of course, also be necessary at the same time because of the Arab fear of Zionist expansion.

57. If the analysis in Section II* is correct, whilst working for American/Russian agreement, all possible steps should be taken to increase Europe's concern and responsibility for the area, starting now with much greater assistance for refugees and development. It is

* Vide Paras: 22(f), 23(a), (c) and (g), 24(c) and 27, 28, 29, 30, 31(d) and (e).

Britain and Western Europe which are most dependent on Middle East oil and the Suez Canal. It is from Britain and Europe that Zionism and Jewish refugees originated. Apart from Russia only Britain and Europe have the necessary resources and power, and are sufficiently close at hand. Both expediency and moral responsibility demand, therefore, to call for British and European attention to this problem.

58. Can cooperation between France, Britain and other European countries be developed by the time Arab power recovers sufficiently to become again a potential threat to Israel? And if so, would Israel and the Arabs accept guarantees from such an "intermediate force", in the absence of American/Russian agreement? Clearly only if positive political efforts are made in this direction which, fortunately, should both help and be helped by Britain's efforts to join Europe.

59. **Frontiers.** That it is in the interests of Israel to withdraw in exchange for the Arab recognition proposed, there seems little doubt. For the inclusion within her boundaries of large numbers of Arabs whose population growth is so much higher than her own seems otherwise bound to result in a serious potential risk to her security. And to retain her recently won territory *without* the Arabs in their former homes can only result in further hostilities in due course.

60. Neither a "bi-national" status of recently won territory, nor the suggestion of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank are likely to be sufficiently acceptable to the Arabs to bring Israel security in the long run.

61. As to the security of frontiers, clearly any withdrawal which Israel will accept will depend not only on the reliability of the international guarantees discussed above, but also on the frontier arrangements themselves.

62. The demilitarization of Sinai under U.N. observation, with its return to Egypt for commercial (oil) exploitation would seem to be the key to security for both sides. From this, the dream of a U.N. base in Sinai might ultimately develop.

63. With Egyptian airfields and armies thus far removed from Israel and the Tiran Straits, Israel might perhaps feel able to accept the military disadvantages of withdrawal from the West Bank enclave. Minor adjustments seem desirable on both sides, and the Jordan/Israeli frontier should be patrolled by U.N. forces on both sides, or perhaps the West Bank also demilitarized.

64. Settlement of the Syrian Heights problem seems likely to take longer in view of Syria's extreme position and her apparent determination, as yet, to continue the raiding tactics so largely responsible for the war.

65. But since the Israeli occupied Syrian territory contains the key to the Jordan Water Development plans, some joint Israeli/Jordan (and if practicable Syrian) development commission under the chairmanship of a U.N. representative might be established, in order to press on with this urgent development meanwhile. If, in due course, Syria's attitude becomes such as to enable Israel to withdraw from the Syrian Heights, then again these might either be demilitarized or the frontier patrolled by U.N. forces on both sides.

66. **Armaments.** As to armaments, clearly reasonably sophisticated arms are necessary for Israel to feel secure, for without them the 40 million or so Arabs surrounding her could overwhelm her peoples of a mere 2½ million with knives, shotguns, etc.

67. The *quantity* of arms required for both sides to feel secure must not only be balanced but also—though a minimum—be adequate in relation to the length of frontiers, etc., to be defended.

68. As indicated in para. 31 (f) of Section II, the balance between the *type* of arms in the June War was such as to place a heavy premium on striking first and by surprise. That, plus the difficulty of the Israeli "citizen army" remaining mobilized for long, and the exaggerated advantage of air superiority in open desert warfare produced the disastrously *unstable* military situation.

69. With the defensive, stabilizing arms (e.g. anti-tank and anti-(low flying) aircraft guided weapons) now becoming available, with the frontier arrangements discussed above, with observation posts to guard against surprise air attack, and with Israel largely dependent on Western arms, it should now be possible to provide a more stable military situation, if not by open agreement with Russia at least by tacit agreement or example. There should also be all possible limitation of offensive and destabilizing arms including tanks, all types of bombing aircraft and missiles capable of strategic attack against cities.

70. Russia having, as yet, refused Britain's and America's proposals to limit or at least register arms supplies to Middle East countries, the re-arming of both sides has already begun, but is still well short of making good all war losses on the Arab side.

Probable Arab Objections

71. Arab objections to a general settlement on the lines referred to in para 43 above seem likely to be:—

- (a) Their basic resentment of what they consider to be the injustices of the past, with of course the accompanying problem of the refugees.

- (b) Their fears of what they consider to be Zionist "expansion" and "aggression" as illustrated by—1948, 1956 and 1967. (The 1948 War resulted in a 23 per cent increase to Israeli territory over the U.N. Partition Plan.)

72. These Arab objections may be said to be the basic crux of the problem of peace in the Middle East, because, in essence, the Israelis desire peace, whereas, as yet, the Arabs do not. The prospect of overcoming these crucial Arab objections will depend mainly on:—

- (a) The attitude of Russia.
- (b) The struggle within the Arab countries themselves.
- (c) Israel.
- (d) The time factor.
- (c) The attitude of America, Britain and The West.

73. **Russia.** Despite her visiting warships and rapid replacement of perhaps three quarters of Egyptian and Syrian arms losses, the Russian attitude seems to have moderated somewhat in the face of the severe "tactical" defeat she suffered from the June war. Nevertheless her basic aims probably remain, i.e. of gaining influence in this key area, gaining access to the Indian Ocean and embarrassing the West. (She has already gained a useful naval base at Alexandria.)

74. Unless the situation can soon begin to move towards an Arab/Israeli settlement, the June war—though a "tactical" defeat for Russia—could, in the long term, turn out to be a "strategic" victory. Whilst hoping and working for continued Russian moderation and cooperation, clearly we have to be prepared also for intransigency from her.

75. **The Inter-Arab Struggle.** At the Khartoum Conference in August much money from the oil rich Arabs was voted for Jordan and Egypt, whilst lifting most of the oil bans against the West. A minor victory was probably gained by the "moderates" against the "extremists" (Syria, Algeria and Iraq).

76. The future seems to lie mainly with King Hussein and Nasser whose countries did most of the fighting, suffered the main losses and are in great economic difficulties. The key question is whether Hussein's moderate views and increased prestige can prevail over Nasser, who seems to have been sobered. There are some signs of hope for this, and the Nasser/Faisal agreement over the Yemen is also being implemented. Tito and the Prime Minister of the Sudan also seem to be pushing in the right direction.

77. Nevertheless, the declared Arab intentions after Khartoum were still "no peace, no recognition and no negotiations with Israel".

78. **Israel's** reaction is, understandably, to stand firm. One hopes that her original promises of no territorial ambitions and magnanimity in victory still remain valid.

79. But her present insistence on direct negotiations without mediation seems neither just nor expedient. For with the four great powers so involved in the creation of the situation, it is not a pure Arab/Israeli issue; and the Arab peoples are unlikely to allow their leaders to swallow that much pride or to negotiate under duress. More flexibility on Jerusalem and the return of refugees would also greatly help the Arabs to negotiate, apart from the importance of these issues (on which U.N. resolutions were passed) in themselves.

80. **Time Factor.** Both Israel and the Arabs seem to think time is on their side, which is probably false in both cases. Delay probably favours no-one except possibly Russia. Positions will consolidate, economics deteriorate, military clashes recur, Hussein might go, Nasser regain his ambitions, or Russia restart exploitation. Moreover world opinion may have lost interest, and American elections are approaching, as is the winter—for the refugees.

81. **America, Britain and The West.** With the *Arabs*, we can do little until we have improved our relations. This is vital and has now happily started with recent visits to Egypt and prospects of diplomatic relations being restored. It should include all possible admissions of past injustices which do not encourage the Arabs to continue non-recognition of Israel.

82. With *Israel*, perhaps mainly in the U.N. and through America, it seems necessary to help her see that vital opportunities may be missed, and the support of world opinion lost, if she does not act urgently on the refugee problem and soon indicate her acceptance of the general principles in para. 43 above and the help of a U.N. envoy as suggested by Mr. Brown and supported by U Thant.

83. We might, too, go on trying to persuade her to withdraw fifteen miles or so (maximum gun range) from the Canal, with U.N. Forces only on a de-militarized East Bank to ensure against, and give warning of, any attempted Egyptian re-occupation. This without prejudice to any final settlement and without insisting *yet* on Israeli ships using the Canal, which is not crucial for her with the Gulf of Aqaba open.

84. Apart from the reduction of tension and incidents, the re-opening of the Canal would do much to get Egyptian and Aden economies going again, it would help American wheat going to starving India and is likely to be favoured by Russia. With the Canal losses of Britain alone around £20 million a month its opening should enable Britain plus Western Europe to add large sums towards refugee rehabilitation and development with all the consequential advantages this would bring to Israel.

85. Clearly too, we must try to get Israel to be *seen* to be non-expansionist, to allay the deep Arab fears of this, whether they be justified or not.

86. Most unfortunately the sinking of the *Eilat* and the Israelis' retaliatory bombardment have hardened attitudes on both sides, at least for the time being; but there seems no reason to suppose that these have changed the basic situation.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

87. No attempt will be made to conclude with a "blueprint" of solutions to this baffling problem, but the following summary may help Christians and others to make their contributions to the continuing debate in the search for truth, justice and peace wherein must, surely, lie God's will.

Causes and Responsibilities

88. Clearly these are far from being confined to the two peoples mainly concerned, i.e. Arabs and Israelis. Responsibility for the war and present impasse also rests heavily upon Britain, America, Russia, France, Germany and much of the rest of Europe, to say nothing of other members of the League of Nations and the United Nations and their staffs. We are all guilty of neglecting and aggravating, in one way or another, a problem which has been developing ever since the Balfour Declaration of which the 2nd November this year was the fiftieth anniversary.

Asymmetry of the Confrontation

89. Equally, the basic problem is far from one in which the Israeli case is opposite to the Arab case and vice versa. The Israeli grievance is basically with the more revolutionary Arab leaders and their recent Russian supporters. The Arab grievance is basically not so much with Israel as with Britain for what they consider to be our giving of their land to the Jews, and with America, Germany and Europe for encouraging or forcing Jews to go there.

90. Though both Arabs and Israelis are distrustful of the U.N. their reasons for this differ, the former for legalizing Britain's surrender of their rights, and the latter for failing to provide the security to which that legalization entitles them.

91. Again, Israel basically seeks peace, because, in general, the status quo suits her. The Arabs still seek war because the status quo seems unjust and imposed upon them by force or threat of force.

92. Emotionally, the victorious Israelis feel exhilarated and confident—perhaps over-confident in some cases. The defeated Arabs feel humiliation and bitterness to add to their resentment of past injustices and fear of future Israeli expansion.

93. In suffering, Israeli casualties were, happily, comparatively light (though many Jews in Arab countries were imprisoned or expelled in the recent war). Arab casualties were on the other hand heavy (with prolonged suffering for many in the Sinai Desert) and hundreds of thousands of innocent refugees were again displaced from their homes.

94. In terms of national existence no Arab country was seriously threatened, whereas Israel faced, and still faces in the long term, the possibility of national extermination, which world opinion could never condone.

Symmetry of the Confrontation

95. There are however two senses in which the Arab/Israeli situation is symmetrical. Both parties can be said to have much right on their side (though for different reasons) and both are also in some degree guilty (though again in different ways).

Elements of Settlement

96. Briefly these are:—The Refugee problem and development.

Israeli withdrawal.

Arab recognition.

Guarantees of security.

Jerusalem.

97. **Refugees.** Although all these elements are to some extent inter-dependent, on grounds of both humanity and for reduction of tension, it must surely be right for the refugee and development problem to be tackled first, without waiting for the final settlement. Arab refugees are entitled to return to their homes or to compensation, and Israel to the cessation of incitement of refugees to resistance.

98. **Withdrawal, Recognition and Security.** These three are obviously closely linked. Unless she has changed her mind regarding territorial ambition, Israel will *withdraw* provided the Arabs *recognize* her and there are sufficient guarantees of security. This security should not be impossible if we work (as proposed in Section III) for:—

(a) *Arms* to be balanced, reasonably stable and at a minimum.

(b) *Frontiers* to be patrolled by U.N. Forces on both sides, and demilitarized, at least in the case of Sinai, until we can provide:—

(c) *International Guarantees* either by the two super powers, or—failing their ability to agree—some such “intermediate force” as that proposed from Britain and Europe.

99. Whether the Arabs will simultaneously *recognize*, in exchange for such *withdrawal* under these conditions is the crux of the problem and depends on the extent to which:—

- (a) The resentment of *past injustices* can be removed.
- (b) Fears of *Zionist expansion* can be allayed.
- (c) Guarantees of their *security* can be assured—as in para. 98 above.
- (d) The *refugee* problem has been solved with increased aid—particularly from Western Europe.
- (e) Israel shows flexibility on the *Jerusalem* issue.

100. Clearly time will be required to achieve the change of heart needed on both sides for *complete* Israeli withdrawal in exchange for *complete* Arab recognition.

101. Perhaps the first step will have to be acceptance of “non-belligerency” by the Arabs for some limited withdrawal and/or limited implementation of (a) to (e) in para 99 above.

102. Perhaps too, Israeli agreement with Jordan, Egypt and Syria may have to be negotiated separately rather than altogether.

103. But it is hoped that the above summary may help to show the points at which Christian insights and influence should be brought to bear over the months—or years—ahead, which will elapse before the Arab/Israeli confrontation ceases to cause so much human suffering, and to threaten world peace and the future of the U.N.

104. There can be few issues in which emotional factors are more involved and which cry out, therefore, for the cleansing spirit of repentance and reconciliation from the peoples of so many nations. High on that list stands our own. This Middle East issue presents, therefore, one of the most urgent challenges to Christian citizens of Britain for their study, prayers, and action—including all possible aid.

12th November, 1967.

Anthony W. Buzzard.

POSTSCRIPT

105. Between finalizing this paper and sending it to print the following Resolution, presented by Britain, was unanimously adopted by the Security Council at an historic meeting on 22nd November, 1967.

“ The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East.

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.”

106. The members of the Security Council were:—Mali (President) America, Russia, Britain, France, (Nationalist) China, India, Japan, Canada, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Brazil, Argentina, Denmark and Bulgaria. Also participating in the meeting—but not voting—were:—Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

107. As stated by Britain's representative—Lord Caradon—in presenting this unanimously adopted Resolution, it “is the result of close and prolonged consultation with both sides and with all members of this Council . . . every member . . . has made a contribution in the search for common ground on which we can go forward”.

108. Para. 1 of the Resolution, taken in conjunction with its preamble and para. 2, seems generally in line with the *basic formula* contained in para. 43 (a) and (b). Para. 2 (b) of the Resolution shows, however, less urgency for the *refugees* than paras. 35, 36 and 97.

109. It will be noticed that the Resolution does not mention *armaments*, as was pointed out by America in the speeches immediately following the adoption of the Resolution. However, as both she and Israel pointed out, provision for limiting the arms race in the Middle East had been included in the unadopted Russian draft resolution.

110. Nor, apart from the establishment of demilitarized zones, does the Resolution attempt to solve the problem of *guaranteeing security*, though Ethiopia stressed the importance of American/Russian cooperation and understanding and France the indispensability of collaboration and releasing tension between the great powers.

111. Nor is there any specific mention of *Jerusalem* in separation from the general principle of Israel's withdrawal. But France drew attention to the Assembly's earlier vote calling on Israel to do nothing to prejudice the state of Jerusalem.

112. Other significant points made in the speeches immediately preceeding and following the adoption of the British Resolution were:—

- (a) *General praise* for the Resolution or Lord Caradon's successful efforts, by America, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, Denmark, Japan and Nigeria.
- (b) *A demand for complete withdrawal of Israel* from *all* occupied territory, by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Russia, Bulgaria, Mali, India, Nigeria, Brazil, Argentina, France and Ethiopia. In most cases this was argued by linking the principle of withdrawal to the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory” quoted in the preamble.

- (c) *Any withdrawal by Israel* to be dependent upon directly negotiated peace treaties, guaranteed security, secure boundaries and free navigation of all waterways to and from the Red Sea, by Israel, who added that this would create the conditions for resolving the refugee problem, and that the Israeli Government would “determine its attitude to the Security Council’s Resolution in the light of its own policy”.
- (d) *Withdrawal to be the immediate or first step* towards peace, in view of Israel’s aggression in defiance of the U.N. Charter, by Jordan, Egypt and Syria, of whom the last specifically announced its non-acceptance of the Resolution.

113. The next day the Swedish Mr. Gunnar Jarring was designated Security General’s Special Representative, who, in the words of the Nigerian representative “will require all the luck in the world to be able to succeed”.

114. Meanwhile more recent events, both in and over the cease-fire lines and in the capitals of the principal contestants confirm the view expressed in para. 80 of the paper, that time is probably on no-one’s side, and certainly not that of the refugees facing the onset of winter.

3rd December, 1967.

Anthony W. Buzzard

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

5 December, 1967.

Thank you for your letter of 4 December enclosing a copy of the address given by Mr. John Reddaway to the Annual Meeting of the Council on 30 November.

I am most grateful to you for forwarding the text so quickly and have noted your request regarding its confidential nature.

(C. G. Mays)

Miss M. Holmes & Court, M.B.E.,
General Secretary,
British Council for Aid to
Refugees,
35 Great Peter Street,
London, S.W.1.

BRITISH COUNCIL FOR AID TO REFUGEES

35, GREAT PETER STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

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Confidential

EE 18/12

4th December, 1967

Dear Mr. Mays,

I have pleasure in enclosing herewith a copy of the address on the current Palestine refugee problem, given by Mr. John Reddaway, Deputy Commissioner-General of UNRWA, to the Annual Meeting of this Council on the 30th November.

As you may know, Mr. Reddaway was expressing his personal views, rather than those of UNRWA, and it would, therefore, be desirable for this document to be regarded as confidential.

Yours sincerely,

Elizabeth Bevanbury

(for) General Secretary

C. G. Mays, Esq.,
United Nations Department,
Foreign Office, S. W. 1.

Enclosure

Mr. Moberly

Mr. Doherty

Mr. Samuels

Eastern Dept

this may be of interest to you.

Ed Mays

You may wish to compare pp 5-22 with the papers produced by the State Department and Sir R. Bevanmont on the same subject.

See MR Moberly's minute of 5 Dec

N. H. Moberly

18/12

20/12

Q.D. 20/12

THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

- RE-APPRAISAL, 1967 -

(Text of an Address given by Mr. John Reddaway,
Deputy Commissioner-General of the United Nations
Relief & Works Agency, at the Annual General
Meeting of the British Council for Aid to Refugees
at Caxton Hall, London, on 30 November, 1967)

INTRODUCTION

Within the limited time available to us this afternoon, I do not propose to spend very long describing the aftermath of the hostilities in the Middle East in June and the impressive and, I would say, on the whole very effective efforts that have been made to cope with the massive human problem of hundreds of thousands of newly displaced persons. These matters have been reported on in the international press, and from UNRWA Headquarters we have been sending out situation reports for the information of voluntary agencies and others concerned. I shall be glad to try to answer any questions you may have to put to me about current problems and emergency aid. But when I received your kind invitation to come and speak to you today - and may I say how pleased and honoured I was to receive it? - I decided, I hope rightly, that you would wish me to take as the main theme of my remarks the broader issues concerning the future of the refugees, both those from the conflict in 1948 and those newly uprooted by the events of this summer.

EMERGENCY, 1967

Some 350,000 persons were newly displaced as a result of the hostilities in June and have found refuge in East Jordan (200,000), Syria (116,000) and the United Arab Republic (38,000). Of these newly displaced persons about 130,000 were already refugees from the 1948 conflict; they are divided between East Jordan (110,000), Syria (16,000) and the United Arab Republic (3,000). The number in East Jordan is still increasing as more come across each day from the West Bank and Gaza.

The whole refugee community has suffered twice in a lifetime the

impact of armed conflict and the ensuing disruption of their lives.

In Gaza, the poorest of the poor among the refugees have been engulfed in the tide of war for a third time in the space of twenty years. Even in those areas which were not directly touched by the fighting, the economic impact of the conflict has been severe and it is the refugees who have suffered most.

Within the last few weeks a new, enormous problem has arisen in Egypt as a result of the continued incidents in the Canal Zone. The civilian population has been evacuated from the Suez, Ismailia and Kantara areas and many have also left Port Said. When I was in Cairo earlier this month U.N. sources there gave the current number of displaced persons within Egypt as 398 000. The U.A.R. Government is looking after its own citizens but has asked UNRWA to provide assistance for all the newly displaced Palestinians in the U.A.R. who may now number over 10,000.

Early in July the General Assembly authorised UNRWA "to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area (that is, other than registered refugees) who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of recent hostilities".

In fact UNRWA has of course been only one among many organisations and agencies playing a part in the great international effort which has been undertaken to deal with the emergency in the Middle East. This effort has been a combined operation to which the Governments directly concerned in the area, other donor governments, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, UNICEF,

the World Food Programme as well as UNRWA, national and international non-governmental organisations and countless individuals in many parts of the world have all made essential contributions.

AID FROM BRITAIN

Here I should like to pay special tribute to the invaluable and most generous help which has been provided from this country both to UNRWA and to other organisations working in the area such as the Save the Children Fund, the Pontifical Mission for Palestine and the Near East Christian Council. All told, I understand that over £500,000 sterling has been contributed from non-governmental sources. Of this about £160,000 has been channelled through UNRWA. Through the UNRWA Liaison Group of the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to Refugees we received 2,000 tents, sufficient to shelter 10,000 of the newly displaced refugees in Jordan. These included 185 marquees which have been invaluable for use as schools, clinics and distribution centres. The main donors were the Anglo-Arab Association, the Disasters Emergency Committee (on which the British Red Cross Society, Christian Aid, Oxfam, the Save the Children Fund and War on Want were represented) and the Middle East Relief Fund which was set up as a result of the appeal launched in June by Lord Lothian and Dame May Curwen on behalf of the UNRWA Liaison Group. The purchase and despatch of the tents was very ably handled by Mr. Frank Harcourt Munning of War on Want.

We have also received donations of cash and supplies from Oxfam, the Anglo-Arab Association, Christian Aid, War on Want, the United Nations Association the Council for Education for World Citizenship and many others.

These donations have been used to provide hot meals, clothing, blankets, family kits consisting of a primus stove and cooking pans, trucks for the transport of food and other essential supplies and five prefabricated kitchens and a pharmacy for the tented camps in the Jordan Valley.

Meanwhile we have continued to receive support from various sources in this country for our normal programmes, particularly vocational training, rehydration and nutrition centres and health care generally. I would like to mention in particular the very generous donations we have received in the form of vocational training scholarships from the Astor Bursary Fund. What finer memorial could there be to one of the best and most generous friends that the Arab refugees and UNRWA have ever known?

The Government of the United Kingdom made a special emergency donation of \$500,000 to UNRWA in June and has also given £500,000 sterling to the Jordan Government.

THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

The immediate emergency needs of the newly displaced refugees have now been largely met, thanks to the concern and generosity of so many different governments, organisations and individuals throughout the world. Whether and how long these needs continue will depend on developments on the political plane in the Middle East and elsewhere. Meanwhile the refugees, both new and old, remain the sad victims of events beyond their control. The hungry must be fed, the homeless given shelter, the sick healed and the children educated. Amid so much distress it is hard to single out some as deserving more help than others. But the plight of those who face a grim winter in the misery and discomfort of the tented camps in Jordan and Syria must surely weigh most heavily of all on the minds of their fellow men.

THE LONGER TERM

During these anxious months since the fighting broke out in June, attention has understandably - and rightly - been centred on ensuring the survival of the mass of humanity affected by the conflict and on the immediate human problems of individuals uprooted from their homes and separated from their families. But all the time, while tackling as best we can these present problems, we cannot but be conscious of the great unanswered questions which in the longer run overshadow the lives of these hundreds of thousands of people, victims of the strife which tore Palestine apart in 1948 and which was renewed with such violence and tragic human consequences this summer. What does the future hold for this mass of unfortunate humanity? Where and how can they find peace and settled lives? What measure of justice can they hope for from their fellow-men?

You will not of course expect me to be able to supply answers to these basic questions. For these answers are still shrouded in an uncertain future. Some indeed hang on the outcome of political decisions not yet made. And I would ask you to bear in mind that, in discussing these issues at all, I shall in the main be giving you merely my own personal views and not speaking officially on behalf of UNRWA or the United Nations. *

To begin with, I think it would be helpful to cast our minds back to the situation which existed before the recent outbreak. In May of this year nineteen years had elapsed since the exodus of Arab refugees who fled from the fighting in Palestine in 1948. No one knows for certain how many were uprooted from their homes at that time, but the most widely accepted estimates range around 750,000. By natural increase this

* May I also ~~remind you~~ ask you to bear in mind that UNRWA's role is purely humanitarian? We have no responsibility or competence in regard to the political aspects of the refugee problem - although of course we have to try to take account of political realities

nation of refugees - a community larger than the population of several of the present Member States of the United Nations - had grown to about a million and a quarter by this year. How had they fared in the meantime? What progress had been made towards a solution of their problem?

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Theoretically, there would appear to have been four possible methods of solving the problem of the Palestine refugees. These were -

- (1) repatriation,
- (2) emigration, *(by which I mean emigration outside the Arab world),*
- (3) mass resettlement,
- (4) individual rehabilitation.

They are not mutually exclusive. A solution might partake of some or all methods.

As things had turned out in the years since 1948 -

Repatriation had not been possible owing to the opposition of Israel.

Emigration had been negligible owing to the lack of countries willing to open their doors to a large influx of Arab refugees and owing to the reluctance of the refugees to cut themselves off from the Arab World and from their hopes of returning to their homes.

Mass resettlement was tried but failed owing primarily to opposition of the refugees and the host governments. Even without this opposition, it is doubtful whether this method could have succeeded. The physical capacity of the host countries to provide land and water for massive schemes of resettlement seems to have been over-estimated in the early 1950s. And no convincing arguments were ever produced to show why the

host countries should be expected to give priority to the resettlement of the refugees in preference to their own poor and landless citizens.

The international community had thus been left with individual rehabilitation as the only practicable and politically acceptable means of providing, if not a solution, at least a partial remedy of the problem.

Up to the hostilities in June,
/ Rehabilitation on an individual or family basis had already taken place on a considerable scale and the rate of rehabilitation was accelerating.

In fact, individual rehabilitation, depending mainly on the effort and will to survive of the individual himself, has usually been at the core of any success in coping with massive human problems such as that of the Arab refugees. Plans and projects and resettlement schemes devised by external agencies have rarely solved refugee problems, though they may have contributed to a solution.

SOME MISCONCEPTIONS

In my view, there is very little truth in those ideas about the Palestine refugees which are unfortunately widespread and all too readily accepted in Western Countries and which depict the refugees as idle, good-for-nothing people, content to live on international charity, stagnating in idleness in the refugee camps, a perpetual burden on their fellow-men, pawns in the game against Israel heartlessly manipulated by Arab governments which have made no effort to solve the problem. If I spend a little time refuting these misconceptions, it is only because they persist so stubbornly in the reporting on the problem which appears in Europe and North America. A case in point was the recently published paperback on "The Six Day War" by Randolph and Winston Churchill. The observations on the refugee problem contained in the concluding chapter

of their book present a picture which I cannot recognise from my own acquaintance with the problem over the past seven years.

To take first the assertion that for nineteen years the refugees have been "rotting in idleness" in the camps established by UNRWA. One fifth of the refugees from the 1948 conflict re-established themselves in the Arab world by their own efforts and have never been a charge on UNRWA. The remainder were, for the most part, poorer people of farming stock and it was their misfortune that the countries where they found refuge already had a surplus of locally born peasant farmers and already faced grave problems in ensuring a livelihood for their own citizens. Even so, many of these poorer refugees found homes for themselves in the towns and villages of the host countries and the number of refugees living in the UNRWA camps has never exceeded 40 percent of the total refugee population. Moreover, it is quite misleading to assume that because the camps remained and, in fact, grew in size and because the refugees continued to live in them, no progress was being made towards the economic rehabilitation of the camp inhabitants. This misconception seems to derive from experience in dealing with the refugees in Europe, where great emphasis was always placed on clearing the camps as evidence of rehabilitation. Such ideas were not applicable to the problem of the Palestine refugees since, unless they were allowed to return to their former homes there was nowhere else for the refugees living in the UNRWA camps to go. In the circumstances existing and in the absence of a political solution, the best they could hope for in this respect was a gradual improvement of the living conditions in the camps, and this is in fact what has been taking place - sometimes to a marked degree, particularly where the camps were located in areas in which good

opportunities for employment existed. Some of the refugee camps, indeed, had developed into thriving communities, even though they were still at a fairly low social and economic level and still contained many families living on the edge of subsistence.

For the first few years after 1948 there was no doubt some truth in the idea that the refugees living in the UNRWA camps were stagnating in enforced idleness. But for many years past, any generalization of this kind has not corresponded to the facts. Although on the political plane the problem of the Palestine refugees has, regrettably, remained hopelessly deadlocked, on the social and economic plane much solid and undeniable progress has been made in improving their condition. This progress has been primarily due to three factors: first and foremost, the rapid economic development of the Arab host countries and of the Arab world generally in recent years; second, the energy, intelligence and adaptability of the refugees themselves, who have fortunately shown themselves to be eager for work and very capable of profiting by any opportunity given them; and third, the education and training which the host Governments, various voluntary agencies and UNRWA have been able to give the young refugees to enable them to take advantage of any opportunities of employment that might come their way. A subsidiary but not unimportant adjunct to these principal factors in the rehabilitation of the refugees has been the economic aid supplied by UNRWA in the form of rations, shelter and other relief services. The regular provision of this relief assistance over an extended period, even though on a meagre scale, has certainly helped the refugees not merely to survive but also to recover their capacity to support themselves.

It is true that it has not proved possible for UNRWA to reflect

adequately the extent of this rehabilitation in its published statistics of the number of refugees who have been rendered self-supporting and from whom relief assistance has therefore been withdrawn. But, however regrettable this may be - and, in fairness to UNRWA and the Arab host Governments, the difficulty of measuring degrees of progress in economic rehabilitation among a mass of people living not much above subsistence level needs to be recognised - it does not alter the reality of the progress that had been made.

While I am...
In Jordan, for example, official and authoritative statements have been made in recent years indicating not only a very high level of economic growth for the country as a whole but also suggesting that the problem of unemployment and underemployment which has chronically beset the Jordanian economy was within sight of solution. These statements implied that within a few years Jordan, in spite of its not having been endowed with abundant natural resources, might look forward to becoming economically viable and independent of external aid. This could only mean that, in common with the other citizens of Jordan, the 720,000 refugees, representing over half of ^{in all the four host countries} the whole refugee population, were rapidly achieving the capacity to support themselves and, hence, that the social and economic aspects of the refugee problem in Jordan, though not the political, were well on the way, if not to a solution, at least to a partial remedy.

The numerically smaller problems of the refugees in Lebanon and Syria also showed encouraging signs of progress towards social and economic rehabilitation. Even in Gaza improvement was discernible in recent years, including a positive shortage of unskilled labour at certain seasons of the year. But of course this improvement in the level of economic activity

rested primarily on the artificial and precarious base of a high level of expenditure injected into the Strip by the United Arab Republic Government, UNEF and UNRWA. A more solid element of improvement in the condition of the refugees in Gaza in recent years was the placement, with the active co-operation of the Gaza and U.A.R. authorities, of some thousands of young refugees in employment in Egypt and elsewhere and the remittances which they were then able to send back to Gaza for the support of their relatives.

As for the assertion that the Arab Governments have been deliberately and inhumanly keeping the refugees in a state of destitution and dependence on international charity as a weapon in the prosecution of their political aims against Israel, this also is wide of the truth. Although the host Governments have opposed mass schemes of direct resettlement, on the grounds that this would be contrary to the interests and expressed wishes of the refugees themselves, their record in promoting the rehabilitation of the refugees as individuals through education, training and employment has been notably humane and helpful. They have extended this aid to the refugees in spite of the grave difficulties which already confronted them in providing a livelihood for their own rapidly expanding populations.

BEFORE AND AFTER JUNE, 1967

This then was the situation of the refugees from the 1948 conflict as we in UNRWA saw it in May, before the outbreak of hostilities. Under the surface of a continuing deadlock on the political plane, the slow but steady process of rehabilitating individuals through education and employment had in recent years begun to make an evident impact on improving the general condition of the refugees. Rehabilitation was being achieved

not by ambitious and costly works projects and schemes of mass resettlement but by the operation of normal economic and human factors - those factors which have in the past proved most effective in the Arab countries of the Middle East in coping with human problems arising from movements of population.

This cautiously hopeful picture of a steadily improving future for the refugees has been shattered by the hostilities and their aftermath of upheaval and economic disruption. Whether it can be pieced together again remains to be seen. For the moment it is undeniable that the hopeful process of rehabilitation has been sadly set back.

In the truncated part of Jordan east of the River there are now about one and a quarter million people living. Of these nearly a half are either Palestine refugees or newly displaced residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. More are drifting into east Jordan every day. Already 15,000 refugees have found their way across to the East Bank from Gaza. If they should prove to be only the vanguard of a general influx into east Jordan by the 300,000 or so refugees who have been crammed into the Gaza Strip, it is hard to see how Jordan, which already can barely sustain its present crippling load of refugees, could ever get back on its feet again. Nor is it only the refugees and newly displaced in east Jordan who will suffer. Many of the established residents are already hard hit by the economic consequences of this summer's events. The loss of the West Bank has deprived the country of the tourist trade based on Jerusalem, the agricultural production of the Jordan Valley and the orchard areas of Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron and the foreign currency supplied by remittances from West Bank residents who had found employment outside Jordan. Much of the economic

activity of East Jordan was generated by and dependent upon these three sources of income based on the West Bank

In Syria the displacement of population and the economic impact of recent events are smaller in relation to the whole population of the country and to its total economic resources. But the effects are still severe, particularly since for some years past the economy of the country has been adversely affected by various factors. Even in those areas and among those sections of the populace not directly affected by the fighting, it is the refugees who are the first to suffer since their foothold in the economic life of the country is still precarious.

In the Lebanon, even though it escaped the physical impact of the conflict, the economic consequences have been severe and have aggravated the malaise which had affected the economy for some time past. And again it is the Palestine refugees who are the first to go to the wall when times are hard.

At the present time too many uncertainties overhang the future of the refugees in Gaza and the West Bank to permit any prediction of how long the adverse effects of recent events will last in those areas. Some remedial activity is already being taken by the Government of Israel to restimulate economic activity on the West Bank. But clearly if the refugees living in Gaza and on the West Bank remain cut off from opportunities of education and employment in the rest of the Arab World, this cannot but increase the difficulty of promoting their rehabilitation. There have been reports in the press of high-powered planning teams who have been charged by the Government of Israel with the task of assessing the capacity of the West Bank to support by intensive agricultural and industrial development a

greater population than it has in the past. If the refugees still remaining in Gaza and the West Bank remain isolated and cut off from the rest of the Arab world, only time can show whether, in fact, it may be feasible to offset the disadvantage of their isolation by some such new, radical approach which would not depend for its success on education and employment opportunities in the Arab countries of the Middle East.

RE-APPRAISAL OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The recent upheaval in the Middle East has shaken up the established pattern of attitudes and entrenched positions which seemed so rigidly deadlocked before. And so it may be worth while to take a fresh look in this new context at the four possible methods of solving the refugee problem. I will take mass resettlement first.

MASS RESETTLEMENT

If there is no general settlement in the Middle East and if the present state of affairs seems likely to continue indefinitely, it is, I suppose, not improbable that the Government of Israel will undertake some intensive development of the West Bank with a view to promoting the permanent resettlement there of some of the refugees who lost their homes and livelihood in 1948. If, as is quite possible, such an attempt should succeed, will that prove that, contrary to the view UNRWA has taken for the past ten years or so, mass resettlement is the answer to the problem?

Opinions are bound to differ on a controversial issue such as this and I am not myself qualified to venture any positive judgment in a matter where even experts may disagree. But perhaps I may usefully draw attention to some of the considerations that have influenced UNRWA thinking on this subject in the past.

First, it seems necessary to bear in mind that, if it were to have any chance of succeeding, an attempt to solve the problem by schemes of mass resettlement would have to be backed by massive funds and technical resources, such as UNRWA has never had available.

The dimensions of the investment that would be required were indicated in a report prepared in 1959, by the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold. He approached the problem of the Palestine refugees from the viewpoint of regarding them as part of a general problem of unemployed and underemployed population in the whole Middle East region. He worked out the magnitude of investment that would be required in order to create jobs and absorb into productive employment the whole of this unemployed and underemployed population, including the refugees, over a ten-year period beginning in 1960.

The total investment required was of the order of \$14 billion, much of which could, Mr. Hammarskjold suggested, have been found from sources within the region itself, provided that the oil-producing countries could be induced to invest in the other countries of the region not endowed with oil resources. The remainder would have had to be provided from outside the region. The investment required to take care specifically of the Palestine refugees was estimated at about \$1.7 billion.

By contrast, UNRWA has never had at its disposal more than some \$35 to \$40 million a year and these funds have been entirely pre-empted for meeting the cost of running its services. Indeed for the past four years we have been running on deficits which now add up to a total of over \$6 million. In case \$35 to \$40 million a year may give a false impression of money to spare, may I remind you that this has sufficed over the years

to enable UNRWA to spend ten pence a day on each refugee. Of this five pence have gone on rations and other forms of relief, such as housing, a penny on health and four pence on education.

Then, too, it must be remembered that large-scale resettlement schemes take time to develop and, meanwhile, the people for whom they are intended must be fed and sheltered and given education and medical care. Usually such projects take years to reach the stage where the beneficiaries can be left to fend for themselves. One of the most promising of all the projects of this kind which UNRWA studied in the early years was shown, after prolonged technical examination, to require fourteen years before all the engineering works would be completed, all the land brought into production and all the beneficiaries rendered capable of supporting themselves. This exemplifies, I think, the very real technical difficulties which beset this method of solving the refugee problem.

Finally, people cannot be resettled by these means unless they are themselves willing to co-operate or unless, failing their co-operation, the government concerned is prepared to use powers of compulsion. In the past neither of these conditions has been met.

All this is not to say that, in present, changed circumstances, the possibility of some new initiative designed to promote, by direct means, resettlement of large numbers of refugees and displaced persons should be discarded out of hand. Indeed, leaving aside any projects of this kind that Israel might decide to undertake in areas under her control, it is not impossible that, if the present state of affairs continues, the Government and others concerned in east Jordan and perhaps in Syria too may find themselves compelled to think in these terms as a means of relieving the

problem of surplus, unproductive population. And, in the end, a solution of the special problem of the refugees in Gaza must envisage transferring large numbers of them elsewhere and giving them a new start in new surroundings. When that time comes, projects of direct, mass resettlement might well be an element in the new start. However, at the present time, while attention is still centred on the hope that the newly displaced will in one way or another be able to return to the areas where they were living before the fighting, it would obviously be premature to expect any new initiative of this kind to commend itself to the Arab governments or to Arab opinion.

One thing is certain. If in time such an initiative were to be launched and were to have any prospect of succeeding, it would have to take account of the fact that for twenty years past most of the refugees from the 1948 conflict have been living in a more or less urbanised environment divorced from the land and without the opportunity of practising the traditional farming skills of their forefathers. Only the older men of about forty years of age and above possess much practical experience of farming and other rural occupations and few of them have had the opportunity of using their skills since they left their homes in Palestine. A large programme of training in agriculture would be an essential part of any such approach. Whether UNRWA could usefully play a role in a new initiative of this kind would depend on the circumstances in which it was launched and the degree of positive support which it received from the governments concerned. My personal expectation at present is that such an initiative might be politically more acceptable if it were presented as part of a general programme of economic development benefiting the population as a whole rather than as directly designed to resettle refugees and displaced persons. If

so, that would tend to restrict the scope of UNRWA's participation.

EMIGRATION

I do not think there is anything new to be said at present on emigration as a method of solving the problem. Recent events have not so far opened up fresh possibilities of large masses of Arab refugees being admitted to countries in need of immigrants. Nor do they seem to have diminished the reluctance of the refugees to cut themselves off from the Arab World, though presumably they may have dimmed the hopes which the refugees have been nourishing for the past nineteen years of returning to the homes they left in 1948. However difficult the future may be for the refugees if they remain in the Middle East, I would not myself expect that these difficulties will stimulate any large number to pull up their roots and seek a new life in an alien environment elsewhere in the world. Within the Arab countries of the Middle East region there may of course well be considerable further migration from economically depressed areas into those where there are better opportunities. This was a feature of the socio-economic character of the region even before the hostilities and may be more marked in future. The refugees tend to be more mobile than the established population of the host countries and may well move in even larger numbers than before into Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Libya.

Outside the Arab world an increasing number of young refugee men have in recent years been finding their way into Europe in search of employment, particularly in the Scandinavian countries, West Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. It is too soon to say whether this may lead in time to any sizeable permanent emigration. Most of these young men are

seeking merely temporary employment abroad. where they can pick up good wages and acquire skills and experience, with the idea of returning after a year or so to the Arab world. But some are settling down in steady, well-paid jobs in Europe. For the moment the flow has been diminished as a result both of events in the Middle East and the slowing-down of economic growth in Europe. But in the longer run it seems probable that this is a trend which will continue and increase. The voracious sponge of European industrial development has already drawn in so many thousands of workers, often less educated and less skilled than the young Arab refugees, from countries adjacent to the Arab world and it seems highly probable that we have as yet seen only the beginning of a similar attraction into Europe of young Arabs, and particularly Arab refugees. in search of work and experience.

REPATRIATION

Repatriation - a return. as they see it, not only to the homes and property but also to the whole way of life they left behind in 1948 - has been the solution incessantly demanded by the refugees year in and year out since then. They have been supported in this demand by the Arab Governments. And their claim to return to their homes or, alternatively, to receive compensation for their property, if they chose not to return, has been endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in a Resolution first adopted in 1948 and re-affirmed year after year since then. But this Resolution has never been implemented.

After nineteen years the refugees have still had neither an opportunity of returning to their homes nor compensation for their property. Since the two issues of repatriation and compensation are linked together as

alternatives in the Resolution, the continuing deadlock over repatriation has had the result of denying the refugees any benefit from the property they left behind in 1948. It would hardly seem that this can have been the intention of the Assembly in adopting its Resolution nineteen years ago. Suggestions have been made from time to time for measures to enable the refugees to receive compensation, irrespective of whether they would have the opportunity of returning to their homes and without prejudice to this or any other political claims they may have; but these suggestions have not been pursued.

Meanwhile, the Palestine Conciliation Commission has been patiently getting on with the laborious task of identifying and evaluating the immovable property which the refugees left behind. The Commission announced in 1965 that it had completed this task. It has identified and recorded some 450,000 property holdings and has invited individual owners to check that their holdings have been correctly recorded. It has not however made public any up-to-date valuation of the property. A figure of £100 million (sterling) was given by the Commission in 1951 as representing an approximate global evaluation. Clearly this would have to be greatly increased to correspond with present-day values. Arab spokesmen have asserted that the value would amount in present monetary terms to two thousand million dollars or more.

There is no certainty that the refugees, if offered compensation without prejudice to their claim to repatriation, would avail themselves of the offer. Up to the recent outbreak of hostilities it is by no means impossible that they would have rejected it, preferring to continue to forego compensation in order to avoid any de facto prejudice to their claim to repatriation.

But in the changed circumstances since June it may be that they would be more receptive to such an offer. Certainly their hopes of returning to their homes and resuming their former way of life - which always connoted to a greater or less extent the recovery of the territory lost in 1948 and the re-establishment of an Arab Palestine - have been hard hit by recent events. And certainly also a much greater realism is now evident among the refugees, as also indeed in the Arab World generally. There are even some among the Palestinians in Gaza and on the West Bank who are now saying that their community has suffered enough - and more than enough - as a result of the prolonged conflict between the Arab World and Israel and that they can no longer go on bearing the brunt of Arab hostility towards Israel, however justified that hostility may be. Paradoxically perhaps, the new set-backs, disappointments and tragedies which the refugees have suffered as a result of this summer's events may have made it easier rather than harder for them to come to terms with the events of 1948. Attention is now centred on the newly displaced persons and the newly occupied areas, and the older claims dating from 1948, though not forgotten, seem somewhat blunted, somewhat less persistent and uncompromising. Is there here at last the makings of a compromise, the basis of a settlement?

^{at this time.} No one can say ^{if} But ~~surely~~ there is in the present state of affairs ^{of a settlement, surely well opportunity} at least an opportunity ^{the} that must be explored for all it is worth, ~~a~~ chance ~~that~~ must not be allowed to go by default. Timing and context are all important. If it is true that there can be no lasting peace in the Middle East without a settlement of the refugee problem, it is also probably true that there can be no real solution of the refugee problem except in the context of a general peace settlement. In that context the elements of a

solution of the refugee problem might be -

first, return of the newly displaced persons to where they were living before June.

second, unconditional compensation to the refugees from the 1948 conflict for the loss of their property (i.e. they would not be required to renounce repatriation as the price of receiving compensation),

third, rehabilitation grants to any of the refugees who would not be eligible to receive any substantial payment by way of compensation for property,

fourth, the renewed offer of a substantial 'token' repatriation of refugees to Israel (at one time the Government of Israel offered to admit up to 100,000),

fifth, continued, large investment by the international community in the education and training of the young refugees,

sixth an ambitious programme of economic development in the host countries, particularly Jordan, from which the refugees might benefit in common with the rest of the population, and

seventh, the continued operation of UNRWA and its services for a strictly limited period during which the responsibilities would be progressively transferred to the governments concerned.

There is one other element of a rather different kind to which I would myself attach importance as an adjunct to action on these lines. This is that means should be found for the world at large, and particularly the governments most directly concerned, to give public recognition to the

undeniable fact that a great and grievous wrong was done to the Arab people of Palestine in the course of the events of the past fifty years.

From the hours of talk and the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of personal contacts which I have had over the past seven years with Palestinians and other Arabs, ranging from illiterate refugees to eminent Ministers and Heads of State, it is clear to me that, over the Palestine issue, the Arab people are suffering not only from a deep sense of actual injury but also from a torment of frustration at the failure of the Western Powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States, even to acknowledge that the injury exists and was ever inflicted. I believe that this has been a major factor in creating the psychosis of suspicion and resentment which now dominates the attitude of the Arab world towards the West. And I believe that some public acknowledgement by the Western Powers of their awareness of the wrong that was done to the Arab people of Palestine is a first and essential step towards the creation of better understanding and better relations.

Now of course I fully appreciate that there is a good deal that can be said by way of qualifying the simple statement that a great wrong was done to the Arab people of Palestine in the years from 1917 onwards. There will be some who will say that the hardship and misery inflicted on the Palestinian Arabs cannot be weighed in the balance against the centuries of persecution suffered by the Jewish people of the diaspora, particularly in the hideous climax during the Second World War. And some again may seek to strike a balance between the exodus of Arabs from Palestine and the influx of oriental Jews from Arab countries into Israel. There will be others who will observe, not without some justification, that

errors and inflexibility, extremism and disunity on the Arab side contributed much to the disasters which overtook Arab Palestine. But when all possible qualifications are made, it does not seem to me that any honest man can study the historical record of events without concluding that, indeed, those events had the effect of inflicting a great injury on the Arab people of Palestine.

Would it do any good to acknowledge the injury if in fact nothing can be done to put it right? Clearly the Western Powers are neither willing nor able to put the clock back to before 1948 and they would no doubt feel compelled to make that plain, even if they were prepared to acknowledge the injury itself. To diplomats and politicians of a certain turn of mind the idea of the government of a great and powerful country publicly acknowledging that its actions have, however unintentionally, helped to inflict injury on a small and poor nation is ~~either ludicrous~~ ~~or~~ unthinkable. I can only say that in my judgment a simple demonstration by the Western Powers of their awareness of the injury that had been done to the Arab people of Palestine would have an immediate beneficial impact on Arab opinion, and, in the context of an attempt to solve the refugee problem on lines such as those I have indicated, might well prove to be the catalyst essential for a successful reaction.

INDIVIDUAL REHABILITATION

And so, to conclude, I return to the fourth and last method of solving the problem - by the progressive rehabilitation of individual refugees through education and employment. This is the method which, for want of any better, we have had to resort to in the past, and which we may well have to rely on in the future if, again, no progress can be made in

other directions. But let us not underestimate the efficacy and relative economy of this method. It would indeed be quite wrong to dismiss it as a confession of failure or a surrender to inertia and immobilism. Even if, in the new circumstances now existing, it should prove possible to make progress with other methods, there will still be a need to educate and train the young refugees so that they may lead useful lives, wherever their future may lie. Indeed this is an essential element in any approach to a solution of the problem. Moreover, a policy of continuing to promote individual rehabilitation through education and training is in fact an insurance policy against the risk that other methods may never be adopted or, if adopted, may not succeed.

I am glad to be able to tell you that, amid all its preoccupations with the urgent, day-to-day tasks arising from the emergency, UNRWA has been able to give time and thought to the further development of its education and training resources and has already presented to potential donors specific proposals which would have the effect of increasing by about 45% the total number of places available in UNRWA training centres, of increasing by about 50% the capacity of the UNRWA/Unesco Institute of Education which conducts the in-service training of the four thousand or so unqualified and underqualified teachers in UNRWA schools, of replacing all unsatisfactory school buildings over a period of about three years, of eliminating over-crowding and double shifting in the classrooms and of improving the pupil/teacher ratio, which is essential for raising the quality of the teaching in our schools. I hope you will find this evidence

of hopeful, forward-looking planning on UNRWA's part as encouraging as I do myself.

If these plans are put in hand, the Agency will be committing itself to an act of faith, a policy of hope. For this means investment in a future which is still uncertain. It presumes that, in spite of present set-backs, the Arab countries of the Middle East will again achieve a rapid rate of economic development and that opportunities of productive employment will again be created and will demand an increasing supply of educated and trained men and women.

It presumes also that in future, funds will be forthcoming to meet increased operating costs arising from the investment in new, improved and enlarged schools, laboratories, libraries and training centres.

But this will not be the first time that UNRWA has proceeded in faith - and so far its trust in the resilience of Arab society, in the energy and ability of the refugees themselves and in the generosity and humane concern of governments and peoples elsewhere in the world has not been misplaced. Indeed, in the absence of a more radical solution, there is no alternative if the refugees are not to be left to stagnate and fall further back in their struggle to recover their economic independence.

CONCLUSION

I wish it were possible for me to give you some clearer ray of light, to indicate to you some more positive hope of resolving once and for all this bitter problem. Believe me, I deeply regret that the organisation for which I work cannot contribute more than it does towards a just and lasting solution. I regret also that what we do to ameliorate this human tragedy is not more effective and that our work is not free from defects and

shortcomings. But in any consideration of the role which UNRWA plays in this whole entangled affair, there is one thing which needs saying in justice to all the many devoted men and women - for the most part themselves Palestinians and refugees - who, in earlier years as well as now, have spent so much energy and so much thought and care in the service of the refugee community. They cannot and should not be held responsible for the fact that that in the years from 1917 to 1948 the world created a problem which it could not solve. No one should allow an understandable exasperation over a stubborn, intractable problem to cloud his judgment of the solid, unpretentious but infinitely worthwhile job which this instrument of the world community is performing in the Middle East.



CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y.

(1827/247/67)

20 December 1967

Dear Tony,

Palestine Refugees

You may be interested to see the attached record by the Minister of State of the conversation at a lunch given recently by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, at which Dr. Michelmores of UNRWA and Senator Javits were also present.

N/I.

For ever,

Stephen

(S.L. Egerton)

A.R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

pm
MTS 2/1
✓ 23/1



I should have recorded before that a week or so ago I had lunch at the invitation of Prince Sadruddin with him and Mr. Michelmores and Senator Javits. The purpose of the lunch was to discuss the problem of the Palestine Refugees and what might be done by private interests here in the United States to raise large-scale funds for a new and ambitious scheme to solve the refugee problem once and for all.

2. Senator Javits said that he and a number of other leaders in the United States contemplated a scheme to cost a billion dollars. He thought that a quarter of that amount might be raised by contributions from various companies and industries and private subscribers in the United States. He thought that another quarter or more might be raised by contributions from the United States and other Governments, and the remainder might, he thought, be found on loan from the World Bank and other banking sources.

3. Our discussion was mainly directed not to the purposes and finances of such a scheme but to the question whether the time had come for him to initiate such a plan.

4. I need not record the full discussion but the upshot was that it was necessary to await at least the early discussions which Ambassador Jarring is going to undertake in the Middle East. With this conclusion Senator Javits agreed. He said that he was shortly visiting Israel and that later on he would keep in touch with Prince Sadruddin to consider, in the light of Ambassador Jarring's first recommendations, whether a plan of the kind which he had contemplated might be launched.

(Caradon)
18 December 1967

original entered at ER3/5

CONFIDENTIAL

(63)



1. Sir D. Allen

2. Mr. Branchley

3. Eastern Dept

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I had lunch with Mr. Remez, the Israeli

Ambassador the other day. No one else was present.

2. He said that Israel would cooperate with Mr. Jarring but with a view to facilitating direct negotiations, either with the other Arab countries as a group or singly. He thought that Jordan might be willing to negotiate directly.

3. On specific points he thought that withdrawal would depend on secure frontiers. He understood the difficulty of formal recognition of Israel by the Arab countries and would settle for an end of belligerency and the covert goodwill of the oil countries.

4. When I suggested that Nasser's recent speech revealed a new confidence he tended to agree but did not think that Russian support would go beyond a certain point. I mentioned Russian intervention in the Yemen. But he thought they would soon see their mistake.

5. I pressed him on the elements of a settlement. On the Canal he was non-committal and switched to the Gulf of Aqaba and asked about Bab el Mandeb. I said that in Geneva we had obtained South Arabian agreement to take over our international obligations, including the 1958 Agreement. He agreed that the new independent State could not be tied further.

6. He thought Sinai should be demilitarised, but I could not draw him on the future of Jerusalem /beyond

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2.

beyond the basic Israeli position.

7. We had a long talk about refugees which I considered to be basic to Nasser's motivation. Mr. Remez said that the Israeli Government had commissioned a report on resettlement and were considering whether to publish. The main proposals would be for an international fund to compensate or resettle, the transfer of many of the Gaza Strip people to the Jordan Valley, the absorption in various Arab countries of quotas, and the retention within Israel of about 200,000. This would bring the Arab element in Israel to about 500,000, the maximum which a country of 2,500,000 could absorb.

8. I spoke briefly of the danger of an arms race. As usual he agreed but insisted on Israeli defence needs. On our rapprochement with the Arab world he gradually accepted my arguments that as a neutral country we could be more helpful if we were in normal relations with all countries in the area.

(G.O. ROBERTS)

12 December, 1967

Copies to:

Eastern Dept.
N.E.A.D.
Aden Dept.

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*Separate action on Bd
papers on para 4.
- Copy on to Refugee papers
(para 7) & submit to
Mr. Danyal
pa [signature] 12*

Miss Warburton

Please see Lord Caradon's letter to Sir Richard Beaumont of 1 December at folio 20.

2. I learn from Eastern Department that Sir Richard Beaumont's special "unit" has ceased to exist. Sir Richard is currently on leave, and I have been unable to discover his plans for next month. I have spoken with Mr. Rich and Mr. Moore, neither of whom thinks that there would be any point in arranging for Sir Richard to talk with Lord Caradon in January.

3. Refugees will doubtless be covered in the agenda of talks with Mr. Roberts?

R.B. Bone

(R.B. Bone)
20 December, 1967

Mr. Moberly


We expect to arrange a discussion of the M.E. while Lord Caradon is here in Jan., probably with Mr. Roberts. May we take it that we can tell Lord Caradon that his interest in refugees can be covered then?

Anne Warburton

21/12.

Miss Warburton informed that this was overtake by Grant and that there was no hint at the meeting for anything but a brief comment on refugees & a fuller discussion will take place on 18/1.

per *MA 12/1*



Mr. Mobley / cm.

This paper should
presumably now be
entered into E Dgt.

The ~~notes~~ attach-
ment has been
circulated as Annex

B of the SCg Ctee
paper (SC (67) 52).

2P3/14 McGouley
" 7/2

Enter E.

cm.

T. xii

McGouley

EE 18/12.

Permanent Under-Secretary

PALESTINE REFUGEES

... [I submit a version of our paper on Palestine refugees, which takes account of the views of departments responsible.

Flag A

2. We have now had the comments of Lord Caradon and Sir P. Dean on this paper.] Sir P. Dean reports [in his telegram No. 3370 of 27 October] that the Americans are in general agreement with the principles set out in the paper, except that they think it important that any agency dealing with the resettlement of refugees should be outside the United Nations because the Arabs could less easily obstruct its work if they wished to do so and because it would make it easier for one Arab country to go ahead with resettlement without the others. These arguments are valid, but the task of setting up and financing a non-United Nations organisation for resettlement is likely to be extremely difficult, and we are still left with the possibility that it may be Israel rather than the Arabs which is the stumbling-block. [In a more recent telegram Sir P. Dean states that the Americans, who were inclined to wait and see what becomes of the appointment of a United Nations Special Representative on the Arab/Israel conflict, are now thinking of taking an earlier initiative. (Washington telegram No. 3386 of 30 October)]

Flag B

Flag C

Flag D

2 Lord Caradon [(New York telegram No. 2919 of 29 October and Mr. Youde's letter 1527/178/67 of 28 October to Mr. Moore)] agrees with the proposals put forward in our paper, but is not clear how they can be put into practice. He [agrees that the American idea for a pilot scheme is a non-starter and] considers, rightly in our

/opinion

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opinion, that we should avoid purely American or Anglo-American schemes. He reverts to the idea of setting up a three- or four-man United Nations commission of experts to be appointed by the Secretary-General to reassess the refugee problem and to make recommendations on resettlement. This would be entirely separate from the Special Representative's mission, which would not need to concern itself with refugees [and it could be mounted when the UNRWA debate comes up in New York.]

3. It is clearly important for humanitarian reasons that some initiative should be taken soon over refugees ~~and I am convinced~~^{but} ~~that~~ the American suggestion of a Great Power initiative outside the United Nations is both undesirable and unlikely to succeed. Lord Caradon's suggestion for a Commission is in theory attractive; but we should not underrate the difficulties of it, which are:

- (a) that no constructive solution of the refugee problem is likely to be achieved in advance of a general settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute. It will have to be a part of that settlement, as Mr. Youde admits in paragraph 8 of his letter; and
- (b) that even the setting up of a Special Commission may be thwarted by the Arab States and their supporters, as
 - (i) being the thin end of the wedge, which might eventually deprive the Palestine Arabs of their fundamental right to return to their homes by planning their resettlement outside Isreal (and, indeed, the West Bank) and also:
 - (ii) depriving the Arab States of what they have always considered to be one of their strongest political cards (i.e. the plight of the refugees); and in any eventual settlement exposing them to the danger of recognition of Israel without any
/assurance

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assurance of Israeli withdrawal from the present occupied areas.

These drawbacks seem to us to be conclusive.

4. [I have therefore suggested that] Any Special Commission to look into this question should be instructed to submit its report (which should be made public) and recommendations to the Secretary-General's Representative designated to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. [Lord Caradon agrees in principle, but prefers to await the outcome of the present round of debates in the United Nations before expressing a final opinion.

x | [6. I suggest that the paper as now amended should be adopted as a Steering Committee Paper and the background brief on Arab refugees be covered by a minute on the above lines, which has been seen by Eastern and United Nations (Political) Departments.

7. Immediate action in Mr. Youde's letter is being left to Eastern Department.]

(R. A. Beaumont)

13 November, 1967

Copies to:

Sir D. Allen
Sir D. Greenhill
Mr. Hayman
Mr. Brenchley

Heads of:

Eastern Department
United Nations (Political) Department
United Nations (Economic & Social) Department
News Department
Planning Staff
Mr. Paul (Joint Research Department)

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Yes - for - proceed as
at X (for steering
com purposes the
minute w. 1
amend be
shortened
& become a brief
cover with
less

less references to tele. de)
I hope we can discuss
a steering letter paper now
fairly soon

John 11/11

Boyle HA 15/11
L.R. Beaumont 11/15/11
L. P. Weston 11/16/11
to Goulding MG 16/11

PALESTINE REFUGEES

The refugee problem derives from the flight of Palestinian Arabs during the Arab-Jewish fighting of 1948 from their homes in what is now Israel. The Arab Governments maintain by and large that these people were driven out by the Israelis; the Israeli authorities that they fled of their own accord and unnecessarily. A second wave of refugees was created by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan in June, 1967. This "new refugee" problem includes some "old refugees" who were settled on the West Bank. The rest of this paper deals exclusively with the "old refugees" but includes these people. It does not cover the "new refugees" from the West Bank or the Gaza Strip or Israeli-occupied Syria. It is still hoped that the majority of these will return to the West Bank and their former homes (or places of residence). The Israelis should be pressed to take these people back to the West Bank as soon as possible, so that any solution of the general refugee problem can use as its starting point the position on 4 June, 1967.

2. Our best statistics of the "old refugees" as on 4 June, 1967 are:-

(a) Total number of refugees: about 1,300,000

(b) Of whom:

700,000 in Jordan

300,000 in the Gaza Strip

160,000 in Lebanon

140,000 in Syria

Small numbers are to be found in Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

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(c) Of the 700,000 in Jordan, 400,000 were, before the recent hostilities, on the West Bank and 300,000 on the East Bank.

(d) Of the 700,000 in Jordan, some 230,000 were living in camps.
Note: It looks as though some 100,000 "old refugees" who crossed to the East Bank after 5 June will remain on the East Bank as well as about 100,000 "new refugees".

3. Since the formation of the State of Israel the refugees have been given relief aid through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) at a cost of some \$37 million a year, provided mainly by the United States and United Kingdom Governments. UNRWA has been effective within its terms of reference, but has been unable to devote its resources to resettling refugees, whose numbers have continued to swell as a result of the food and medical facilities which it has provided. The United Kingdom and United States Governments have of late been worried at having to continue to finance the Agency indefinitely, particularly as the Arab Governments have been adamant in refusing to talk of resettlement or even to ensure that only those refugees in need have taken advantage of the relief schemes.

4. The refugee problem has added considerably to the inherent instability of the Middle East situation. The presence of the refugees, both in camps and outside, has tended to prolong the memories of Arab defeat in 1948, has been a breeding ground for political agitators and terrorists and has to some extent held back Jordan's economic advance. For these reasons alone it is in Her Majesty's Government's interest to secure a settlement of the problem.

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5. The broad elements of the dispute over the refugees are to be found in the interpretations of General Assembly Resolution No. 194 (iii) of 11 December, 1948. The Arab case is that paragraph 11 of the Resolution must be implemented. This requires ".... that the refugees wishing to return to their homes, and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property, which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible."

The Israelis, while not disputing paragraph 11, argue that it cannot be taken in isolation and there must be a settlement on the basis of the whole of General Assembly Resolution No. 194, i.e. that there must be a full peace settlement taking into account all the factors in dispute. In practice, we were of the opinion until June, 1967, that the Israelis would accept the return of refugees only when they were certain that the number of those wishing to return would be sufficiently small to pose no problems to Israel in economic and public security fields. In 1949, for example, she offered to take 100,000 refugees plus all the refugees in the Gaza Strip if the Gaza Strip were ceded to her as part of a peace settlement.

6. It is in Her Majesty's Government's interests to secure a settlement of the refugee problem, if necessary in isolation, both in order to free ourselves from having to contribute to UNRWA and in order to promote the peace of the Middle East. In practice, /however,

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however, any solution of the refugee problem in the immediate future will probably have to be part of an overall settlement of the Arab/Israel conflict. For this, the present time probably offers the best opportunity which has yet presented itself, for the following reasons:

- (a) There is strong international pressure for a final solution to the Arab/Israel conflict;
- (b) The Israelis have assets with which they can hope to strike a bargain with the Arabs;
- (c) The Russians have admitted the need for an overall settlement;
- (d) The Americans support Israel's hopes to use her conquests to seek a solution;
- (e) The U.A.R. needs some form of settlement to release her from economic difficulties (though these difficulties have now been alleviated by the promise of aid by the oil producing States);
- (f) King Hussein more than ever needs to reduce the potential internal threat posed by the dissatisfaction of his refugees; and
- (g) After the latest example of the inability of the Arabs to solve the problem by military means, many of the refugees must be expected to have lost hope in a solution by force and to be correspondingly more willing to accept a political solution.

7. . If a general settlement were to come about by stages, following Israeli withdrawal and Arab recognition that belligerence
/had

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had ended, the refugee problem should in our view, come second in priority after the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. We believe that the Israelis, the Russians and probably the Americans would accept this. In advance of such a general settlement however we should be prepared to support, and in certain circumstances to participate in, constructive international discussions for the solution of the refugee problem.

8. On the hypothesis that a general settlement would include on Israel's part withdrawal from most of the recently occupied territories and on the Arabs' part a formal end of belligerency and a recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, a consequent solution of the refugee problem could be based on a combination of some of the following possibilities:

- (a) Israeli agreement to take a number for resettlement in Israel, and to provide compensation for the remainder.
- (b) Arab agreement that as large numbers as possible should be integrated in the host countries.
- (c) Arab agreement that a proportion should be settled in other Arab countries notably Iraq and Syria.
- (d) Arab agreement that encouragement should be given to refugees to settle outside the Middle East, e.g., Canada, Australia and Latin America. A special appeal would be made to the countries concerned to accept Arab immigrants.
- (e) Intensive development of the West Bank as a province in which as many refugees as possible would be settled.

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In that case the West Bank would probably become an autonomous province of Jordan.

- (f) Large-scale international financial contributions to subsidise resettlement under (b), (c), (d) and (e) above, and possibly to contribute to the compensation which would be principally supplied by Israel, but which would need to be on a generous scale and might therefore be beyond Israel's capacity.
- (g) The establishment of a new international office possibly under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ascertain the wishes of the refugees, and to assist with putting the various schemes into effect.

9. On the assumption that any of these suggestions were politically acceptable to the parties concerned, the Israelis would have to be prepared to pay large sums in compensation and final agreement could easily break down on over-ambitious Arab demands. The best estimate of the value of Arab property left in Israel in 1948 was made by the Palestine Conciliation Commission in 1966. This put the value of Arab property at about \$500 million at 1947 values. Allowing for inflation, present day values might be about \$1,000 million, or even \$1,500 million if interest were taken into account. Such a sum could presumably be found, if not by Israel alone, by international (mainly American) contributions. It would not however be found without a struggle and the final figure might well be less, particularly since Israel might make counter-claims for Jewish property taken over in Arab countries.

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10. In theory a Referendum would be the fairest way to ascertain the wishes of the individual refugees. But in practice this is unlikely to work. In the first place, the Arab Governments would almost certainly, as hitherto, try to influence the decision of the refugees for political reasons which had little or not relation to their real desires and needs. Secondly, it would probably be difficult to be specific about the alternatives open to the refugees, since in advance of the results of the Referendum it might not be possible to state with any certainty the amount of compensation payable in individual cases.

11. Similar difficulties would attend attempts to settle the refugees outside the Middle East, or even in their present host countries. The former solution would in the first place run counter to their previous demands and to the spirit of the United Nations resolutions. It is, moreover, uncertain whether Canada and Australia, for example, would have the will or capacity to cope with large scale immigration of Palestinians. It would also seem almost impossible to overcome politically the insistence of the Arab Governments that the refugees should be given the right to return to their homes in Palestine, which has been the corner stone of Arab policy for the last twenty years.

12. In fact no solution is likely to be acceptable either to the refugees themselves or to the Arab Governments which did not contain:-

- (a) the right of the refugees to return to their homes; and
- (b) the right of compensation.

Undoubtedly, if the right of the refugees to return home were conceded by the Israelis, the Arab Governments would press for the

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/refugees

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refugees returning home to have restored to them or to be compensated for, the properties they had left behind in 1948. This would be both impracticable and unacceptable to the Israelis. But it might afford a point of departure in a negotiation, as a result of which something on the following lines might emerge:-

- (a) The refugees would be given the right to return to their homes under Israeli rule, in which case they would receive a small grant from the Israeli Government to settle them, but would not necessarily get their former properties back or only a part of them.
- (b) Those who did not opt to return to Israel would be given the following options:-
 - (i) settlement on the West Bank of the Jordan (probably demilitarised and under Jordanian rule), with a grant and the promise of massive international aid in the development of the West Bank, which would have difficulty in absorbing them;
 - (ii) "permanent resettlement in present host countries, or in other Arab countries, with again, a grant, perhaps larger for the individuals and an annual payment from international sources to the host government over a period of, say, five years to cover the absorption of these refugees into its economy;
 - (iii) settlement outside the Middle East altogether, with a much larger individual grant and perhaps the assisted passage to any country willing to /accept

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accept the refugee in question, which would then resettle him and his family in accordance with its usual resettlement programme (i.e. without an international financial contribution).

13. Clearly, from the point of view of Israel, the last of these solutions (i.e. (b)(iii)) would be the most advantageous, since it would remove the refugees from the Middle East and they would therefore cease to be an Arab political pawn in the Arab/Israel conflict. It is, on the face of it, unlikely that many of the refugees would wish to return to Israel, unless the compensation were generous. It is most likely that the majority would wish to stay in the Muslim Middle East and it would take a very strong financial inducement to make them leave the area. In fact, by adjustment of the grants to be made in relation to any of the options outlined above, it should be possible to weight the choice before the individual refugee. This could be arranged by negotiation between the contributors of the funds, Israel and the Arab countries under United Nations auspices.

14. The difficulties in bringing about a solution on these lines should not be under-estimated. Israeli acceptance would depend on only a few refugees wishing to return. If the vast majority are to agree not to return, the compensation offered will need to be very high and will raise the difficult question of availability of funds. The Arabs' estimate of the cost of resettlement in Arab States (in addition to individual compensation) is likely to be very high indeed.

15. In the short term there is no alternative to UNRWA for the care of the refugees, but it is the object of this exercise that it

/should

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should be allowed to disappear. Indeed, its disappearance at an early stage of any internationally agreed scheme to resettle the refugees would be advisable, since, by the nature of its work and, particularly, as a result of the policies of the "host" Arab countries, UNRWA has concentrated more on relief than on resettlement. It would therefore be advisable to hand over the arrangements for resettlement to some other body. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (at present Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan), which has a much more positive attitude to resettlement, would be the obvious body to resettle refugees who opt to leave the Middle East and start again elsewhere. It would be for consideration whether this same organisation would be the channel through which the United Nations would communicate with and finance "host" governments in the Arab world during the period of absorption of the refugees.

16. Probably the greatest difficulty in connexion with the resettlement of refugees would be the Gaza Strip and its 300,000 refugees. They could certainly be fitted into the above scheme, but much might depend on the future political settlement of this area. In any case, it could not absorb economically the refugees at present there.

17. It is difficult to see what pro-Arab policies Her Majesty's Government could follow with regard to longer term solutions of the refugee problem, as opposed to gestures of immediate relief. Until now the Arabs have stood on the letter of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii), but because of outright Israeli opposition to this line we have never supported it. Even

/mild

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mild references to a wish for constructive developments in the refugee problem are likely to be taken by the Arabs as an attempt to liquidate the problem. As a result, there do not seem to be any initiatives which we could take without offending the Arabs. The best course seems to be to clear our own minds (perhaps in consultation with the United States and other allies) about likely practical solutions against the time when a general settlement is possible, and in the meantime confine ourselves to general expressions of hope that the tragic plight of the refugees can be remedied. This would not, of course, stop us continuing our present line of pressing the Israelis to allow the return to the West Bank of the new refugees.

18. A suggestion for financing a resettlement scheme is given at Annex.

10 October, 1967

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ANNEX

Finance

In 1966, UNRWA spent some \$37 million on the refugees, of which the United States contributed \$23 million and the United Kingdom \$5 million. ~~\$18 million~~

2. There is no breakdown of this sum into expenditure in each of the host countries. However, from a breakdown based purely on refugee population we arrive at the following approximate figures:

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of refugees</u>	<u>Expenditure from UNRWA sources</u>
Jordan	700,000	\$20 million
Gaza	300,000	\$8 million
Lebanon	160,000	\$5 million
Syria	140,000	\$4 million

3. If the refugees are taken into the host countries and UNRWA disbanded, the international community might have to make a one time grant to each refugee family. Thereafter the host countries would need international financial aid to tide them over the initial period. The refugees would have received compensation to enable them to make a start which should obviate the need in most cases for purely relief expenditure. What would be required would be funds available to set up schemes which would provide continuing employment for the refugees.

4. If the international community were to agree to pay into the host governments' budgets for, say, five (possibly up to ten) years the \$37 million which UNRWA collected, this might provide a balance sufficient for the governments to ensure the /refugees'

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refugees' economic future, because:

- (a) a certain number of refugees would have opted to live in Israel;
- (b) UNRWA has hitherto supported large numbers of refugees who did not need support, because the Agency has been unable to rectify the ration rolls;
- (c) the expenditure on UNRWA's expatriate staff and headquarters machinery would no longer be required;
- (d) many of the services, e.g. health and education, which took a large proportion of UNRWA's expenditure, are available in some degree to citizens of the host countries; and
- (e) as time goes by, assuming that the governments are spending the money wisely and conscientiously trying to absorb the refugees, an increasing number should become established members of the community and cease to require financial help from the host government.

5. We might, therefore, start out by considering payments in the region of \$37 million a year, though it may in the event be necessary to pay higher sums in the first few years and gradually reduce the payments towards the end of the period stipulated.

6. Any suggestion that the country in greatest need because of economic difficulties, i.e. Jordan, should be paid more per capita than the others would not be acceptable to the other governments.

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copy UN Dept 1. 17-17 Dec 1
2. Enter



UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y.

(1827/205/67)

7 December, 1967.

(21)

Dear Tony,

EE18/12.

(12)

United Nations Commission on the Palestine Refugees

A Would you please refer to our telegram No. 3085 of 8 November, in which the Minister of State agreed that consideration of his idea about the establishment of a United Nations Commission of Enquiry on the Refugees should be deferred until after the Security Council had decided on the terms of a mandate for the Secretary-General's Special Representative?

3 2. Since then Lord Caradon has had talks with the Jordan Minister for Foreign Affairs (al-Rifai), with Dr. Michelmores of UNRWA, and with Ambassador Jarring (c.f. paragraph 7 of our telegram No. 3493 of 29 November). The overriding Jordanian concern was clearly to try and get the Israelis to allow many or most of the "new" refugees back to their homes, (or, in the case of displaced "old" refugees, to their camps) on the West Bank. The Jordanians seemed much less concerned, for the present, with the problem of trying to make progress on the hard-core of the problem, what to do with the 1948 refugees.

3. Lord Caradon may have further opportunity for discussion with Jarring before he sets out for the Middle East, but he now thinks that it will be best to leave it to Jarring to get on with his preliminary consultations before we put forward any new proposal. Later on there may be good reason to revert to the idea of a United Nations Commission to review the problem of the refugees and to make new and comprehensive proposals for dealing with the whole problem. But clearly the question of the return of new refugees to the West Bank and old refugees to the Jordan Valley camps will be in the forefront of Jarring's initial consultations, and it may be that reference to these immediate questions will be amongst his first recommendations.

4. I might also mention here that Prince Sadruddin has suggested to Jarring that a man experienced in refugee problems from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and another experienced man from UNRWA might be seconded to work with Jarring (Sadruddin had consulted

the Minister (to see with (20)).

/Michelmores

A.R. Moore Esq., C.M.G.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

UN Dept
m. Davis

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Michelmores who agreed with this suggestion). Sadruddin had in mind that these two men would not only be a great help to Jarring but would also act in liaison with him and Michelmores. Jarring thanked Sadruddin for the proposal and said that he would bear it in mind, though he did not wish to act on it immediately.

5. Meanwhile we expect at the most a shorter UNRWA debate than usual, probably starting within the next day or two. The Arabs are already claiming that time is too short to discuss this matter adequately now and they may "reserve their right" to bring the subject up again in a resumed or special session in the early months of 1968.

6. We shall report again about this soon.

7. Copies of this letter are being sent to Urwick in Washington, and to the Chanceries at Amman, Beirut, Cairo and UKDEL, Geneva.

John, En
P.H.

(C.P. Hope)

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(20)



UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

845 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

1 December, 1967.

EE18/12.

Have arranged
tentative
arrangements
for Prince
Sadraddin
to be in the
UK early
in February,
but not, I
think, before
then.

8/11

B.V.
notes.
18/12/67
to Mr. Bone
(UN Pol).

I think you know Prince Sadraddin Aga Khan,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
I have always liked him very much and I have a
high opinion of the way he has tackled his present
big task.

2. He has been here in New York for the past week
or two and has several times spoken to me about the
problem of the Palestine refugees. He has just
been to see me and left with me a memorandum on
the subject which he says that he has not shown to
others. I have not yet studied it, but when I
have done so I shall send it to you with my comments.
I am not sure that he intended it to be shown to
anyone else so if you see him it may be best not
to refer to it.

3. During our discussion I told him that I had
been in consultation with you on Palestine refugee
problems and I said that I thought it would be a
good thing if he could look in to see you when he
is next in London. He said that he was eager to
do so and would get in touch with you to tell you
when he next arranged to visit London from Geneva.
He will be returning to Geneva in a week or so.
He is going to Washington now and will probably
come to see me again before he leaves the United
States.

4. He has been having discussions with Gunnar
Jarring and after talking to Michelmores he has
suggested to Jarring that he (Sadraddin) and
Michelmores might each nominate someone with
experience in refugee problems to work temporarily
on Jarring's staff. Jarring made no immediate
reply to this suggestion, and I may have an

/opportunity

Sir Richard Beaumont, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

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opportunity of finding out what he thinks about it when Jarring has lunch with me on Sunday.


5. I dare say that I shall be writing to you about refugee problems again before long. I hope to be in London next month and I should like to come and talk to you then. The purpose of this note is merely to warn you that Sadruddin may get in touch with you and I certainly recommend that you should see him.

Fousser
Hugh
(Caradon)

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original entered ER2/19



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For Para. 4

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 3493

29 NOVEMBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3493 OF 29 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO
BEIRUT NICOSIA AND SAVING TO STOCKHOLM MOSCOW UKMIS GENEVA
ROME AND JERUSALEM.

YOUR TEL, NO. 6812 (NOT TO ALL) MIDDLE EAST.

I WENT TO CALL ON AMBASSADOR JARRING THIS MORNING TO
PAY MY RESPECTS TO HIM AND TO WISH HIM WELL. I TOLD HIM SOMETHING
OF THE DISCUSSIONS LEADING UP TO THE UNANIMOUS VOTE FOR THE
RESOLUTION LAST WEEK AND THE PART PLAYED BY THE TWO SIDES
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

2. AS TO HIS PROGRAMME OF WORK, HE SAID THAT HE HAD INTENDED
FIRST TO GO TO THE CAPITALS, SPENDING TWO OR THREE DAYS IN
EACH, MERELY TO LISTEN TO WHAT THE GOVERNMENTS HAD TO SAY,
AND HE HAD HOPED TO START OUT ON THIS ROUND QUITE SOON.
BUT NOW IN VIEW OF THE TALK OF AN ARAB SUMMIT ROUND ABOUT 9
DECEMBER HE DID NOT THINK THAT HE SHOULD GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST
IMMEDIATELY. HE HAD GATHERED THAT THE ARABS MIGHT BE IRRITATED
IF HE DID SO BEFORE THE SUMMIT. CONSEQUENTLY FOR THE TIME
BEING HE INTENDED TO STAY IN NEW YORK THOUGH HE WOULD OF COURSE
HAVE TO THINK AGAIN IF THE ARAB SUMMIT WERE POSTPONED OR CANCELLED.

3. MEANWHILE HE WAS SEEING SOME OF THE DELEGATES HERE AND HE HAD
TODAY HAD A GOOD TALK WITH KUZNETSOV (WHOM HE KNOWS AND LIKES WELL).
HE IS TO HAVE LUNCH WITH KUZNETSOV TOMORROW. LATER TODAY HE IS TO
MEET THE SYRIANS (DAOUDI AND TOMEH).

4. JARRING THEN SPOKE ABOUT HIS BASE FOR OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NO ARAB CAPITAL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO
OTHER ARABS (HE DID NOT MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF JERUSALEM). HE
SAID THAT HE HAD THOUGHT OF CYPRUS WHICH WOULD BE IN MANY WAYS THE

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UKMISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3493 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

MOST CONVENIENT CENTRE, AND HE WOULD HAVE A LIGHT PLANE AT HIS DISPOSAL. BUT WITH THE PRESENT UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT CYPRUS HE DOUBTED WHETHER HE COULD PROCEED WITH THIS PLAN, THOUGH THE PRESENT DANGERS OVER CYPRUS HE HOPED MIGHT BE OVER IN A WEEK OR TWO. ALTERNATIVELY HE HAD THOUGHT OF RHODES, BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD OBJECTED. HE WAS CONSIDERING GENEVA THOUGH THIS WAS TOO FAR AWAY, AND WE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF ROME.

5. I SPOKE ABOUT THE SUEZ CANAL AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE TRAPPED SHIPS. THERE ARE TWO SWEDISH SHIPS AMONGST THEM SO HE KNEW THE PROBLEM, AND HE WAS RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA THAT A START MIGHT BE MADE BY SEEKING AGREEMENT TO RELEASE THEM. HE SAID THAT HE HAD VERY MUCH IN MIND THE AIM OF SMALL STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION TO START WITH.

6. JARRING ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD THE MOST IMPARTIAL POSITION IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS AND HE THEREFORE WELCOMED WHAT I SAID ABOUT OUR ANXIETY TO GIVE HIM EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE A PERSONAL TALK WITH ME IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT WEEK OR SO.

7. I SPOKE TO HIM ABOUT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. AS TO THE QUESTION OF THE QUOTE NEW UNQUOTE REFUGEES RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES ON THE WEST BANK AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGING THAT SOME OF THE QUOTE OLD UNQUOTE REFUGEES SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO THE UNRWA CAMPS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, HE SAID THAT THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE VERY MUCH IN THE FOREFRONT OF HIS EARLY DISCUSSIONS. ON THE QUESTION OF THE HARD CORE PROBLEM OF THE QUOTE OLD UNQUOTE REFUGEES, I TOLD HIM THAT I PERSONALLY HAD THOUGHT THAT WHILE HE GOT ON WITH THE REST OF HIS TASK THERE MIGHT BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR MAKING AN INTERIM RECOMMENDATION THAT A HIGH LEVEL COMMISSION MIGHT BE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE PLAN. HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS WORTH CONSIDERATION.

/8. I HAD

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UKMISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3493 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-3-

8. I HAD ONLY MET JARRING ONCE BEFORE IN SWEDEN. I WAS MUCH IMPRESSED, AS I EXPECTED TO BE, BY HIS CALMNESS AND STEADINESS.

F.O. PASS AMMAN 471, TEL AVIV 616, CAIRO 218, BEIRUT 213, NICOSIA 122 AND SAVING STOCKHOLM 38, MOSCOW 110, UKMIS GENEVA 155, ROME 37 AND JERUSALEM 43.

LORD CARADON

[REPETITION TO CARIO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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\$ 4.5m

Old £
1.607,140

New £
1.974,700

\$ 5.00 m

1.785.700

2,083,000

\$ 5.25 m

1.874,985

2.187,150

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
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2. E.H.
APR 30.11
BRITISH EMBASSY, 27.11

TEL AVIV.

23 November, 1967.

1825/67



Dear Tony,

Palestine Refugees

We have read with much interest Sir R. Beaumont's paper on this subject enclosed with your letter of 11 October to Urwick, and the subsequent correspondence from Washington and New York. Following the unanimous acceptance by the Security Council of a United Kingdom resolution which inter alia affirms the necessity of "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem", it is perhaps time for us to let you have our comments also.

2. We are in broad agreement with Sir R. Beaumont's approach - particularly with his emphasis on trying to solve the problem on a regional basis. More important, we believe that this fits in with current Israeli thinking on the problem and that they might be persuaded to participate in a scheme along the lines mapped out by Sir R. Beaumont. As you will recall, Mr. Eban (our telegram No. 1003) and Mr. Eshkol (our telegram No. 1211) have both indicated in major statements in the last few weeks that any solution of the refugee problem can only be brought about with regional and international coöperation.

3. The central question for the Israelis will be how many refugees they would be expected to accept for resettlement in this country. As well as the problems of economy and public security mentioned in paragraph 5 of Sir R. Beaumont's paper, demographic considerations will loom large in Israel's calculation of the number of refugees she could safely re-admit. In addition she is also likely to make great play of the fact that she has absorbed anything between six hundred thousand and one million Jews from Arab countries since 1948; she would therefore insist that these "refugees" should also be regarded as a factor in the equation. Apart from the Gaza refugees who would automatically be Israel's responsibility if the Strip were ceded to her, it would be optimistic to count on her taking back more than a token number of refugees (say fifty thousand) from other areas.

4. While we may have to accept the practical limitation on Israel's capacity to absorb more than a small proportion of the refugees, there seems no reason why we should not insist that she should bear the lion's share of the cost of their resettlement. It is worth remembering that in the four

/weeks

A.R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

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four weeks after the Six Day War World Jewry raised \$230 million for Israel and that, since then, further large sums have come in from the same source. If Israel fund-raisers set their minds to it, there is little doubt that they could run a highly successful "Save the Refugees to Save Israel" campaign which could easily top the target figures envisaged in the Annex to Sir R. Beaumont's paper.

5. The Israelis have long questioned UNRWA's definition of what constitutes a refugee and cannot be expected to accept the statistics quoted in paragraph 2 of Sir R. Beaumont's paper. To illustrate their scepticism of UNRWA's figures I enclose a copy of a recent work by Dr. Walter Pinner entitled The Legend of the Arab Refugees. Eastern Department has already received a copy of the first results of the Israel census of the occupied territories which also casts doubt on these figures.

6. The timing of any attempt to solve the refugee problem will doubtless now be linked to the progress on the ground of the resolution which the Security Council has just passed. If, however, the Secretary-General's special representative runs into trouble, and at the end of the day a general settlement is brought no nearer, it should be noted that the Israelis have indicated that they would not be opposed to the separate settlement of particular questions, including the refugee problem. The most recent authoritative statement on these lines was made on behalf of the Israel Government by the Minister of Labour, Mr. Yigal Allon, in his speech at the Balfour Dinner in the Knesset on 2 November when he included amongst the questions which might be solved independently of a general settlement refugees; the re-opening of the Suez Canal to navigation, including Israeli vessels; and facilities for foreign tourists of all nationalities to cross ceasefire lines between Israel and her neighbours.

7. We see advantage in Sir R. Beaumont's suggestion (Foreign Office telegram No. 6051) that a United Nations Commission might be set up after the appointment of the Secretary-General's special representative in order to assist him on this aspect of his task. If in its findings the Commission were to suggest that a solution of the refugee problem should be devised by a body outside the United Nations, then so much the better. Not only would this help the Americans to sell the idea to Congress (paragraph 5 of Urwick's letter (1825) of 4 November), but it would also probably go a long way to secure Israel's support for the plan. They are likely to be far more cooperative with an outside organisation since they have little faith in the realism or impartiality of the United Nations.

8. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Washington, Amman, Beirut and the United Kingdom Missions at New York and Geneva.


Yours ever
 Norman Aspin
 (N. Aspin)

En Clair

TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Telno. 1003

UNCLASSIFIED



6 September 1967

TOP COPY

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1003 of 6 September
Repeated for information to Amman Benghazi Bahrain Jeddah Khartoum
Kuwait Tripoli Tunis Cairo Algiers Beirut Belgrade
Washington Moscow UKMIS New York HC Aden Paris and UKDEL
NATO.

My telegram No. 989.

Foreign Minister's press conference.

At a televised press Conference on Tuesday, 5 September,
Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs again rejected President
Tito's proposals for solving the Arab/Israel problem. He
repeated Israel's call for directly negotiated peace settlements,
official transcript of conference follows by Bag.

2. Following are main points of interest:

- (a) Resolutions of Khartoum Arab summit had strengthened Israel's need and right to maintain the present situation until a new arrangement is made with Arab neighbours.
- (b) To describe the Arab attitude in Khartoum as moderate was unjustified. The adoption of resolutions providing for 'no recognition, no negotiations and no peace' was in violation of three fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter.
- (c) The U.N. Should take a 'modest and realistic view' of its role in the present dispute at its forthcoming General Assembly. Mr. Eban questioned the U.N.'s right to make recommendations affecting Israel's security since it had done nothing to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in June.
- (d) Israel hoped to make some interim proposals about the refugee problem at the annual debate on U.N.R.W.A. However no complete solution could be achieved without regional and international co-operation.
- (e) He believed that the re-opening of the Suez Canal would be facilitated now that the Arab States had dropped their oil embargo, but noted that Egypt and Israel were bound by a mutual agreement regarding the use of the canal. Official sources are reported to have subsequently added the gloss that if Egypt were to remove the block ships and re-open the canal to international shipping Israel would not object.

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9/14/67
p.a.

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TEL AVIV TELNO. 1003 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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If, however, Israeli ships were refused permission to use the canal, Israel would ensure that Egyptian ships were likewise barred.

Foreign Office please pass UKDEL NATO as my telegram No. 4

Mr. Hadow.

Sent 1140Z/6 September

Recd 1332Z/6 September

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TOP COPY

Telno 1211

31 October 1967

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1211 of 31 October.
Repeated for information to U.K. Mission New York, Washington,
Amman and Cairo.

Middle East.

Following are main points of interest in speech made by
Israel Prime Minister yesterday at opening of winter session
of Knesset:-

- (a) Problems of Middle East can only be solved by a permanent peace based on direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. Israel is prepared to conduct negotiations with all the neighbouring countries together or with any one of them separately. There is no sense in entering into discussions on the conditions of a settlement except in direct negotiations.
- (b) Mr. Eshkol expressed the hope that the world powers and the United Nations would avoid 'obscure and meaningless formula like declarations of cessation of belligerency'. Such 'empty declarations' could only have the result of strengthening those who are bent on war.
- (c) By replenishing the arsenals of the Arab States, the Soviet Union is largely responsible for exacerbating tension in the area. Israel must also obtain additional arms to balance those going to the Arabs. The attitude of the French Government is deeply regretted but Israel still hopes France will resume her aid.
- (d) Syria and Jordan bear the direct responsibility for the nurturing in their territories of nests of Al Fatah saboteurs. 'I again draw their attention to the results that may follow from this responsibility'.
- (e) Israel intends to develop East Jerusalem. A master plan is being prepared which will include 1,000 to 1,500 housing units. The Jewish quarter of the Old City will be rehabilitated. The Government intends to transfer to East Jerusalem Departments and public institutions from Tel Aviv as well as Ministries in Israel Jerusalem which have no suitable permanent accommodation.
- (f) There are areas in Syria, Iraq and other countries suitable for the absorption of Arab refugees who could be an agricultural element beneficial to those

/countries

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MR 2/11

Tel Aviv telegram No.1211 to Foreign Office

-2-


countries. Israel is prepared to assist in the solution of this problem within the framework of a regional or international plan.

2. A full summary, in English, of Mr. Eshkol's speech follows by bag.

Mr. Hadow

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Eastern Dept.

VVVVV



(17)

Mr Weston
(Eastern Dept)
6/28/67

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release SG/SM/750
PAL/1027

15 June 1967

EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND SECRETARY-GENERAL OF LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES

Following is the text of messages exchanged between the United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, and the Secretary-General of the League of Red Cross Societies, Henrik Beer:

Telegram dated 12 June from Henrik Beer, Secretary-General of the League of Red Cross Societies, Geneva, to U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations (translated from French)

"League of Red Cross Societies welcomes cease-fire established in Middle East, which was regarded by its President and Vice-Presidents in their appeal of 5 May as essential prerequisite for any effort aimed at finding solution that would restore peace in that part of the world. As that condition has fortunately been fulfilled today, I wish to assure you, on behalf of all the national societies members of our federation, that the League is prepared, in accordance with its traditional procedures and in close collaboration with the International Red Cross Committee, to assume its responsibilities in connexion with the provision of assistance to all civilian victims of the conflict.

"However, it considers that priority should be given to having countries draw up a general inventory of needs for each category of following: first, civilian populations; secondly, old refugees; thirdly, new refugees. To this end, it seems desirable that a local bureau should be set up to centralize information, prepare an over-all programme, and co-ordinate various activities. In view of large number of parties concerned with assistance, I take the liberty of suggesting that United Nations should take initiative in this field in collaboration with international institutions, Red Cross and non-governmental agencies concerned."

(more)

PA/KA 23/1

Telegram dated 14 June from United Nations Secretary-General to Secretary-General of League of Red Cross Societies

"Much appreciate your most helpful and constructive message of 12 June. Am consulting our people in Near East and particularly UNRWA and will send substantive answer in near future."

Additional Telegram dated 14 June from United Nations Secretary-General to Secretary-General of League of Red Cross Societies

"Security Council informed on 14 June by representative of Israel that there are considerable numbers of United Arab Republic soldiers still in Sinai in disorganized and desperate conditions whose sole objective is to reach the Canal and return home. They especially lack food, water and medical attention. Any efforts by League of Red Cross Societies to deal with this problem would be much appreciated and I would suggest that if you agree you should approach Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic direct to see what could be arranged."

* * * * *

CONFIDENTIAL

16
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

16 November, 1967.

Div
UNRWA ITEM



EE18/13 (11)

EE18/14 (18)

In John Moberly's temporary absence from the Department, I am writing to answer your letters of 3 October (with a copy of your draft statement for delivery by the United Kingdom delegate in the Special Political Committee's debate on UNRWA) and of 14 November.

2. We have very little to add to or amend in your draft statement. In paragraph 3 you raise the three suggestions for reform of the financial basis of UNRWA put forward in the Commissioner-General's 1967 Report (and summarised at (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 31 of Section 4 of IOC(67) 176 of 6 October 1967). Paragraph 2 of your later letter reminds us that we undertook to give you in separate correspondence a line to take on these questions. On further consideration there is little that we can say. We do not know yet whether this will figure largely in the debate, and if it does not, we would suggest that you should not raise it.

3. In paragraph 3 of your draft statement you say that "in the aftermath of war, it does not seem likely that any of these three suggestions will be found practicable at an early date". In fact, only the first suggestion will have been affected by the war.

4. We have recently had to answer Parliamentary Questions on this subject and I attach our draft answer and notes for supplementaries, and the relevant paragraphs of a Background Note. You will see that we do not think that the proposals mentioned at (b) and (c) of paragraph 31 of Section 4 of the IOC brief really meet the difficulty of assuring UNRWA income adequate to provide all the services that would be desirable.

5. If you feel, in view of the way the debate goes, that it is necessary for you to deal with these issues, we would suggest that you draw on the material in our draft answer and notes for supplementaries to Parliamentary Questions on

/the

S. L. Egerton, Esq.,
UK Mission,
NEW YORK.

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the subject.

6. In paragraph 5 of your draft statement we would suggest that the sentence beginning "Since then, perhaps 14,000 refugees of Palestinian origin....." should after "...West Bank;" continue "but there has also been a continued movement in the other direction". The next sentence would be "This leaves a minimum of 215,000 "new" refugees." After the sentence which ends "... where most of them would again become self-supporting." we would suggest the insertion of the sentence "As one of the major contributors to UNRWA we cannot condone a continuation of the situation whereby UNRWA camps in the Jericho area lie empty while the Agency has to provide emergency shelter in East Jordan for their former inhabitants."

7. Your letter of 14 November asks about our 1968 contribution. Arguing along the lines indicated in the Secretary of State's letter of 18 October to Lord Caradon, we have asked the Treasury and the O.D.M. to agree to an increase in the level of our 1968 contribution to UNRWA. We hope to have some news on this before the UNRWA debate in the Political Committee, but until we have reached agreement in Whitehall we must ask you to be guided by the attached Note 3 for Supplementaries.

(J. R. Rich)

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(15)

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Reference.....

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
17 NOV 1967
EE 18/12

U.N. (Pol.) Dept.

UNRWA DEBATE

Please see Mr. Egerton's letter of 3 October, 1967, and subsequent minuting. I attach a draft reply to Mr. Egerton.

2. With reference to paragraph 2 of Miss Warburton's minute of 5 October, I recommend that we should not mention any of the grandiose ideas which are in the air - particularly in the light of Urwick's letter 1825 of 4 November, 1967 (attached).

Pse see amended draft.
Mr. Rutter 15/11

T. J. Rutter

T. J. Rutter

13 November, 1967

Mr. Rutter - to amend dft. is necessary in view of later letter, p.m.

Mr. Rich. 15/11

We have no comment on the draft, but you will want to look at it with Mr. Egerton's later letter. We agreed that this letter might best come from you.

*Ann Warburton
to J.W.*

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1825

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
4 November, 1967.

Dear Tony,

Palestinian Refugees

Our telegrams 3370 and 3386 and also Teddy Youde's letter to you 1527/178/67 of 28 October refer.

2. I have now been given an account of the meeting in the State Department on 1 November about refugees to which we referred in our telegram 3386. The meeting was chaired by Luke Battle, the Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs; in addition to State Department officials, Joseph Johnson of the Carnegie Foundation for Peace, who carried out a mission on behalf of the U.N. Secretary-General a few years ago on refugees resulting in the so-called "Johnson plan", was also present.

3. Although discussions on the refugee problem are to continue in the State Department and the conclusions of this meeting cannot therefore be regarded as a definitive U.S. position on the refugee question, there was a clear consensus against launching any major initiative in advance of the UNRWA debate at the United Nations.

4. The only move the Americans are thinking of making during the next week or two (and even on this no final decision has yet been taken) is to take soundings of the Israelis in Tel Aviv, probably at First Secretary level, about how their own thinking on refugees is progressing. The State Department are rather concerned that the Israeli position may become fixed, a plan may be approved by the Israeli Cabinet and that Comay will then come to Washington to present it without the Americans having had any chance to influence Israeli thinking while their plan is taking shape.

5. The Americans are also sticking firmly to the view that when the time comes to launch an international initiative on refugees, aimed at resettling as many refugees as possible, it should not be done through the United Nations. The reasoning behind this is set out in paragraph 6 of our telegram 3370; the need to obtain Congressional approval if funds are to be made available is also an important factor in State Department calculations and they think it will be easier to sell the idea to Congress if the machinery for putting the plan into effect is outside the United Nations.

/ 6. There

A.R. Moore, Esq. C.M.G.
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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6. There was also general agreement at the meeting on the need to strengthen still further the repatriation element in any plan dealing with the refugee problem. Eventually the Americans would also like to transfer some of UNRWA's functions to host governments: to "take the W out of UNRWA", as it was put by Joseph Johnson. But they are very anxious not to put forward any suggestion which might have the effect of weakening UNRWA at this critical juncture.

7. I asked Atherton, the Country Director for Israel, whether the Americans thought a settlement would be easier if the problem of refugees could be divorced from the main negotiations for a Middle East settlement and dealt with separately (paragraph 9 of Teddy Youde's letter of 28 October). Atherton said that in the State Department's view the problem of refugees was an inseparable part of a general settlement and the Americans thought it would be wrong to try to hive it off and deal with it on its own. He thought this might even have the result of "pulling the rug out from under the U.N. Special Representative's feet".

8. The State Department are now working on a new paper on more modest steps which might be taken to help refugees in the interim period, consistent with but not in any way likely to disrupt the prospects of an overall settlement. They are due to have a further meeting on the subject in about ten days' time.

9. While the Americans have still not adopted any final position, they do appear to be thinking in very different terms from those set out in Teddy Youde's letter. They attach great importance to keeping their heads down about refugees until after the UNRWA debate, which they think may not go quite as badly as we seem to fear. They are opposed to any major new initiative in the United Nations before the Special Representative has had time to get to work. They are also firmly against trying to tackle the main task of resettlement within a United Nations framework and want any agency which is set up for this purpose to be entirely independent of the U.N.

10. As the major source of funds (and here one must bear in mind the difficulties which the Administration are likely to face with Congress in its present mood and the influence this has on the State Department's thinking about the problem), the U.S. are likely to play a crucial role in any new deal for refugees even if for tactical reasons they do not wish it to be launched as an American plan. For the moment at least they do not seem likely to be receptive to the kind of proposal set out in Teddy Youde's letter.

11. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, and UKMis. Geneva and New York.

*Yours ever,
Alan*

(A.B. Urwick).


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UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y.

1527/178/67

28 October, 1967.

*Dear Moore,*Palestinian Refugees

You sent Leslie Glass a copy of your letter of 11 October enclosing a copy of the position paper on the "old" refugees prepared by Sir R. Beaumont. This arrived most opportunely as the U.S. Mission here have been pressing for some weeks for comments on the U.N. aspects of the State Department's "low visibility" scheme summarised in Urwick's letter to Moberly 1825 of 29 September, particularly of course in the context of the forthcoming UNRWA debate. (1)

2. Although the State Department's "low visibility" plan seems to be a sincere attempt to try to make a concrete start on the re-settlement of refugees in countries willing to take them in and to offer aid and assistance to alleviate their lot, we believe that it has many difficulties and dangers. The resources collected, by the means contemplated, would surely fall far short in the end of what would be required. The problem is so great that, in our view, only an international effort under U.N.-auspices from the start could have any chances of success. The last thing we want to do is to give the impression that a few Powers have a special (i.e. historic) responsibility to deal with the problem. Whilst we do not wish to discourage any American initiative, especially if it will augment the funds available to the refugees, we feel that the State Department's proposal - if it ever even gets approval - will be only a palliative and will not get anywhere near the heart of the problem.

3. Sir Richard Beaumont's position paper, on the other hand, represents a serious attempt to deal with the whole problem. But like him, we do not see how it can be launched either now or in the near future. If no new initiative is launched because of difficulties of timing, the problem merely drifts and becomes far more unlikely of solution.

4. We feel here that if we are to have a fresh plan to deal with Palestinian and other Arab refugees there should first be a review of the whole problem carried out by a U.N. Commission composed of men of acknowledged international standing. Without such a review and comprehensive proposals we do not see how international support for a more forward review can be secured. Furthermore, if we do not have this "new look" at the problem, the danger will be that the present inadequate arrangements will continue, with some increased contributions to UNRWA but without the new approach and the new organisation which seem to us to be

/essential.

A. R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.



essential. Our proposal therefore would be that the Secretary-General should be authorised to set up a Commission on Palestinian and other Arab refugees to study the matter and make recommendations on it. This should be done within a reasonably short time - within, say, sixty days. The Commission would thus act more as a Royal Commission than as a Standing Commission. We recognise of course that this proposal raises a number of issues with important political aspects which require very careful thought. For example, we should have to consider whether the Commission should deal only with old refugees or with "new refugees" as well. If there is to be a final and definitive settlement for the refugees both categories would presumably need to be dealt with, but in dealing with the "new refugees" the Commission would have to be very careful to avoid the implication that they expected a continued Israeli occupation of Jordanian, Syrian and U.A.R. territory. This is particularly apposite in connection with the West Bank.

5. It would also be necessary to set out clearly the relationship between the proposed Commission and the United Nations Representative which we hope the Security Council will soon send to the area on the basis of a resolution of balanced principles which should be the guidelines on which to attempt a general settlement.

6. There is also the question of what form the initiative would take; a resolution of the General Assembly or of the Security Council, asking the Secretary-General to appoint the individual members of the Commission? On this last point we are quite clear: that the Secretary-General should appoint a group of highly-qualified individuals rather than invite countries to appoint representatives.

7. There would of course be other difficulties, such as objections from Congress and others to the appearance of yet another U.N. body in this field, given that the U.S. would have to be the major source of funds. But nevertheless we feel that the whole question of refugees has got so bogged down over the years that the only possibility for a real solution is to start afresh with the appointment of a Commission.

8. The terms of reference of the Commission, as we see them, would (in spite of the difficulties set out above) be to examine comprehensively the whole problem and to be completely uninhibited, in making recommendations, by the unsatisfactory history and the past. No doubt, as you say, the problem of refugees is one that can only be finally solved when peace comes to the Middle East, as part of a general settlement. But at the same time we are sure that no general settlement will be achieved in the Middle East until there has been some radical new thrust towards a solution of the fundamental problem of the refugees.

/9. There




9. There is another reason why the appointment of a Commission is necessary and appropriate at the present moment. If the problem of refugees is not taken out of the nexus of the other questions which affect the problem of peace in the Middle East, it will bedevil the task of the United Nations Representative whom we hope will be sent out to the Middle East in the near future with an "even-handed" mandate to start negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Arab/Israeli war. By divorcing the problem of refugees and dealing with it separately, there is a hope that the two problems can at the start be tackled individually and so have a better chance of approaching a solution.

10. The Minister of State has spoken to Michelmores, who is exceedingly preoccupied with both the present problems and the future purpose of his UNRWA. He seemed to welcome the idea of a U.N. Commission for the refugee problem, indicating that he thought it essential for some new and bold step of this kind to be taken soon if there were ever to be a solution. The Minister of State believes there is a need to move quickly on this matter and we would welcome your comments as soon as possible. In the meantime, when the debate on UNRWA takes place, we believe we need not be inhibited in what we say in support of UNRWA by the fact that we may later come to propose the appointment of a United Nations Commission. We shall have to continue supporting UNRWA in any case so long as it continues to function. Please let us know whether you endorse this line.

11. I am sending copies of this letter to Phillip Adams in Amman, Michael Hadow in Tel Aviv, James Cable in Beirut, Robert Tesh in Cairo, John Killick in Washington and Cope in Geneva.

Yours ever
John Byatt.
for (E. Youde)

(12)



TOP COPY

E

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CYPHER: CAT 'A'

PRIORITY UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3085

8 NOVEMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3085 OF 8 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO AMMAN,
TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, CAIRO AND UKMIS GENEVA.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 6051.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

FOLLOWING FOR BEAUMONT.

YES, I AGREE THAT IT WILL BE BEST TO WAIT TILL WE KNOW THE
OUTCOME OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING EXPECTED TO START TOMORROW.
WE CAN THEN RECONSIDER THE IDEA OF A U.N. COMMISSION ON THE REFUGEES
WHEN WE KNOW WHAT THE MANDATE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE. AT PRESENT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE
WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE, AND INDEED
WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY OUTCOME AT ALL. I AM NOT UNDULY
DESPONDENT ABOUT THIS BUT THE OUTLOOK AT THE MOMENT IS CLOUDY,
IF NOT STORMY.

FO PASS SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 127, TEL AVIV NO. 50, BEIRUT NO. 148,
CAIRO NO. 208 AND UKMIS GENEVA NO. 137.

LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Addressed to *UKMIS NEW YORK*

telegram No. *6051* (date) *7 Nov*

And to

repeated for information to *Washington*

Saving to *Amman, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Cairo and
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Draft Telegram to:—
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No. *6051*

(Date) *7/11*

And to:—

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Washington

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Your telegram No. 2919 [of 29 October] and Youde's letter of 28 October (1527/178/67) to Moore: Palestine Refugees.

Following from Beaumont.

We have been looking at our paper on this subject in the light of your comments, but conclude that the refugee problem is so much an integral part of the Arab/Israeli conflict that it cannot in practice be considered in isolation or on humanitarian grounds alone. For this reason a U.N. commission if set up independently would not be practical^{politics} and might in any case be strongly opposed by the Arabs as the thin end of a political wedge. Similar objection could be expected to a body outside the U.N. as suggested^{ed} in Washington telegram No. 3370 [of 27 October], paragraph 6. These objections might however be removed if the

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*1265
7/11/67*

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commission were to be set up with the mandate you suggest after the appointment of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and instructed to assist him on this aspect of his task, ^{while nevertheless} making its findings public.

2. What do you think?

L. 7/n

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Ephemeral

(10)

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RECEIVED IN
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- 8 NOV 1967

EE 18/12

The saddest part, and there
are some very sad premises in this
letter, is the belief that the
idea of re-settling the refugees
in e.g. the Euphrates valley
is thought to be new.

The Clapp Commission of 1949 (i.e.)
was told quite clearly by the
Arab countries they visited that the
idea was unacceptable whether or
not there was room for Palestinians.

act
4/11

I agree with Mr Saunders. It
is a political question which
describes the re-settlement problem of

A unit. I think is solved - perhaps
to find out Port is becoming more realistic
under pressure of events but there
are not many signs of it - it is
isole to unconscious schemes like
settlement in the Englishman's valley
(the Turks incidentally would I think
think he non-starters) or in Iraq
or in the Japanese or in Australia. They
will be allowed to go but they will nevertheless
continue to be segregated by their
"Lorr" Rights.

R
L.

Sir R. Beaumont
CONFIDENTIAL

M. Sanders
M. Butler
Mr Beaumont
Encl

1cm.
4 x 1

(1824/57/67)

(9)



EE 18/12

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BEIRUT.

31 October, 1967.

Dear Tony,

Palestine Refugees

Thank you for your letter of 11 October about the refugee problem. Christopher MacRae had a long talk with Ted Wahl (who, you will remember, is the First Secretary in the American Embassy here who deals exclusively with refugee questions) to discuss some of the points raised in Sir Richard Beaumont's paper and Urwick's letter (1825) of 29 September to Moberly. I enclose a copy of the record of this discussion.

2. If I may say so, both MacRae's paper and Beaumont's constitute attempts to consider the kind of progress that might be practicable within the existing framework of the problem. Similarly, the attitude of senior officials of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), as I understand it from conversations with them, tends to be that they have, in fact, achieved more than is always appreciated and that quite a number of the more enterprising Palestine refugees have already succeeded in shedding their refugee status and in establishing themselves on a permanent footing. One is very conscious of the fact that a number of Palestinians have done well for themselves in the Lebanon: Beidas, the founder of the Intra Bank, is a name that springs to mind. UNRWA are thus inclined to take the attitude that a little more patience, a lot more co-operation and a great deal more money would eventually enable them to solve the whole problem on existing lines. I agree, however, with the central thesis of Beaumont's paper that the existence of the refugee problem is such an important factor in promoting instability in the Middle East that we really cannot allow it to drag on indefinitely on the present basis. I wonder, however, whether either he or the Americans go far enough. It seems to me that the whole refugee problem has settled into such a well worn rut and that all the conflicting arguments and interests have become so ingrained that only a dramatically new approach could break the existing framework and permit a solution. Lord Caradon seems to have the same idea in his telegram No. 2919 (para. 3). The proposals in para. 6 of Beaumont's paper strike me as too reasonable to attract any support in the Middle East, because they offer all concerned much less than they want.

3. You may remember Bernard Shaw's remark that reasonable men adapted themselves to the world as they found it; unreasonable men tried to change the world. All human progress was thus due to unreasonable men. It is in the light of this dictum, and bearing in mind that all reasonable, sound, statesmanlike, practical

/schemes

A. R. Moore Esq., C.M.G.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

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He also said "not bloody likely" all

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?? schemes have failed to solve the Palestine refugee problem during the last twenty years, that I should like to put forward an entirely unreasonable proposal of my own.

4. This starts from the assumption that, when confronted with a tangle of conflicting interests and prejudices so deeply ingrained by time, the only hope is to come forward with something so big, so new and so dramatic as to provide a new emotional appeal capable of making people forget their old instinctive reactions. What I have in mind is that the United Nations should undertake to finance the creation of an entire new Arab community in the Middle East - perhaps in the Euphrates Valley. It would be a greatly enlarged and even more ambitious version of the Tennessee Valley authority which, lavishly financed for ten or twenty years, would aim at employing the manpower of a million or more Arab refugees to build dams, construct irrigation systems, establish hydro-electric power and generally make the desert blossom like the rose.

5. Enormous amounts of money would be required and you will naturally ask where they would come from. My answer would be: from ending the war in Viet-Nam. It has long seemed to me that the only possible ending to this war (Armageddon apart) lies in an American withdrawal; just as the Algerian problem was successfully solved by the French withdrawal. But the seemingly insuperable obstacle has always been the difficulty of persuading the Americans that they could cut their losses without irretrievable damage not only to their prestige, but also to their national morale and unity. But, if American withdrawal from Viet-Nam could be part of an Americo/Russian world bargain for simultaneously restoring peace and stability to the Middle East and South East Asia, perhaps the very immensity of the project could offer the Americans an escape from their emotional dilemma and, if such a staggeringly visionary scheme were to be launched on a breathless world by H.M.G., the side effects on our endeavour to join the Common Market and on our own national morale and sense of purpose might also be beneficial.

6. Perhaps this is all the merest pipedream, but it does seem to me that, in considering the problems of the Middle East in general, and of the Arab refugees in particular, we are faced with a choice: either we put forward proposals sufficiently limited and conventional to stand a reasonable chance of acceptance but, if the experience of the last twenty years is any guide, no chance of success; or we opt for something so big and visionary as to stand very little chance of adoption but which, if it were to be adopted, might actually succeed. As you will see from the enclosed copy of a Minute by Paul Howell, he does not regard the idea as economically impossible.

.. I am not circulating these wild ideas to the other recipients of your letter, but enclose extra copies of MacRae's memorandum in case you wish to send these on.

James Cable
James Cable
(J. E. Cable)

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Record of a discussion with Mr. Theodore Wahl,
1st Secretary, U.S. Embassy, on 19 October 1967
about the Palestinian Refugee question.

American thinking

Wahl told me that the State Department has a special research team which has been throwing up some new ideas on the subject of the Palestinian refugees; it has been spurred into further effort recently because Senator Edward Kennedy has shown distinct interest in being able to put up some radically new scheme to the Senate, and the State Department does not wish to have its clothes stolen. The State Department's thinking about some "new grouping" to collect and disburse funds for the refugees (mentioned in Urwick's letter under reference) still seems to be very tentative, and certainly not more definite than Sir Richard Beaumont's thoughts in paragraph 8(g) of his paper.

Should UNRWA or another agency do the job of implementing any new major schemes?

Wahl himself, who is the State Department officer in the field most closely concerned with this problem, has been a consistent supporter of UNRWA's being turned to new uses. He maintains that it is quite flexible enough to take on new tasks and has in the past been mainly concerned with relief rather than resettlement merely because that, after all, has been its mandate. The advantages that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees might have in international contacts for the purpose of the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in areas outside the Middle East are, in his opinion, easily outweighed by its lack of the solid administrative basis and its lack of the knowledge of the Palestinian refugee problem and the area, which UNRWA has built up over the last twenty years. He has suggested to the State Department as an alternative (and considers that this view is gaining some acceptance) that other agencies should be pulled in to help rather than allow the present compartmentalisation to continue whereby the other U.N. Agencies automatically offload any problem concerning Palestinians, however remotely, onto UNRWA. He feels, for instance, that the ILO, the FAO and the WHO, as well as the High Commissioner for Refugees, could be brought into play usefully.

Insulation of Refugees from rest of host countries should be discouraged.

3. Although Wahl himself accepted our premises that no solution to the refugee problem was conceivable except in the context of some kind of general Arab/Israeli settlement, and that the present time probably offered the best opportunity there has been for such a settlement, American planning for refugees (apart from the research team mentioned above) is still working on the assumption that the West Bank is going to remain in Israeli hands for the time being. Even so, Wahl thinks there are various things which can usefully be done. One is that every effort should be made to prevent the host countries insulating the refugees from the rest of the population. This, clearly, is considerably easier said than done, since "integration" is politically such a dirty word in the area. However he feels that, especially in the case of Jordan, we can help in a small way towards breaking down this barrier if, when we give money for development schemes such as school or hospitals

/we can...

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we can unobtrusively do this on condition that so many places are reserved for Palestinians. This is a tactic which would have to be played very delicately if we are to avoid the charge of interference in internal affairs and using aid as a lever: but it is at least one practical way in which we could possibly have some effect on the situation, even if to a marginal degree only.

A placement-service for trained Palestinians might be useful

Another thing Wahl feels that the donor countries might well consider more seriously is the question of the placement of trained refugees in jobs in other countries. UNRWA already fulfils this function to some extent: their vocational training centres have their feelers out in the Gulf and elsewhere, and usually have a shrewd idea of what openings are available for their trainees. However, some scheme whereby the job opportunities open to Palestinian refugees were made more widely known to them might be very useful. We were neither of us sure what would be the best means of achieving this; but it is a question which is, I feel, worth further consideration.

The new Gaza refugees to the East Bank might be a good target for some initial initiative in resettlement.

5. One of the main problems of any new kind of initiative for "resettlement" is, of course, the touchiness of the host governments about any move which could be interpreted as an acknowledgement that the refugees had forfeited their rights to their former property. However, the sheer magnitude of the problem of new refugees to the East Bank must surely have dulled the sensitivity of at least the Jordanians on this score. In particular, Wahl wondered whether there was any initiative which might be taken about the recent influx of refugees from Gaza, who had trickled through to Jordan in the last few weeks and are now, I believe, being put in a camp near Karak. On the one hand, these refugees must have quickly come to realise that for whatever reasons they may have fled, the prospects on the East Bank were extremely gloomy; and on the other, the Jordan government clearly do not want these "foreign" refugees in their territory and would be glad to get rid of as many as possible. Even some very limited scheme to settle abroad such of these Gaza refugees as have special skills might well be the thin end of the wedge.

If Canada and Australia^{are} to take more Palestinian immigrants, we should have early discussions with them.

6. We went on to discuss the possibility of a resettlement of Palestinian refugees outside the Middle East. Wahl expressed the view that the Canadians, and more particularly the Australians had apparently been bending over backwards to accommodate the susceptibilities of the host countries about the acceptance of Palestinian refugee immigrants. In fact, the Australian Embassy here went so far, a month or two ago, as to issue a statement specifically denying press reports that Australian immigration policy towards the Palestinian refugees had changed. If we were hoping for a significant number of refugees to be absorbed by these two countries, there would clearly have to be some early discussions about this possibility.

/The financing

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The Financing of any new scheme

7. We also discussed the question of the financing of any possible new scheme of resettlement. Though we came to no positive conclusions, I have the impression that some of the suppositions in paragraph 4 of the annex to Sir Richard Beaumont's paper, may be slightly optimistic. In the first place, it seems on the whole unlikely that an appreciable number of refugees would in fact opt to live in Israel. Secondly, although the rectification of the ration rolls has been such an explosive political issue for the last few years, I am doubtful that very much would be pared off the annual bill if this could finally be done. Wahl agreed with me in this assessment, estimating that the maximum saving per year would be not more than \$2 million - and that the administrative effort involved in a thorough checking of the rolls would, of course, be considerable. Lastly, though it is true that the social services needed by the refugees exist in the host countries, this is not to say that suddenly the clinics, schools, doctors, and teachers and so forth, which the refugees use, would suddenly become redundant, and not an item to be paid for: rather, the bill for them would have to be paid by the host countries rather than by UNRWA.

NEED

8. One final point; Wahl said that NEED, the new American fund raising organisation for the refugees, was now to stay in existence for some months longer (it was to have disbanded, first in August, then this month). It has handed over a cheque of \$2 million to UNRWA, so far (to the chagrin of the Jordanians who had hoped to get their hands on this); and may be able to raise a fair amount more - the official target is \$10 million. Fortunately there have not yet been any storm warnings that Congress might consider diminishing their annual UNRWA contribution by an equivalent amount, although the State Department's finding it increasingly difficult to "sell" UNRWA to Congress.

A.C.D.S. MacRae

(A.C.D.S. MacRae)
25 October, 1967

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Mr. Cable

1. I believe that all Palestive refugees could have been and could still be resettled within the Middle East, given that other Arab States were willing to absorb them and if adequate finance was available. The trouble is that they were never offered alternativ livelihood - only "refuge" on a supposedly temporary basis against the day of return.

2. I have discussed this problem with Mr. Bennell. Talking still in terms of economic feasibility rather than political acceptability, the points seem to us as follows:-

(a) It would be necessary to resettle the majority of refugees on the land, accompanied by intensive training and demonstration. For the purposes of calculation it is better to work in terms of family units rather than per capita. Assuming 6 per family the total number of family units to be placed would be (in round figures) 220,000. It would be realistic and conservative to estimate that 20% could be occupied in secondary activities related to agriculture e.g. processing industries, transport, trading, so that 180,000 farm units would be needed, each say 5 hectares = 900,000 hectares.

(b) Existing and potential land available in the Euphrates Valley in hectares is:

Turkey	: 160,000	900,000
Syria	: 240,000	530,000
Iraq	: 1500,000	1,500,000

1,900,000	2,930,000
-----------	-----------

There is therefore, overall, sufficient land available in Turkey and Syria. In Iraq this is also true because land utilization is inefficient; more intensive techniques would make room for more farmers.

(c) The limiting factor is water. Total mean availability in the Euphrates, assuming all storage works constructed, including over year storage, would be 27 milliards, which would be adequate for intensive irrigation on only 1,300,000 hectares out of the total land available. You will note that this is inadequate for the existing areas under utilization (1,900,000) but the point is that present methods (particularly in Iraq) are not intensive, i.e. the average holding per family is much much higher. The missing factor here is the actual requirements related to population in the three countries con-

cerned, to say nothing of population growth. It is, however, not unreasonable to suppose that at least a high proportion of the refugee *population can be absorbed in present* circumstances assuming more efficient agricultural methods and thus a lower water requirement. (Note the present costs of producing water by alternative methods, i.e. desalination, is £450,000,000 per milliard, but would include 1200 MW of electricity).

- (d) The cost of engineering and allied services for agriculture plus housing etc. could be estimated from experience elsewhere. The preliminary estimate given by Sir Alexander Gibb and partners for Syria is £600 per hectare = £3000 per family. Thinking in terms of costs only, therefore, £540,000,000 would be required to resettle the total refugee population.
- (e) It should, however, be noted that there is very considerable rain grown ("dry land") crop potential in Syria and Turkey, and also water in rivers other than the Euphrates - e.g. the Tigris. It can also be accepted that a high proportion of the refugees could be absorbed by industry (requiring other forms of capital investment).

3. These are all very superficial calculations but one can say that from the point of view of engineering and economics (given also highly efficient agricultural production reducing the family holding to say an average of 2½ hectares) the problem of providing alternative livelihood in Iraq and Syria is feasible (more so if Turkey were included) without undue strain on existing populations and assuming moderate population growth. It would, however, demand a much higher degree of efficiency in land utilization. The capital injection provided as 'compensation' by outside donors would be very advantageous to the economies of those countries. Finally, there are other areas in the Middle East which could absorb some refugees.

4. BUT, all this is theory related to the practical economics of the problem. Other factors which militate against any such solutions are:

- (i) No Arab country wants to absorb refugees and thus create another minority - albeit Arab - within their territories. The need for concentrated and therefore technically efficient resettlement schemes would tend to preserve those minorities without full integration;
- (ii) Apart from genuine reactions to racial injustice, most Arab countries like to keep the refugee problem as a rallying cry for unity coupled with opposition to Israel - the only two issues they accept consistently as issues common to them all;

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2.

(iii) The refugees themselves are, like all mankind, intensely bound by the emotion of land ownership - 'my land, my country' - not land anywhere. Nothing in the past twenty years has been done to reduce that emotional attachment and the image of the great return to their promised land is always uppermost in the minds of the decaying humanity which occupies the camps. Only the most enterprising and vigorous have broken away to find full occupations for themselves, and - against all odds - forge for themselves a status in other communities. (After all this is an intense sentiment dear to the hearts of the Jews whose claim to Palestine goes back 2000 years, not 20 like the Arabs!)

5. The answer to your question is therefore that the resettlement of a million or so refugees in the Euphrates (add Tigris) basin is not impossible from the purely economic and physical angle, though the costs would be high. Moreover, the injection of that amount of capital into the countries concerned (even Turkey) would be a big advantage to them. But of course we should have to investigate the problem in much greater depth to give a confident answer.

P. P. Howell

30 October, 1967.

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PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 3386

30 OCTOBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 3386 OF 30 OCTOBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO
AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, UKMIS GENEVA AND TEL AVIV.
UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 2919: PALESTINE REFUGEES.

BATTLE, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EAST AFFAIRS IN THE
STATE DEPARTMENT, STRESSED TO THE MINISTER TODAY THAT THE U.S.
POSITION ON REFUGEES WAS FAR FROM RIGID. THE AMERICANS WERE HOWEVER
ANXIOUS NOT TO RISK PROVOKING THE ARABS BY GETTING OUT IN FRONT ON
THIS QUESTION. WHILE NOT TALKING ABOUT LIQUIDATION,

THIS WAS IN FACT THE OBJECTIVE TOWARDS WHICH THEY FELT WE
SHOULD TRY TO WORK.

2. BATTLE WAS FULLY SEIZED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT LOSING
THE PRESENT FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY AND MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS TO
BE A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 1
NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS REFUGEES. FOR THE MOMENT THE AMERICANS
DID NOT SEE THE ANSWER CLEARLY, BUT IF SOMEONE CAME UP WITH WHAT
LOOKED LIKE THE RIGHT ANSWER BATTLE THOUGHT A U.S. INITIATIVE MIGHT
COME RATHER SOONER THAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN GIVEN TO UNDER-
STAND BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

F.O.PASS SAVING TO AMMAN 25, BEIRUT 58, CAIRO 33, TEL AVIV 30
AND UKMIS GENEVA 85.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 2359Z/30 OCT.

RECD 2359Z/30 OCT.

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
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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2919 29 OCTOBER

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2919 OF 29 OCTOBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO
BEIRUT AND UKMIS GENEVA.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 3370.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

WHEN THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE ARRIVED I WAS ON THE POINT
OF RAISING AGAIN THE PROPOSAL WHICH I PUT FORWARD SOME TIME AGO
THAT A U.N. COMMISSION SHOULD BE APPOINTED TO REVIEW THE WHOLE
QUESTION OF REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (OLD AND NEW) AND TO MAKE
EARLY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A "NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE AND IMAGINATIVE
APPROACH TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM" (YOUR SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ON 26 SEPTEMBER).

2. I HAD READ RICHARD BEAUMONT'S PAPER AND I HAD HEARD OF THE
AMERICAN SO-CALLED "LOW VISIBILITY" PILOT SCHEME WHICH HAD
BEEN UNDER RECENT DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON. I WAS PUZZLED BY THE
AMERICAN PILOT SCHEME AND, ALTHOUGH I COULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN
VARIOUS SUPPLEMENTARY FORMS OF ASSISTANCE, IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT
THE PILOT SCHEME COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS PROVIDING A SOLUTION
TO A PROBLEM OF THIS MAGNITUDE. I THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD AVOID
PLANS WITH AN AMERICAN OR ANGLO-AMERICAN LABEL, AND ANY
SUGGESTION THAT SUCH A SCHEME PROVIDED AN ANSWER TO THE WHOLE
PROBLEM WOULD OF COURSE BE STRONGLY OPPOSED BY THE ARABS.

3. THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY BEAUMONT SEEMED TO ME EXCELLENT
BUT WITHOUT A COMMISSION OF THE KIND I SUGGESTED I DID NOT SEE
HOW THEY COULD BE INITIATED. IT MAY BE WELL, AS SUGGESTED IN THE
WASHINGTON TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, TO WAIT TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS
ABOUT THE APPOINTMENT OF A U.N. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BUT I AM
BOUND TO SAY THAT THE MORE I THINK ABOUT IT THE MORE IT SEEMS
NECESSARY TO MAKE A NEW APPROACH TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM IN ORDER
/TO DRAW UP

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.2919 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

- 2 -

TO DRAW UP RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WOULD ATTRACT INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT. MY FEAR IS THAT UNRWA'S ACTIVITIES WILL BE INADEQUATE AND THAT THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES WILL CONTINUE TO BEDEVIL ATTEMPTS AT ANY GENERAL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

4. I SPOKE PRIVATELY TO MICHELMORE ABOUT THIS IDEA AND HE SEEMED TO WELCOME IT. HE DOES NOT SEE ANY OTHER WAY OF GETTING A MOVE ON ON ANYTHING LIKE THE SCALE REQUIRED.

5. WASHINGTON TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE SPEAKS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CONCERN TO GET THROUGH THE UNRWA DEBATE NEXT MONTH AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE. BUT THE DEBATE IS LIKELY TO RAISE FIERCE FEELINGS AND THE GENERAL REFUGEE QUESTION WILL BE RAISED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND MAYBE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS WELL.

6. I REALISE THAT THIS PROPOSAL FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF THREE OR FOUR MEN OF THE HIGHEST STANDING AND INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION TO REVIEW THE WHOLE PROBLEM AND MAKE NEW RECOMMENDATIONS RAISES MANY QUESTIONS AND DIFFICULTIES, BUT WE CANNOT GO ON TALKING ABOUT A NEW AND IMAGINATIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME WITHOUT THINKING HOW IT SHOULD BE PREPARED.

7. MOREOVER, AS FAR AS THE U.N. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IS CONCERNED, I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT FACILITATE HIS TASK IF HE COULD LEAVE THE REFUGEE QUESTION TO THE U.N. COMMISSION FOR THE TIME BEING AND GET ON WITH OTHER TASKS, THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION BECOMING AVAILABLE IN A MONTH OR TWO'S TIME.

8. WE ARE WRITING (YOUDE'S LETTER TO MOORE OF 28 OCTOBER) SETTING OUT SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND I HOPE THAT IN DECIDING WHAT OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD BE TO THIS MAJOR PROBLEM MY RECOMMENDATION IN FAVOUR OF A U.N. COMMISSION CAN BE BORNE IN MIND.

FO PASS TEL AVIV NO. 519, AMMAN NO. 380, CAIRO NO. 119

BEIRUT NO. 183 AND UKMIS GENEVA NO. 94.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 1924/29 OCT 1967

RECD AT 1924/29 OCT 1967

[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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
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ROUTINE WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 3370

27 OCTOBER 1967

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(4) - b-py AHd

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 3370 OF 27 OCTOBER AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, UKMIS GENEVA, TEL AVIV.

MOORE'S LETTER TO URWICK OF 11 OCTOBER:
PALESTINE REFUGEES.

WE HAVE NOW DISCUSSED THIS FURTHER WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AFTER THEY HAD STUDIED BEAUMONT'S PAPER.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT AGREE THAT IN PRACTICE ANY SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WILL HAVE TO BE PART OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE AND THEY ARE NOT AT PRESENT INCLINED TO UNDERTAKE ANY SEPARATE INITIATIVE AT LEAST UNTIL THE U N REPRESENTATIVE IS APPOINTED AND THEY HAVE SEEN WHAT HE IS ABLE TO ACHIEVE.
3. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S MAIN CONCERN IS TO GET THROUGH THE UNRWA DEBATE NEXT MONTH AT THE UNITED NATIONS AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE. THEY THINK UNRWA'S FINANCIAL POSITION IS REASONABLY SATISFACTORY AND THAT SOME OF THE LESSER CONTRIBUTORS MAY WELL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FUNDS. THEY ALSO REFERRED TO THE VALUABLE PART BEING PLAYED BY NEED, THE RED CROSS AND UNICEF IN COPING WITH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM.
4. THE ONE DEVELOPMENT WHICH MIGHT FORCE THE AMERICANS TO SHOW THEIR HAND SOONER OVER REFUGEES WOULD BE THE LAUNCHING OF A MAJOR PUBLIC INITIATIVE BY THE ISRAELIS TO DEAL WITH THE REFUGEES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MR RUSK APPARENTLY RAISED THIS POSSIBILITY WITH MR EBAN DURING HIS VISIT HERE: EBAN SAID THE ISRAELIS HAD PUT A WORKING GROUP ON THE PROBLEM AND WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF A CONSORTIUM OF DONOR COUNTRIES TO FINANCE RESETTLEMENT. HE ALSO GAVE MR RUSK A FAIRLY FIRM UNDERTAKING THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD CONSULT THE AMERICANS FIRST BEFORE THEY MADE ANY PLANS PUBLIC: HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING
/AMBASSADOR

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WASHINGTON TELEGRAM No. 3370 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

- 2 -

AMBASSADOR COMAY TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THIS PURPOSE.

5. ONCE THE UNRWA DEBATE IS OUT OF THE WAY AND A U N REPRESENTATIVE HAS GONE TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THE AMERICANS THINK THEY MIGHT PERHAPS HOLD EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THEIR PLANS AND ALSO WITH THE JORDANIANS TO PROBE THEIR THINKING ABOUT REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN VAGUE INDICATIONS FROM ONE OR TWO LEADING JORDANIANS THAT THEY WERE THINKING ALONG THE RIGHT LINES. BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE ABOVE ALL ANXIOUS TO DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT EMBARRASS THE U N REPRESENTATIVE OR MAKE THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT AND FOR THIS REASON THEY ARE INCLINED TO LEAVE LONGER-TERM PLANS IN ABEYANCE FOR THE TIME BEING. IF HOWEVER THE ARABS WERE EVER TO COME FORWARD AND SHOW REAL WILLINGNESS TO SETTLE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ONCE AND FOR ALL, THEY DO NOT FORESEE ANY INSUPERABLE QUOTE ENGINEERING UNQUOTE DIFFICULTIES.

6. THEY WERE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN BEAUMONT'S PAPER. THE ONE POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE THEY DETECTED BETWEEN OUR THINKING AND THEIR OWN WAS THAT, WHEREAS WE SEEMED TO FAVOUR WORKING THROUGH THE U N, THEY WERE ANXIOUS THAT ANY AGENCY DEALING WITH THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES SHOULD BE OUTSIDE AND SEPARATE FROM THE U N. IF SOME ARAB STATES WISHED TO OBSTRUCT THE WORK OF AN AGENCY WORKING ON RESETTLEMENT, IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR THEM TO DO SO IF IT WERE OPERATING UNDER U N AUSPICES. ALSO IF ONE ARAB COUNTRY SUCH AS JORDAN WISHED TO GO AHEAD ON ITS OWN WITH THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES, THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS WOULD APPLY. THE AMERICANS THEREFORE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE LESS EMBARRASSING FOR ALL CONCERNED TO MOUNT THE OPERATION OUTSIDE THE U N.

F O PASS SAVING TO AMMAN 24, BEIRUT 56, CAIRO 31, UKMIS GENEVA 77 AND TEL AVIV 29.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 0015Z/28

RECD AT 0015Z/28

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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ADEN DEPT.: J.I.R.D.: J.I.P.G.D.: NEWS DEPT.
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Mr. Rutter is in o.v.

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EE 18/12

Mr. Moore

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Enter.

Palestine Refugees

(2) Thank you for letting me see a copy of your submission of 18 September with which I agree generally. I also found myself in general agreement with the paper which Sir R. Beaumont circulated on 13 Sept. I am inclined to think that if any scheme is to be successful it will have to be based on the two principles set out at the beginning of paragraph 10 of the latter paper, but administered in such a way that the refugees decide, with the acquiescence of the host governments, to settle in the countries where they presently are. There is, however, an important tactical point which it seems to me has not so far been covered and on which I think we should begin to form a view. The point in question is the timing of any move about refugees in relation to other moves in the Arab/Israel dispute. Does a solution for the refugees come with or after a general settlement?

2. If an attempt is made to solve the refugee problem in the context of the general settlement and it is made a part of that settlement, will it not add enormously to the difficulty of reaching an agreement and thus perhaps obstruct the creation of a more settled situation between the Arabs and Israel? On the other hand if a solution for the refugees is held over until a general settlement (based on withdrawal and non-belligerence), will there be a sufficient incentive on anybody's part to reach a difficult compromise with the refugees? I am not sure about the answer to this dilemma. I suspect the correct answer may change according to whether circumstances favour the achievement of a general settlement or otherwise. In the absence of having a clear answer myself I can only suggest that it is a subject which deserves further study and add that my instinct is to have a shot at including principles for the settlement of the refugee problem in a general settlement. If you agree that there should be a further study the Planning Staff would be happy to take part in it. It would involve, of course, not only the refugees but an attempt to order all parts of the problem in a list of priorities so that we may decide what should be in an opening package, ~~for~~ a fall-back position and a minimum position.

J. A. Thomson

(J. A. Thomson)
21 September, 1967

Copied to:

Sir R. Beaumont
Sir J. Henniker-Major
Mr. Brenchley
Mr. Lambert

I have incorporated
Mr. Thomson's point about
timing in a draft letter
to which I have marked in
other parts.

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/ Sir

Sir R. Beaumont together with
some comments on his paper on refugees.
I think we can wait a bit
before embarking on the
exercise suggested in Dr. Thomson's
1st paragraph.

~~A.P. 17~~
5.10

A.P. 17.
5.10.

(4)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

11 October, 1967

Palestine Refugees

*Top (blue) copy
sent*

I enclose a copy of a paper on Palestine refugees which has been prepared by Sir R. Beaumont. It is designed to stimulate ideas about possible ways of reaching a permanent solution of the Palestine refugee problem in the context of an overall settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute. I should be grateful if you would discuss it with the State Department in the light of the ideas which they are themselves developing as reported in your letter to John Moberly No. 1825 of 29 September, and let us have your and their comments.

2. Apart from comments on the substance of the proposals in the paper, I should be glad of comments on the timing of any attempt to deal with the problem. If an attempt is made to agree on a detailed solution of the problem in the context of a general settlement, this is likely to add greatly to the difficulty of reaching a broad agreement and to delay the process as of Israeli withdrawal, Arab recognition of Israel, and the opening of the Suez Canal. If, on the other hand, the refugee question is left for settlement later, though I doubt if the Arabs would accept this, there will be little incentive to anyone, especially to the Israelis, to contribute to the difficult compromise which will be necessary. It seems to us that the best answer may be for the framework of a general settlement to contain the principles that the refugees have a right either to return to their homes, or to receive adequate compensation and assistance, and for the detailed provisions of a plan based on these principles to be left for negotiation after the framework has been accepted, and the principal steps of withdrawal and recognition have been taken.

3. I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure for their comments to Philip Adams in Amman, Michael Hadow in Tel Aviv, James Cable in Beirut, and Robert Test in Cairo, also to Sir Leslie Glass at UKMIS New York and Mr Cape at UKMIS Geneva.

(A.R. Moore)

A.B. Urwick Esq.,
WASHINGTON.

*p.a.
D.D. 13/10.*

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Ed. (3746)

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R.M. Hadow, Esq., C.M.G., Tel Aviv.
R.M. Tesh, Esq., Cairo.
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Beirut
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J Thomson Planning Dept
4 to
NEAD
17- Sir R Beaumont
Sir J Hennessey - 12/9/67
17- Brunchley


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DRAFT

Type 1 +

To:—

A.B. Urwick, Esq.,
Washington.



From
Mr. Moore

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

I enclose a copy of a paper on Palestine Refugees which has been prepared by Sir R. Beaumont. It is designed to stimulate ideas about possible ways of reaching a permanent solution of the Palestine refugee problem in the context of an overall settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute. I should be grateful if you would discuss it with the State Department in the light of the ideas which they are themselves developing as reported in your letter to ^{John Moberly} me ^{No. 1825} of ^{29 September}, and let us have your and their comments.

2. Apart from comments on the substance of the proposals in the paper I should be glad of comments on the timing of any attempt to deal with the problem. If an attempt is made to agree on a detailed solution of the problem in the context of a general settlement, this is likely to add greatly to the difficulty of reaching a broad agreement and to delay the process of Israeli withdrawal, Arab recognition of Israel, and the opening of the Suez Canal. If, on the other hand, the refugee question is left for settlement later, though I doubt if the Arabs would accept this, there will be

/little

little incentive to anyone, especially to the Israelis, to contribute to the difficult compromise which will be necessary. It seems to us that the best answer may be for the framework of a ^{general} settlement to contain the principles that the refugees have a right either to return to their homes, or to receive adequate compensation and assistance, and for the detailed provisions of a plan based on these principles to be left for negotiation after the framework had been accepted, and the principal steps of withdrawal and recognition been taken.

3. I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure for their comments to Philip Adams in Amman, Michael Hadow in Tel Aviv, James Cable in Beirut, and Robert Tesh in Cairo.

ANN.
10.10

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- 9 OCT 1967

EE 18/12

Sir R. Beaumont

PALESTINE REFUGEES

Your paper of 13 September has been given to me by Mr. Brenchley with the comment that the P.U.S. and he himself have found it very useful and agree generally.

2. I suggest that we should now send it, to some extent amended, if you agree, in the light of this minute, to our Embassy in Washington for discussion with the Americans, and to selected missions for comment. I attach a draft letter to Washington in that sense, which takes account of Mr. Thomson's minute to me of 21 September about the timing of any attempt to solve the refugee problem.

3. As regards the paper itself, I fully agree that any solution must be based on the two points at the beginning of paragraph 11. Any permanent settlement must be accepted, anyway to some extent, by the Arabs as incorporating an element of justice.

4. I have however a number of points on paragraph 7. I am not clear if it is the intention to suggest that in the discussions (presumably international) in which it is argued that we should be prepared to take part, we ought to look at the possibilities listed at (a) to (e) in the same paragraph. I think we should be very careful not to get identified as protagonists of particular proposals, especially any likely to be unwelcome to the Arabs, and whether or not we raised any particular proposal would have to depend very much on the forum.

5. It seems to me that the proposition at paragraph 7(b) does not look far enough for areas of settlement. The host countries are the Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt (in respect of the Gaza Strip) and to a small extent Syria. If we are looking for the best possible solution I should have thought that none of these countries, except Syria, could easily integrate all their refugees permanently, and that it would be logical for Iraq and Syria, both of which have under-developed agricultural areas, to take a substantial proportion. This possibility is perhaps covered by the reference in the last sentence of 7(d) to the refugees being "settled elsewhere", but I think that it should be given more prominence.

6. I am not very happy about the proposal at 7(d) that the West Bank should be turned into a sort of refugee pool into which refugees from all the host countries would have a right to go. Our best hope is surely that the West Bank should again become a normal fully integrated part of Jordan. The solution proposed would more than ever give the West Bank a special "ex-refugee" complexion and would indeed create a demand that it should become autonomous if not independent. Apart from this political consideration

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I doubt whether the West Bank economy could sustain a massive further inflow of refugees from Gaza and Lebanon. However, I agree that the idea merits consideration if only as a pis aller.

7. The idea of weighting the compensation arrangements so as to elicit the right choice by the refugees is clearly sound. But I think the individual grant to be paid to anyone deciding against a return to Israel would have to be substantial, c.f. 11(b)(i).

8. I am sorry to inject these comments at a late stage but I am informed that Eastern Department, because of pressure of work, did not in fact comment on the draft before it went forward.

--- 9. I attach draft amendments, which you may find useful, on the basis of this minute.

A.R. Moore

(A.R. Moore)
3 October, 1967.

Mr R. Beaumont has seen and approves the amendments to the paper. Once the paper has been sent to Washington may we have a spare copy of the revised form?

A.R. Moore
le/w

*Done - pra.
20.30/2.*


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PAL REF

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M

Permanent Under-SecretaryPALESTINE REFUGEES

... I submit a paper on the above subject which takes account of the views of the departments concerned in the Office.

for (R. A. Beaumont)
13 September, 1967
(Room 236 K.C.S.)

Copies to:

Sir D. Allen
Sir D. Greenhill
Sir J. Henniker-Major
Mr. Garvey
Mr. Hayman
Mr. Brenchley
Heads of:
Eastern
U.N. (Pol)
U.N. (E. & S.)
N.E.A.D.
Planning Staff
J.I.P. & G.D.
J.R.D.(M.E.)(Mr. Paul)
P.U.S.D. (Mr. Butler)
News

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PALESTINE REFUGEES

The refugee problem derives from the flight of Palestinian Arabs during the Arab-Jewish fighting of 1948 from their homes in what is now Israel. The Arab Governments maintain by and large that these people were driven out by the Israelis; the Israeli authorities that they fled of their own accord and unnecessarily. A second wave of refugees was created by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan in June, 1967. This "new refugee" problem includes some "old refugees" who were settled on the West Bank. The rest of this paper deals exclusively with the "old refugees" but includes these people. It does not cover the "new refugees" from the West Bank or the Gaza Strip or Israeli-occupied Syria. It is still hoped that the majority of these will return to the West Bank and their former homes (or places of residence). The Israelis should be pressed to take these people back to the West Bank as soon as possible, so that any solution of the general refugee problem can use as its starting point the position on 4 June, 1967.

2. Our best statistics of the "old refugees" as on 4 June, 1967 are:-

(a) Total number of refugees: about 1,300,000

(b) Of whom:

700,000 in Jordan

300,000 in the Gaza Strip

160,000 in Lebanon

140,000 in Syria

Small numbers are to be found in Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

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(c) Of the 700,000 in Jordan, 400,000 were, before the recent hostilities, on the West Bank and 300,000 on the East Bank.

(d) Of the 700,000 in Jordan, some 230,000 were living in camps.

Note: It looks as though some 100,000 "old refugees" who crossed to the East Bank after 5 June will remain on the East Bank as well as about 100,000 "new refugees".

3. Since the formation of the State of Israel the refugees have been given relief aid through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) at a cost of some \$37 million a year, provided mainly by the United States and United Kingdom Governments. UNRWA has been effective within its terms of reference, but has been unable to devote its resources to resettling refugees, whose numbers have continued to swell as a result of the food and medical facilities which it has provided. The United Kingdom and United States Governments have of late been worried at having to continue to finance the Agency indefinitely, particularly as the Arab Governments have been adamant in refusing to talk of resettlement or even to ensure that only those refugees in need have taken advantage of the relief schemes.

4. The refugee problem has added considerably to the inherent instability of the Middle East situation. The presence of the refugees, both in camps and outside, has tended to prolong the memories of Arab defeat in 1948, has been a breeding ground for political agitators and terrorists and has to some extent held back Jordan's economic advance. For these reasons alone it is in Her Majesty's Government's interest to secure a settlement of the problem.

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5. The broad elements of the dispute over the refugees are to be found in the interpretations of General Assembly Resolution No. 194 (iii) of 11 December, 1948. The Arab case is that paragraph 11 of the Resolution must be implemented. This requires ".... that the refugees wishing to return to their homes, and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property, which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible."

The Israelis, while not disputing paragraph 11, argue that it cannot be taken in isolation and there must be a settlement on the basis of the whole of General Assembly Resolution No. 194, i.e. that there must be a full peace settlement taking into account all the factors in dispute. In practice, we were of the opinion until June, 1967, that the Israelis would accept the return of refugees only when they were certain that the number of those wishing to return would be sufficiently small to pose no problems to Israel in economic and public security fields. In 1949, for example, she offered to take 100,000 refugees plus all the refugees in the Gaza Strip if the Gaza Strip were ceded to her as part of a peace settlement.

6. It is in Her Majesty's Government's interests to secure a settlement of the refugee problem, if necessary in isolation, both in order to free ourselves from having to contribute to UNRWA and in order to promote the peace of the Middle East. In practice,
/however,

however, any solution of the refugee problem in the immediate future will probably have to be part of an overall settlement of the Arab/Israel conflict. For this, the present time probably offers the best opportunity which has yet presented itself, for the following reasons:

- (a) There is strong international pressure for a final solution to the Arab/Israel conflict;
- (b) The Israelis have assets with which they can hope to strike a bargain with the Arabs;
- (c) The Russians have admitted the need for an overall settlement;
- (d) The Americans support Israel's hopes to use her conquests to seek a solution;
- (e) The U.A.R. needs some form of settlement to release her from economic difficulties (though these difficulties have now been alleviated by the promise of aid by the oil producing States);
- (f) King Hussein more than ever needs to reduce the potential internal threat posed by the dissatisfaction of his refugees; and
- (g) After the latest example of the inability of the Arabs to solve the problem by military means, many of the refugees must be expected to have lost hope in a solution by force and to be correspondingly more willing to accept a political solution.

7. If a general settlement were to come about by stages, following Israeli withdrawal and Arab recognition that belligerence
/had

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had ended, the refugee problem should in our view, come second in priority after the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. We believe that the Israelis, the Russians and probably the Americans would accept this. In advance of such a general settlement however we should be prepared to support, and in certain circumstances to participate in, constructive international discussions for the solution of the refugee problem.

8. On the hypothesis that a general settlement would include on Israel's part withdrawal from most of the recently occupied territories and on the Arabs' part a formal end of belligerency and a recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, a consequent solution of the refugee problem could be based on a combination of some of the following possibilities:

- (a) Israeli agreement to take a number for resettlement in Israel, and to provide compensation for the remainder.
- (b) Arab agreement that as large numbers as possible should be integrated in the host countries.
- (c) Arab agreement that a proportion should be settled in other Arab countries notably Iraq and Syria.
- (d) Arab agreement that encouragement should be given to refugees to settle outside the Middle East, e.g., Canada, Australia and Latin America. A special appeal would be made to the countries concerned to accept Arab immigrants.
- (e) Intensive development of the West Bank as a province in which as many refugees as possible would be settled.

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In that case the West Bank would probably become an autonomous province of Jordan.

- (f) Large-scale international financial contributions to subsidise resettlement under (b), (c), (d) and (e) above, and possibly to contribute to the compensation which would be principally supplied by Israel, but which would need to be on a generous scale and might therefore be beyond Israel's capacity.
- (g) The establishment of a new international office possibly under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ascertain the wishes of the refugees, and to assist with putting the various schemes into effect.

9. On the assumption that any of these suggestions were politically acceptable to the parties concerned, the Israelis would have to be prepared to pay large sums in compensation and final agreement could easily break down on over-ambitious Arab demands. The best estimate of the value of Arab property left in Israel in 1948 was made by the Palestine Conciliation Commission in 1966. This put the value of Arab property at about \$500 million at 1947 values. Allowing for inflation, present day values might be about \$1,000 million, or even \$1,500 million if interest were taken into account. Such a sum could presumably be found, if not by Israel alone, by international (mainly American) contributions. It would not however be found without a struggle and the final figure might well be less, particularly since Israel might make counter-claims for Jewish property taken over in Arab countries.

/10

10. In theory a Referendum would be the fairest way to ascertain the wishes of the individual refugees. But in practice this is unlikely to work. In the first place, the Arab Governments would almost certainly, as hitherto, try to influence the decision of the refugees for political reasons which had little or no relation to their real desires and needs. Secondly, it would probably be difficult to be specific about the alternatives open to the refugees, since in advance of the results of the Referendum it might not be possible to state with any certainty the amount of compensation payable in individual cases.

11. Similar difficulties would attend attempts to settle the refugees outside the Middle East, or even in their present host countries. The former solution would in the first place run counter to their previous demands and to the spirit of the United Nations resolutions. It is, moreover, uncertain whether Canada and Australia, for example, would have the will or capacity to cope with large scale immigration of Palestinians. It would also seem almost impossible to overcome politically the insistence of the Arab Governments that the refugees should be given the right to return to their homes in Palestine, which has been the corner stone of Arab policy for the last twenty years.

12. In fact no solution is likely to be acceptable either to the refugees themselves or to the Arab Governments which did not contain:-

- (a) the right of the refugees to return to their homes; and
- (b) the right of compensation.

Undoubtedly, if the right of the refugees to return home were conceded by the Israelis, the Arab Governments would press for the

refugees returning home to have restored to them or to be compensated for, the properties they had left behind in 1948. This would be both impracticable and unacceptable to the Israelis. But it might afford a point of departure in a negotiation, as a result of which something on the following lines might emerge:-

- (a) The refugees would be given the right to return to their homes under Israeli rule, in which case they would receive a small grant from the Israeli Government to settle them, but would not necessarily get their former properties back or only a part of them.
- (b) Those who did not opt to return to Israel would be given the following options:-
 - (i) settlement on the West Bank of the Jordan (probably demilitarised and under Jordanian rule), with a grant and the promise of massive international aid in the development of the West Bank, which would have difficulty in absorbing them;
 - (ii) "permanent resettlement in present host countries, or in other Arab countries, with again, a grant, perhaps larger for the individuals and an annual payment from international sources to the host government over a period of, say, five years to cover the absorption of these refugees into its economy;
 - (iii) settlement outside the Middle East altogether, with a much larger individual grant and perhaps the assisted passage to any country willing to /accept

accept the refugee in question, which would then resettle him and his family in accordance with its usual resettlement programme (i.e. without an international financial contribution).

13. Clearly, from the point of view of Israel, the last of these solutions (i.e. (b)(iii)) would be the most advantageous, since it would remove the refugees from the Middle East and they would therefore cease to be an Arab political pawn in the Arab/Israel conflict. It is, on the face of it, unlikely that many of the refugees would wish to return to Israel, unless the compensation were generous. It is most likely that the majority would wish to stay in the Muslim Middle East and it would take a very strong financial inducement to make them leave the area. In fact, by adjustment of the grants to be made in relation to any of the options outlined above, it should be possible to weight the choice before the individual refugee. This could be arranged by negotiation between the contributors of the funds, Israel and the Arab countries under United Nations auspices.

14. The difficulties in bringing about a solution on these lines should not be under-estimated. Israeli acceptance would depend on only a few refugees wishing to return. If the vast majority are to agree not to return, the compensation offered will need to be very high and will raise the difficult question of availability of funds. The Arabs' estimate of the cost of resettlement in Arab States (in addition to individual compensation) is likely to be very high indeed.

15. In the short term there is no alternative to UNRWA for the care of the refugees, but it is the object of this exercise that it

/should

should be allowed to disappear. Indeed, its disappearance at an early stage of any internationally agreed scheme to resettle the refugees would be advisable, since, by the nature of its work and, particularly, as a result of the policies of the "host" Arab countries, UNRWA has concentrated more on relief than on resettlement. It would therefore be advisable to hand over the arrangements for resettlement to some other body. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (at present Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan), which has a much more positive attitude to resettlement, would be the obvious body to resettle refugees who opt to leave the Middle East and start again elsewhere. It would be for consideration whether this same organisation would be the channel through which the United Nations would communicate with and finance "host" governments in the Arab world during the period of absorption of the refugees.

16. Probably the greatest difficulty in connexion with the resettlement of refugees would be the Gaza Strip and its 300,000 refugees. They could certainly be fitted into the above scheme, but much might depend on the future political settlement of this area. In any case, it could not absorb economically the refugees at present there.

17. It is difficult to see what pro-Arab policies Her Majesty's Government could follow with regard to longer term solutions of the refugee problem, as opposed to gestures of immediate relief. Until now the Arabs have stood on the letter of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), but because of outright Israeli opposition to this line we have never supported it. Even

/mild

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- 11 -

mild references to a wish for constructive developments in the refugee problem are likely to be taken by the Arabs as an attempt to liquidate the problem. As a result, there do not seem to be any initiatives which we could take without offending the Arabs. The best course seems to be to clear our own minds (perhaps in consultation with the United States and other allies) about likely practical solutions against the time when a general settlement is possible, and in the meantime confine ourselves to general expressions of hope that the tragic plight of the refugees can be remedied. This would not, of course, stop us continuing our present line of pressing the Israelis to allow the return to the West Bank of the new refugees.

18. A suggestion for financing a resettlement scheme is given at Annex.

10 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Finance

In 1966, UNRWA spent some \$37 million on the refugees, of which the United States contributed \$23 million and the United Kingdom \$5 million.

2. There is no breakdown of this sum into expenditure in each of the host countries. However, from a breakdown based purely on refugee population we arrive at the following approximate figures:

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of refugees</u>	<u>Expenditure from UNRWA sources</u>
Jordan	700,000	\$20 million
Gaza	300,000	\$8 million
Lebanon	160,000	\$5 million
Syria	140,000	\$4 million

3. If the refugees are taken into the host countries and UNRWA disbanded, the international community might have to make a one time grant to each refugee family. Thereafter the host countries would need international financial aid to tide them over the initial period. The refugees would have received compensation to enable them to make a start which should obviate the need in most cases for purely relief expenditure. What would be required would be funds available to set up schemes which would provide continuing employment for the refugees.

4. If the international community were to agree to pay into the host governments' budgets for, say, five (possibly up to ten) years the \$37 million which UNRWA collected, this might provide a balance sufficient for the governments to ensure the /refugees'

refugees' economic future, because:

- (a) a certain number of refugees would have opted to live in Israel;
- (b) UNRWA has hitherto supported large numbers of refugees who did not need support, because the Agency has been unable to rectify the ration rolls;
- (c) the expenditure on UNRWA's expatriate staff and headquarters machinery would no longer be required;
- (d) many of the services, e.g. health and education, which took a large proportion of UNRWA's expenditure, are available in some degree to citizens of the host countries; and
- (e) as time goes by, assuming that the governments are spending the money wisely and conscientiously trying to absorb the refugees, an increasing number should become established members of the community and cease to require financial help from the host government.

5. We might, therefore, start out by considering payments in the region of \$37 million a year, though it may in the event be necessary to pay higher sums in the first few years and gradually reduce the payments towards the end of the period stipulated.

6. Any suggestion that the country in greatest need because of economic difficulties, i.e. Jordan, should be paid more per capita than the others would not be acceptable to the other governments.

had ended, the refugee problem should in our view, come second in priority after the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. We believe that the Israelis, the Russians and probably the Americans would accept this. ^{see amendments} In advance of such a general settlement, however, we should be prepared to support and, if necessary, participate in constructive discussions for the solution of the refugee problem. On the hypothesis that a general settlement would include on Israel's part withdrawal from most of the recently occupied territories and on the Arabs' part a formal end of belligerency and a recognition of Israel's right to exist, we should look at the following possibilities, either individually or in combination, as providing a possible solution of the refugee problem:-

- (a) Arab agreement that the refugees should be settled outside the Middle East, e.g. Canada, Kenya or Australia, with compensation;
- (b) Agreement that they should be integrated fully in the host countries (see also (d) below);
- (c) Israeli agreement to take a certain number for settlement in Israel, the remainder to be compensated and integrated in the host countries;
- (d) The maintenance of the West Bank as an autonomous demilitarized province of the Jordanian Kingdom, in which refugees would be invited to make their homes and which would receive large-scale economic aid and possibly an exit to the sea by Israel. Those refugees not wishing to go to the West Bank could be compensated and either integrated in their host countries or be settled elsewhere. (There are possible variations of this suggestion, e.g.

the creation of an independent Palestine State in treaty relations with Israel and Jordan or the creation of an autonomous Arab area under Israeli sovereignty. From our point of view, there are objections to both these variations in as much as it is our settled policy to support the existence of Jordan and, to this end, the return to Jordan of the West Bank.);

- (e) Any of the foregoing suggestions, either individually or in combination, being made subject to a Referendum to be conducted to determine the wishes of the refugees. J

9. On the assumption that any of these suggestions were politically acceptable to the parties concerned, the Israelis would have to be prepared to pay large sums in compensation and final agreement could easily break down on over-ambitious Arab demands. The best estimate of the value of Arab property left in Israel in 1948 was made by the Palestine Conciliation Commission in 1966. This put the value of Arab property at about \$500 million at 1947 values. Allowing for inflation, present day values might be about \$1,000 million, or even \$1,500 million if interest were taken into account. Such a sum could presumably be found, if not by Israel alone, by international (mainly American) contributions. It would not however be found without a struggle and the final figure might well be less, particularly since Israel might make counter-claims for Jewish property taken over in Arab countries.

10. In theory a Referendum would be the fairest way to ascertain the wishes of the individual refugees. But in practice this is

/unlikely

unlikely to work. In the first place, the Arab Governments would almost certainly, as hitherto, try to influence the decision of the refugees for political reasons which had little or no relation to their real desires and needs. Secondly, it would probably be difficult to be specific about the alternatives open to the refugees, since in advance of the results of the Referendum it might not be possible to state with any certainty the amount of compensation payable in individual cases.

10. Similar difficulties would attend attempts to settle the refugees outside the Middle East, or even in their present host countries. The former solution would in the first place run counter to their previous demands and to the spirit of the U.N. resolutions. It is, moreover, uncertain whether Canada and Australia, for example, would have the will or capacity to cope with large scale immigration of Palestinians. It would also seem almost impossible to overcome politically the insistence of the Arab Governments that the refugees should be given the right to return to their homes in Palestine, which has been the corner stone of Arab policy for the last twenty years.

11. In fact no solution is likely to be acceptable either to the refugees themselves or to the Arab Governments which did not contain:-

- (a) the right of the refugees to return to their homes; and
- (b) the right of compensation.

Undoubtedly, if the right of the refugees to return home were conceded by the Israelis, the Arab Governments would press for the refugees returning home to have restored to them or to be

/compensated

compensated for, the properties they had left behind in 1948. This would be both impracticable and unacceptable to the Israelis. But it might afford a point of departure in a negotiation, as a result of which something on the following lines might emerge:-

- (a) The refugees would be given the right to return to their homes under Israeli rule, in which case they would receive a small grant from the Israeli Government to settle them, but would not necessarily get their former properties back or only a part of them.
- (b) Those who did not opt to return to Israel would be given the following options:-

- (i) settlement on the West Bank of the Jordan (probably demilitarized and under Jordanian rule), with a ~~small~~ grant and the promise of massive international aid in the development of the West Bank, which would have difficulty in absorbing them;

for amendment (ii) ~~permanent re-settlement in present host countries~~ with, again, a grant, perhaps larger for the individuals and an annual payment from international sources to the host government over a period of, say, five years to cover the absorption of these refugees into its economy;

- (iii) settlement outside the Middle East altogether, with a much larger individual grant and perhaps the assisted passage to any country willing to accept the refugee in question, which would then

/resettle

resettle him and his family in accordance with its usual re-settlement programme (i.e. without an international financial contribution).

12. Clearly, from the point of view of Israel, the last of these solutions (i.e. (b)(iii)) would be the most advantageous, since it would remove the refugees from the Middle East and they would therefore cease to be an Arab political pawn in the Arab/Israel conflict. It is, on the face of it, unlikely that many of the refugees would wish to return to Israel, unless the compensation were generous. It is most likely that the majority would wish to stay in the Muslim Middle East and it would take a very strong financial inducement to make them leave the area. In fact, by adjustment of the grants to be made in relation to any of the options outlined above, it should be possible to weight the choice before the individual refugee. This could be arranged by negotiation between the contributors of the funds, Israel and the Arab countries under U.N. auspices.

13. The difficulties in bringing about a solution on these lines should not be under-estimated. Israeli acceptance would depend on only a few refugees wishing to return. If the vast majority are to agree not to return, the compensation offered will need to be very high and will raise the difficult question of availability of funds. The Arabs' estimate of the cost of re-settlement in Arab States (in addition to individual compensation) is likely to be very high indeed.

14. In the short term there is no alternative to UNRWA for the care of the refugees, but it is the object of this exercise that

/it should

it should be allowed to disappear. Indeed, its disappearance at an early stage of any internationally agreed scheme to resettle the refugees would be advisable, since, by the nature of its work and, particularly, as a result of the policies of the "host" Arab countries, UNRWA has concentrated more on relief than on re-settlement. It would therefore be advisable to hand over the arrangements for re-settlement to some other body.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (at present Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan), which has a much more positive attitude to re-settlement, would be the obvious body to resettle refugees who opt to leave the Middle East and start again elsewhere. It would be for consideration whether this same organization would be the channel through which the United Nations would communicate ^{with} and finance "host" governments in the Arab world during the period of absorption of the refugees.

15. Probably the greatest difficulty in connexion with the re-settlement of refugees would be the Gaza Strip and its 300,000 refugees. They could certainly be fitted into the above scheme, but much might depend on the future political settlement of this area. In any case, it could not absorb economically the refugees at present there.

16. It is difficult to see what pro-Arab policies Her Majesty's Government could follow with regard to longer term solutions of the refugee problem, as opposed to gestures of immediate relief. Until now the Arabs have stood on the letter of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii), but because of outright Israeli opposition to this line we have never supported it.

/Even mild

Even mild references to a wish for constructive developments in the refugee problem are likely to be taken by the Arabs as an attempt to liquidate the problem. As a result, there do not seem to be any initiatives which we could take without offending the Arabs. The best course seems to be to clear our own minds (perhaps in consultation with the United States and other allies) about likely practical solutions against the time when a general settlement is possible, and in the meantime confine ourselves to general expressions of hope that the tragic plight of the refugees can be remedied. This would not, of course, stop us continuing our present line of pressing the Israelis to allow the return to the West Bank of the new refugees.

17. A suggestion for financing a re-settlement scheme is given ... at Annex.

13 September, 1967

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Ed. (3746)

Registry
No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

To:—

Type 1 +

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PALESTINE REFUGEES

Redraft of paragraph 7, third sentence seq.
.....In advance of such a general settlement
however we should be prepared to support, and in
certain circumstances to participate in,
constructive international discussions for the
solution of the refugee problem.

8. On the hypothesis that a general settlement
would include on Israel's part withdrawal from
most of the recently occupied territories and on
the Arabs' part a formal end of belligerency and
a recognition of Israel's right to exist in
peace and security, a consequent solution of the
refugee problem could be based on a combination
of some of the following possibilities:

- (a) Israeli agreement to take a number
for resettlement in Israel, and to
provide compensation for the remainder.
- (b) Arab agreement that as large numbers
as possible should be interpreted^{gnated} in
the host countries.
- (c) Arab agreement that a proportion
should be settled in other Arab
countries notably Iraq and Syria.

/((d)

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- (d) Arab agreement that encouragement should be given to refugees to settle outside the Middle East, e.g., Canada ~~/Kenya - N.B.1/~~, Australia and Latin America. A special appeal would be made to the countries concerned to accept Arab immigrants.
- (e) ~~N.B.2.~~ Intensive development of the West Bank as a province in which as many refugees as possible would be settled. In that case the West Bank would probably become an autonomous province of Jordan.
- (f) Large-scale international financial contributions to subsidize resettlement under (b), (c), (d) and (e) above, and possibly to contribute to the compensation which would be principally supplied by Israel, but which would need to be on a generous scale and might therefore be beyond Israel's capacity.
- (g) The establishment of a new international office possibly under the *United Nations* High Commissioner for Refugees to ascertain the wishes of the refugees, and to assist with putting the various schemes into effect.

/Continue with old paragraph 8/

~~N.B.1: I am doubtful about the wisdom of injecting a new Arab element into an African country which already has an Indian problem.~~

~~N.B.2: I am not very attracted by this possibility which I think is rather unrealistic. I would however not see objection to including it in this form.~~

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(ii)


Amend the present paragraph 11(b) to read:

(ii) "permanent resettlement in
present host countries, or in
other Arab countries, with,
again, a ~~great~~....."

grant

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RECEIVED
ARCHIVES No. 1
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BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

29 September, 1967.

1825

Dear John,

E218/12

ARAB REFUGEES.

I have now received the fuller account of the State Department's thoughts about refugees promised in my letter to you 1825 of 27 September.

2. The State Department appear to be thinking in terms of setting up a new and very informal grouping drawn from countries at present contributing to UNRWA for the purpose of collecting and disbursing funds for refugees. It is not their intention that UNRWA should for the present be either supplanted or its functions reduced; but that while UNRWA goes on with its work of relief this new grouping, which they hope would not be beset by the same political difficulties as UNRWA and over which the donors would have more control, should make a start on the permanent resettlement of refugees probably mostly in countries outside the Arab world. The State Department hope (perhaps over-optimistically) that the United States might be willing to amend their immigration rules to some degree to allow Arab refugees to come in and hope that other (and particularly Commonwealth) countries might be persuaded to do the same. They thought that the Intergovernmental Committee on European Immigration at Geneva could also have a role to play. The grouping might also back projects for training and education of refugees with a view to facilitating their permanent resettlement.

3. They thought it would be essential for the success of the scheme to obtain the agreement of the Israelis to accept at least some Arabs who wished to be repatriated within Israel. The offer might perhaps be extended to Palestinians already in Israeli-held areas who would probably be more acceptable (because they could be more carefully screened) to the Israelis than others. Over the years they hoped that UNRWA's role might diminish, while that of the new grouping devoted largely to resettlement of refugees might grow. However the future of UNRWA was at present such a delicate political issue that they did not wish to do anything about refugees at this stage which might make political progress at the United Nations more difficult.

/ 4. As

J.C. Moberly, Esq.
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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Mr Moberly
Mr Begganish MB 4/X am 1
M. Davis 4.10 S.x.
Enter on 4.10
Sir R. Begganish should see

M. Tammell
Join the other pp.
9



- 2 -

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4. As you can see, these ideas are still rather vague and bristle with difficulties. They have not so far been peddled much outside the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department and have not been cleared on the seventh floor; nor have they been discussed with other U.S. government departments such as the Treasury and Immigration. Nor do the State Department appear yet to have any clear idea when it would be appropriate to launch a new initiative on the above lines. They are, however, most anxious that even the fact that they have a new plan for refugees in mind should not become known for the time being. They foresee that it will be necessary to talk to the Israelis and the Jordanians fairly soon after they have taken soundings among members of Congress if only because the Israelis at least will hear about what is afoot almost immediately. One of the State Department's main motives in launching a scheme of this kind is that they hope Congress will be more willing to continue voting money for UNRWA if some attempt is also being made to terminate the refugee problem.

5. Atherton, the Country Director for Arab-Israel affairs, ended by asking how far our own thinking had progressed about refugees and whether we had any similar project in mind.]

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Egerton of United Kingdom Mission at New York, the Chanceries at Amman, Beirut, Geneva and Tel Aviv (together with a copy of my letter of 27 September to the last two posts), and the Consulate-General at Jerusalem.

*Yours ever,
Alan*

(A.B. Urwick).

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Mr Moberly
Mr. B. 29. ix
h. a. 2/10
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CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
27 September, 1967.

219

1825

Dear John,

Arab Refugees.

EJ 18/7
19 attached.

In his letter to you of 22 September Stephen Egerton mentioned a package plan for refugees which had been prepared in the State Department.

N/E
4/10

2. The State Department have been giving a lot of thought to the refugee problem, as they have to Jerusalem (my letter 104842G to you of 21 September refers) and other aspects of a Middle East settlement; one of President Johnson's Five Points was of course justice for the refugees. A paper has been drawn up on the refugee problem within the Bureau of Near East Affairs, but it has not yet been cleared higher up in State Department. I understand that it incorporates a number of the Policy Planning Council's ideas and that repatriation, as well as resettlement and rehabilitation, is included in the list of proposals. The Bureau were not thinking of launching it as a comprehensive plan with any kind of fanfare, but rather to present it sometime later in the year in a low key and not in the General Assembly. They would in any case prefer to get through the UNRWA debate, quietly if possible, first before taking any new initiative over refugees.

3. Roy Atherton, the Country Director for Arab/Israel Affairs, has undertaken to brief me rather more fully on State Department thinking on refugees shortly; he explained that he had previously been a little hesitant to do so while American thinking had not yet crystallised.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Egerton in United Kingdom Mission at New York, the Chanceries at Amman and Beirut, and the Consulate-General, Jerusalem.

Yours ever,
Alan Urwick

(A.B. Urwick).

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Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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